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Executive Summary
More than two decades ago, EU Member States began developing a common framework to ensure their 
decision-making on military exports took into account political and moral concerns that were being raised 
in their constituencies. The Code of Conduct for European Union countries’ exports of military technology 
and equipment, which was put into place in 1998, represented a major milestone in that process. A decade 
later, the EU Code was cast in concrete when it was transformed into a legally-binding Common Position. 
While the system is a distinct improvement on what went before, and the level of control exercised in 
the EU is in many ways setting the global lead, the EU system is still far from perfect. In some cases this 
would appear to be because licensing authorities are not applying the rules with sufficient rigour; in others 
because the rules themselves are inadequate to the task. This report seeks to analyse cases where poor arms 
transfer decisions still appear to be taking place, to identify patterns of poor decision-making where they 
exist, to consider why such patterns exist and to suggest remedies. 
One of the patterns that revealed itself through this analysis was that military equipment sales of a cer-
tain magnitude create economic (or other) pressures to export such that the restrictive criteria of the EU 
Code/Common Position can be overridden. Such an outcome is explicitly forbidden in the relevant EU in-
struments. The report highlights, for example, major sales of naval equipment to Israel, Morocco, Russia and 
Venezuela that were approved or supported by Member State governments when there were good reasons 
under the EU criteria to refuse the deals. This practice is seen to generate inconsistencies in EU attitudes, 
whereby exceptional and large deals appeared to have been pushed through while permission to export to 
those same destinations has been withheld for more smaller transfers. 
Other cases were identified where large economic interests did not appear to be at stake, but rather 
where difficult deliberations were made between selling military equipment to states – such as Chad and 
Mali – with issues regarding development, human rights and (sub-) regional stability to the fore. Various fac-
tors would seem to come into play here, e.g. colonial legacies, perceptions that the equipment concerned 
might help to create the conditions for the end of hostilities and improve prospects for long term develop-
ment, belief that opponents to the intended recipient are such that supplying military equipment for use 
against them is justified. Supplies to Sri Lanka are also interesting in this context, as the scale of those trans-
fers was not large enough for them to be defended on economic grounds. 
In all of these instances, decision-makers appear to have forgotten that EU States are obliged to base de-
cisions on the conduct of the recipient and against the risk that certain negative consequences may ensue, 
as set out in the EU Code/Common Position criteria, a principle to which licensing authorities are recom-
mended to return in all cases. 
The report also identifies an apparent significant disparity regarding the way Member States assess and 
respond to the risk of diversion of exported arms. Some seem to take this very seriously, others less so. The 
report presents in detail the case of many small arms of EU origin eventually finding their way to all sides 
in the Colombian conflict, despite never having been officially transferred to Colombia. These repeated 
instances of diversion occurred notwithstanding the fact that Member States had some familiarity with the 
situation and that some were refusing to license transfers of small arms into Latin America on a regular basis. 
A number of suggestions of how to reduce the risk of repeating a Colombian-type situation are included in 
the report, primarily involving better gathering, sharing and processing of relevant information. 
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One case study in this report, which investigates EU Member State involvement in the probable supply of 
Ukrainian tanks to South Sudan, highlights the legal void in which European transport companies involved 
in this transaction were able to operate. 
There is also an examination of the way in which the EU arms transfer control system is not set up to 
respond to circumstances where arms sales are secured by corrupt practices. A number of cases are pre-
sented, for example the multi-billion-Euro South African procurement from EU Member States of military 
equipment in the late 1990s, which might have had a different outcome had the EU Code/Common Position 
included an “anti-corruption” criterion. Related to this is an analysis of the ways in which governments are 
institutionally structured to promote arms exports, which again tends to militate against rigorous imple-
mentation of the criteria, and proposals for limiting this pro-export bias. 
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Introduction
More than two decades ago, EU Member States 
began developing a common framework to ensure 
their decision-making on military exports took into 
account political and moral concerns that were 
being raised in their constituencies. The EU Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports, agreed in 1998, repre-
sented a major milestone in that process. A decade 
later, the politically-binding EU Code was cast in 
concrete when it was transformed into a legally-
binding Common Position defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology 
and equipment. 
The EU Code/Common Position sets out eight 
criteria against which Member States are to assess 
applications to transfer arms; it establishes the list of 
equipment for which transfer licences are required; 
it establishes a mechanism whereby all Member 
States are to be advised of any licence denials and 
consulted in the event that another Member State is 
considering a licence application for an “essentially 
identical transaction”; and requires that Member 
States report on their exports of military techno-
logy and equipment. 
While the system is a distinct improvement on 
what went before, and the level of control exercised 
in the EU is in many ways setting the global lead, the 
EU system is still far from perfect.
It is the contention of this report that weak-
nesses remain in two respects. First, it seems that 
in a number of cases EU States do not always follow 
the agreed rules with enough rigour. Second, there 
are cases that point to the agreed rules themselves 
being inadequate and in need of improvement or 
tightening. 
An in depth analysis of the EU transfer control 
system and its implementation soon suggests that 
the reason for this is a tension between on the one 
hand the need and obligation to exercise restraint 
and on the other certain pressures to approve and 
even promote arms transfers, including where these 
appear problematic under the Common Position. 
In particular, we note certain underlying factors 
that encourage excessively permissive licensing 
practices, such as:
!"the development of bureaucratic structures for 
the purpose of promoting exports;
!"an idea generally accepted by politicians that 
arms sales promotion is one of their functions;
!"disparities in access to governments, whereby 
business is privileged over other actors;
!"an (outdated) mercantilist interpretation of de-
fence economics which is unreasonably sym-
pathetic to the notion that defence exports are 
irreplaceable in macroeconomic terms;
!"a widely-held belief that ethical concerns (as 
represented by the Common Position criteria) 
can be trumped when political, geo-strategic 
and/or economic interests are aligned against 
them. 
This edited volume is a collective work, which 
draws together public-source data and materials 
that have been at least in part published previously 
and for different purposes by scholars, journalists 
and advocacy organisations from many different 
countries in Europe and elsewhere. The report de-
velops its analysis from a pan-EU perspective, and 
attempts to give a sense of how the different Mem-
ber States are using the system and whether and to 
what extent arms transfers from the EU correspond 
with the outcomes the control system was designed 
to generate.
This report is the first in what we hope will de-
velop into a series that analyses EU arms transfer 
practices. The analysis extends into probing the 
mechanisms behind Member States’ decision-mak-
ing on arms exports. The case studies herein are 
compiled from the available pool of publicly avail-
able material, including the information in national 
reports and the EU Consolidated Report. These are 
organised in several sections, each of which sheds 
light on a different aspect of the EU arms transfer 
system. The case-studies format is used as a means 
to explore determinants of Member States’ arms 
transfer authorities’ policies and practice, and the 
extent to which these comply with the relevant EU 
regulative instruments. 
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Obviously, this is not an exhaustive inventory of 
all the transfer practices that are a cause of interest, 
nor are the available open sources that informed the 
case studies taken as covering all European transfer 
practices worth reporting. Notably, the newer EU 
Member States are the ones least documented, as 
there tends to be less public data on which to base 
analysis. Cases were chosen on the basis that they 
appeared representative or emblematic, and were 
ongoing, recent, or only recently came to light. 
The chapters that we built on these cases are 
all geared at addressing issues that interrelate, so 
inevitably, the chapters touch upon these various 
elements.
Any system which regulates (rather than pro-
hibits) arms transfers will involve decisions at the 
margins which will be open to question. The analy-
sis in this report, however, suggests that Member 
States are in some cases experiencing more funda-
mental problems in applying the rules they have 
agreed to follow. In addition the report identifies 
problematic cases even where arms transfer licens-
ing rules have been followed, which suggests that 
the rules are not always good enough. The report 
then seeks to identify the main problem areas in ex-
isting EU arms transfer control policy and practice, 
to help improve compliance with the relevant in-
struments, and to suggest possible remedies where 
the system is not achieving its designated goals. 
Optimal compliance with an improved Europe-
an regulatory framework on arms trade, in its turn, 
should contribute rather than hamper conflict pre-
vention, conflict-resolution and peace-building in 
the wider world. 
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Glossary
COARM
Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, 
where the 27 EU Member States’ representatives 
convene at level of the EU Council.
EU Code
European Union, the Council, Code of Conduct on 
arms exports, as adopted on 5 June 1998. 8675/2/98, 
REV 2, DG E - PESC IV. 
Common Position 
European Union, the Council, Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining com-
mon rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment, as published in Official 
Journal of the European Union on 13 December 2008 
as L 335/99. The Common Position criteria are cop-
ied in the annex with this report.
Consolidated Report
From 1999 onwards, and in accordance to operative 
provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on arms ex-
ports, the EU Council began publishing annual re-
ports on Member States’ compliance with that code 
of conduct. Each of these reports is published in the 
OJ. Digital copies are available from the Council’s 
website www.consilium.europa.eu
Military List
The most recent version of the Common Military 
List of the European Union was adopted by the 
Council on 15 February 2010,was published in the 
OJ on 18 March 2010, C69/19-51 and can be found 
on www.consilium.europa.eu The List describes 22 
categories of equipment covered by the Council 
Common Position. These categories are referred to 
as ML1, ML2, and so on. 
SALW
The acronym SALW, for small arms and light weap-
ons, refers to any man-portable lethal weapon that 
expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or 
may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, 
bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. 
Small arms are weapons designed for individual 
use. They include small calibre firearms, such as re-
volvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, 
sub-machine guns, assault rifles and man-portable 
machine guns. The EU Common Position and Mili-
tary List system categorizes these small arms as 
ML1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less 
than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons 
with a calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less 
and accessories, and specially designed compo-
nents therefor. 
Light weapons are weapons designed for use by 
two or three persons serving as a crew, although 
some may be carried and used by a single per-
son. These are described under ML2: Smooth-bore 
weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other 
weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 
12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches), projectors and acces-
sories, and specially designed components there-
for. They include medium machine guns, heavy ma-
chine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted 
grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, 
portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable 
launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, 
portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, 
and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres.
Terrorism List
The concept of a EU-Terrorism List proceeds from 
Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The list is 
reviewed bi-annually. 25 individuals and 29 groups 
and entities are designated as terrorists by force of 
Council Decision 2009/1004/CFSP of 22 December 
2009, OJ of 23.12.2009 L346/58-60. 
User’s Guide
The User’s Guide to Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP defines common rules governing 
the control of exports of military technology and 
equipment. This Guide can be retrieved from www.
consilium.europa.eu.
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The EU selling arms
How export promotion takes 
precedence over controls
It is over a decade since, in June 1998, the Eu-
ropean Union agreed its Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports with provisions relating to conflict, human 
rights and development. Although not in the EU, 
Norway has adopted similar measures and joins 
the other countries at meetings about them. Since 
December 2008 it has been a legally binding com-
mon position. EU countries have their own export 
licensing departments to implement this, employ-
ing, between them, what must be several hundred 
people. Yet, despite this, military equipment made 
in the EU is still being licensed for export into areas 
of conflict, to repressive regimes and to countries 
where many go without education or health care 
- not what many of those who worked for the EU 
Code envisaged. 
Why is it that rivals India and Pakistan are still 
both being armed from Europe? That EU-supplied 
parts assisted the Israeli war effort in Gaza? That 
endorsement, via arms sales, is given to the Saudi 
Arabian royal family with its history of repression of 
women, people of differing sexual orientation and 
migrant workers? That South Africa has been bur-
dened with paying for European fighter jets and 
submarines when it needs those resources to ad-
dress its many social problems, including HIV/AIDS?
A root of the problem is that a significant prior-
ity for many EU governments is to promote the sale 
of arms. In several countries, in Europe and beyond, 
military corporations have built a close relation-
ship with governments. Retired politicians and of-
ficials are members of company’s boards and joint 
Government/industry committees are frequently 
established. This tends to put additional pressure 
to support industry first, rather than the interests 
of the people affected by the deals. It seems that 
US President Eisenhower’s farewell speech in 1961 is 
more pertinent than ever and must be heeded: “In 
the councils of government, we must guard against 
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial com-
plex. The potential for the disastrous rise of mis-
placed power exists and will persist.”
The case of Libya illustrates the point. Military 
companies had difficulties supplying that country 
since an EU embargo was in the way, that had been 
instituted in 1986 on the grounds of the Libyan re-
gime’s links with terrorism. After the embargo was 
lifted in October 2004, oil rich Libya was immedi-
ately seen as a major marketing opportunity. For 
instance, the Defence Manufacturers Association (a 
UK trade association which has since merged with 
others) described Libya in July 2005 as “a relatively 
sophisticated customer with a political will to pro-
cure equipment”.1 In May 2007, UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair lent his support, signing an Accord on 
Defence Cooperation and Defence Industrial Part-
nership on a visit there.2 One such partnership has 
been a £85 million (almost €100 million) contract for 
General Dynamics UK Ltd to supply a tactical com-
munications and data system to the Elite Brigade of 
the Libyan Armed Forces.3 
Libya’s President Gadafy was welcomed as an 
honoured guest by his French counterpart Nicolas 
Sarkozy in December 2007, a visit where an outline 
agreement to buy fighter jets, military helicopters 
and armoured vehicles was signed.4 By July 2009, 
following a warm welcome for President Gadafy in 
Italy the previous month, there were reports that 
Libya was considering buying a 2 per cent stake in 
the Italian-based arms manufacturer Finmeccanica. 
Libya had gone from being an embargoed state to 
a valued customer in a very short time - despite its 
continuing poor record on human rights.5 
1 Thomas A (Assistant Director, Public Affairs, DESO), ‘Semi-
nar on Emerging Markets: Libya & Iraq’, DMA News, July 
2005.
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, Joint Commu-
niqué, 29 May 2007.
3 ‘Defence Export success in Libya’, DMA News, July 2008.
4 Tran P, ‘Libya, France Agree to Fighter Talks’, DefenseNews, 
17 December 2007.
5 Kington T, ‘Italy’s Finmeccanica Benefis From Nation’s 
Closer Libyan ties’, DefenseNews, 13 July 2009.
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Government support for military companies 
The image of a particular leader of state, promot-
ing only military exports from companies based in 
his or her country, is no longer entirely accurate. The 
exports that are being promoted may bring com-
mercial benefit to companies that are tied to more 
than one country. EADS is headquartered in the 
Netherlands, but is predominately a Franco-Ger-
man company. Yeovil, a small country town in the 
UK, is heavily dependent on helicopter production, 
but the manufacturer, AgustaWestland is owned 
by Italian-based Finmeccanica. BAE Systems down-
plays its British origins, unless it is trying to win a UK 
deal, and employs more people in the United States 
than the UK. It has other “home markets” in Saudi 
Arabia, India, Sweden, South Africa and Australia. 
Likewise companies based in countries beyond 
the EU have factories within it. The production of 
components complicates the picture further. Today, 
very few pieces of military equipment could be said 
to be the entirely the product of one country.
Military equipment manufacture itself is being 
exported as contracts often include the establish-
ment of a production line in the purchasing coun-
try. Of the 72 Eurofighters sold by BAE to Saudi Ara-
bia under a 2007 agreement, 48 are being assem-
bled there. Similarly, a £700 million (€800 million) 
BAE deal with India signed in July 2010 will see 57 
Hawk aircraft manufactured under licence there by 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The logical 
extension of this is that HAL will produce Hawks for 
the global market. This involves a transfer of exper-
tise and technology that will then support Indian 
indigenous production and ultimately Indian arms 
exports, which in turn raises prospect of further 
proliferation and extra competition.
Leaders selling 
As shown in the Libya example, the arms pro-
motion effort is assisted from the very top. Prime 
Ministers and Presidents often lend their support. 
The start of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
three-day visit to France in March 2010 was marked 
by Nicolas Sarkozy announcing that he had en-
tered into “exclusive negotiations” over the sale of 
four warships.6 Two decades after the end of the 
Cold War, instead of a continuing peace dividend, 
it seems that the former enemy is merely another 
lucrative market for military equipment.
Tony Blair, when UK Prime Minister, was an en-
thusiastic supporter of arms deals. In 2006, this ex-
tended to his Government stopping a corruption in-
vestigation into BAE Systems’ arms deals with Saudi 
Arabia. Although this was said to be for national 
security reasons, a deal for Eurofighter Typhoons 
was being negotiated and was at risk. 7 This military 
contract appeared more important than the effort 
to end corruption.
The smaller European countries also get assis-
tance from their governments. In early 2010 the 
State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of De-
fence met Chile’s Defence minister Francisco Vidal. 
The main topic being discussed in this meeting was 
to promote Norwegian company Kongsberg Grup-
pen ASA, which was competing to supply Chile with 
a huge air defence system.8
Arms export promotion agencies
Some EU countries have special organisations 
devoted to arms export promotion. In the UK, for 
example, a Labour government set up the Defence 
Sales Organisation as long ago as 1966. Denis Healey, 
the Secretary of State for Defence at the time, said 
that “while the Government attach[es] the highest 
importance to making progress in the field of arms 
control and disarmament, we must also take what 
practical steps we can to ensure that this country 
does not fail to secure its rightful share of this valu-
able commercial market”.9 The argument for ex-
porting arms then is still used today although the 
6 Hall B, ‘Paris agrees to sell warships to Russia, Financial 
Times, 2 March 2010. This case is explored elsewhere in 
this report, in the section on ‘Mistral warships for Russia’.
7 Leigh D & Evans R, ‘National interest’ halts arms corrup-
tion inquiry’, The Guardian, 15 December 2006.
8 ‘Møtte Chiles forsvarsminister – diskuterte NASAMS’, Min-
istry of Defence press statement, 12 February 2010.
9 House of Commons, Hansard, 25 January 1966, Col.64.
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responsible body is now called the UK Trade & In-
vestment Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI 
DSO). It employs 160 staff.
In France, a prominent competitor of the UK 
for export of military equipment, responsibility for 
promoting such exports moved in 2007 from the 
Direction générale pour l’armement, with which 
the industry was said to be dissatisfied, to an Inter-
Ministerial Committee for Defence and Security 
Exports, headed by a civilian. As well as marketing 
the military equipment, this Committee is also in 
charge of export controls.
Other arms export bodies are much newer. Swe-
den’s, for example, has just been established. The 
Forsvarsexportmyndigheten, with forty employees, 
started work in August 2010.10 It has a budget of 38 
million Swedish crowns (about €4.5 million) for the 
first six months and is responsible for selling equip-
ment no longer needed by the Swedish armed 
forces, but it is also marketing new products such 
as Saab aircraft.
Assistance with military export promotion is 
given even in those countries where the industry is 
comparatively small. While Norway does not have 
an export agency as such, a post, the Defence In-
dustrial Counsellor, at the Norwegian embassy in 
Washington, has been set up to support Norwegian 
arms exporting industry activities in the American 
defence market. This arrangement has been ongo-
ing since at least 2008, and it is being directly paid 
for by eight Norwegian arms exporting companies.11
10 An English language website of the Swedish Defence and 
Security Export Agency can be accessed through <www.
fxm.se>. It was discussed as ‘New Defence Authority to 
promote arms exports’ in Fria Tidningen, 21 October 2010.
11 Johnsen A B, ‘Norsk våpenindustri sponser UD’, VG Nett, 09 
February 2010. 
Export credit support and other subsidies 
In some EU states the Export Credit Agencies 
(ECA) are government bodies, while in others they 
are private, but all underwrite exports, making sure 
the companies supplying the goods are paid and 
transferring the risk from the private sector to the 
public sector. As most ECA support is needed by 
large projects, percentages can vary greatly from 
year to year. However, a 2007 report published by 
the European Network Against Arms Trade (ENAAT) 
found that between twenty and thirty per cent of 
EU exports underwritten by ECA were military-re-
lated, supporting the sale of a wide range of equip-
ment including aircraft and naval vessels.12 
ECA support was given by the UK to enable the 
export of Hawk fighter jets to Indonesia during the 
Suharto dictatorship. Four warships, worth more 
than ten years of development aid, are being built 
for the Indonesian navy with a financial guarantee 
from the Dutch ECA, Atradius. An armaments pack-
age which cost South Africa €4.5 billion and was 
the subject of corruption allegations from the start 
was backed by ECA in France, Germany, Sweden 
and the UK despite opposition from many in South 
African civil society who questioned the spending 
priorities.13
Other subsidies enjoyed by the arms compa-
nies can include taxpayer supported research and 
development projects, the use of national armed 
forces to display products and the distortion of the 
exporting country’s own military procurement. In a 
UK example, in 2003 the RAF bought BAE Systems 
Hawk trainer aircraft without open competition, 
largely to persuade the Indian government to buy 
the Hawks for its air force. The UK Treasury did not 
believe the Hawks offered value for money. 
This support is not uniformly given throughout 
the EU. 
12 Broek M, et al, ‘European Export Credit Agencies and the 
financing of arms trade’, ENAAT, July 2007. 
13 These exports to South Africa are described elsewhere in 
this report.
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Why do governments support 
the arms industry?
Whatever means they are using to do it - leader 
influence, export promotion agencies or the provi-
sion of export insurance among others - the gov-
ernments are using taxpayer money to support pri-
vate companies. 
Arms exports are not generally popular with Eu-
ropean people. In November 2009 an opinion poll 
commissioned by the Swedish Peace and Arbitra-
tion Society found that 92 per cent said Sweden 
should not allow arms exports to states where se-
rious breaches of human rights occur, 81 per cent 
think exporting to countries engaged in conflict is 
wrong, and 55 per cent would not allow any military 
exports at all.14 In the UK an opinion poll conducted 
by BMRB in December 2004 showed over half the 
sample believed that the arms export promotion 
agency should be closed, while under 16 per cent 
supported its work.
The reasons given for continuing to give sub-
stantial support to an unpopular trade include na-
tional security, to influence other governments and 
employment. Opponents of military trade have 
scrutinized these arguments in rather critical terms:
National security 
There is considerable agreement that today’s 
threats to European security do not come from 
other Nation States. Physical security is most grave-
ly threatened by those legally living within EU 
countries, often born there, who have grievances 
in relation to actions by governments and others. 
More broadly, the biggest threats include climate 
change, competition for energy resources, inequal-
ity and poverty. A key factor in addressing climate 
change is the rapid expansion of renewable energy 
research and development (R&D) and production. 
However, this tends to secure far less R&D resources 
than does military equipment.
14 ‘Majoritet vill stoppa vapenexporten’, Syds venska Dagbladet, 
10 December 2009. 
Part of the military national security premise is 
that military exports can guarantee the supply of 
arms for a country’s armed forces by keeping pro-
duction lines open in that country and keeping 
them in a capacity to be state of the art. However, 
as explored above, the military companies that are 
to provide the guarantee of supply are international 
businesses, with production taking place across the 
globe. All significant purchases include many over-
seas components and sub-systems. It is unrealistic 
to expect these companies and their international 
shareholders to prioritise any one country‘s armed 
forces over those of other markets.
Influence over other governments
One argument sometimes put forward to justify 
arms exports is that they give the exporting coun-
try influence over the purchaser, and that influence 
is being put to laudable geo-strategic, political or 
moral use. But some purchasers seem to obtain 
more influence over sellers than the other way 
round. For instance, the threat by the government 
of Saudi Arabia not to buy Eurofighter Typhoons 
prompted the UK government to stop the criminal 
investigation into BAE Systems. In contrast, the Sau-
di arms purchases have never given the UK govern-
ment any power to pressure the Saudi government 
to improve its human rights record.
Jobs 
The one argument for arms exports that some 
of the public accept is that it is good for employ-
ment. In fact, the number of jobs supported by the 
military industry is rather fewer than is generally 
believed - many people are surprised when given 
the actual figures. In the UK, for instance, military 
exports relate to 0.2 per cent of the workforce and 
less than 2 per cent of manufacturing employment. 
Even then, UK arms exports and the arms companies 
in general receive support from the taxpayer that is 
beyond that available to comparable civil sectors. 
It is this support that provides the arms companies 
with their research and development resources and 
ability to attract skilled workers. 
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It is likely that military industry workers would 
be able to find work elsewhere. This was even re-
cognized by the President and Managing Director 
of General Dynamics UK, when giving evidence to 
a UK parliamentary committee on 8th September 
2010, stating that “the skills that might be divested 
of a reducing defence industry do not just sit there 
waiting to come back. They will be mopped up by 
other industries that need such skills.”
Government-industry links 
One reason for the continuing support by gov-
ernments of the arms industry is the historical equa-
tion of military power with importance in the world. 
Governments are reluctant to face accusations of 
being weak if they do not have a range of the mili-
tary aircraft, ships and tanks. This military mindset is 
reinforced by a close relationship between military 
companies and some governments which can give 
the former immense influence over government 
decision-making. The relationship is sustained 
through the use of lobbying companies, sponsor-
ship and donations, but, more importantly, through 
the arms export promotion units, the “revolving 
door” whereby politicians and officials move to 
work with arms companies, and joint government-
industry bodies. This predisposes decision-making 
in many EU states towards solutions that involve 
spending on military equipment and assisting 
arms companies sell abroad. The arms companies 
also use their close relationship with governments 
to exploit new security concerns. While military 
spending is facing restraints, the security sector is 
growing apace. The European Union’s Security Re-
search Programme (SRC) is fostering the growth of a 
homeland security industry in Europe and many of 
the familiar arms companies are setting its research 
agenda, proposing technical solutions to problems. 
In 2007 the European Commission funded 46 SRC 
projects a total of €156.5 million.15 
15 Hayes B , ‘NeoConOpticon: the EU Security Industrial Com-
plex’, Transnational Institute / Statewatch, June 2009.
Recommendation
In order to be consistent with UN Charter obli-
gations relating to the least diversion of resources 
for military purposes, EU governments should seek 
to dramatically reduce, with the aim of withdraw-
ing, public assistance for the sales of military equip-
ment. To assist with this, EU governments should 
report publicly on the export promotion assistance 
given, including budgets, staffing, promotional ac-
tivities for specific deals and export credits.
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Corruption and the Arms Trade
Corruption has had and continues to have a per-
nicious impact on the legal global arms trade. A 2006 
survey by Control Risks showed that roughly one 
third of international defence companies felt they 
had lost out on a contract in the last year because 
of corruption by a competitor.16 The US Department 
of Commerce ‘Trade Promotion Co-ordinating Com-
mittee Report’ of March 2000 claimed that the de-
fence sector accounted for 50 per cent of all bribery 
allegations in 1994-99, despite accounting for less 
than 1 per cent of world trade.17 It has been estimat-
ed that bribes accounted for as much as 15 per cent 
of the total spending on weapons acquisitions in 
the 1990s.18 In 2005, the International Defence and 
Security Programme of Transparency International 
estimated the global cost of corruption in the de-
fence sector to be at a minimum of around US$20 
billion, almost €15 billion, per year.19 According to 
the International Chamber of Commerce, “corrup-
tion adds up to 10 per cent to the total cost of doing 
business globally, and up to 25 per cent to the cost 
of procurement contracts in developing countries. 
Moving business from a country with a low level of 
corruption to a country with medium or high levels 
16 Control Risks, International Business Attitudes to Corrup-
tion – Survey 2006, p. 5 <http://www.controlrisks.com/PDF/
corruption_survey_2006_V3.pdf> 
17 Perlo-Freeman, S & Perdomo, C, The developmental im-
pact of military budgeting and procurement – implications 
for an Arms Trade Treaty. SIPRI, April 2008. <http://www.
sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/researchissues/
milex_atrans_develop/mili_budget>
18 Tanzi, V, Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, 
scope, and cures. Staff papers 45, Washington, DC: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund: 1998, pp. 559-594.
19 The World Bank estimated that more than US$1 trillion 
(US$1,000 billion) is paid globally in bribes each year 
(2004). The World Bank also put World Gross Domestic 
Product at US$41.5 trillion (current prices, 2004). Global 
military expenditure in 2004 was approximately US$1 tril-
lion (current prices, SIPRI). If $1 in every US$41.5 is misap-
propriated globally each year, then for the defence sector, 
worth approximately US$1 trillion, the cost of corruption 
each year is about US$20 billion. This calculation assumes 
that the defence sector is no more prone to corruption 
than other sectors – an assumption that conflicts with 
popular perceptions.
of corruption is found to be equivalent to a 20 per 
cent tax on foreign business”.20
Corruption and the EU
It is frequently assumed that corruption is more 
a problem for other countries than European states, 
however the following cases challenge this as-
sumption. The first cases highlight instances of EU 
Member States selling arms to states outside the EU 
where corruption has either been proved or where 
a prosecution is underway or being prepared; in the 
latter cases the buyers and sellers are all from the 
EU. 
Ex-EU arms transfers 
In October 2009, dozens of leading French politi-
cians and business figures were found guilty in con-
nection with the sale of weapons worth over €500 
million to Angola in breach of a UN arms embargo. 
Included among the guilty were French arms deal-
er Pierre Falcone and Russian-Israeli businessman 
Arkady Gaydamak, both of whom were convicted of 
illegal arms deals, tax fraud, money laundering and 
embezzlement and other crimes. Charles Pasqua, a 
former French interior minister, was found guilty of 
taking cash from the two arms dealers even though 
he allegedly knew the money was a proceed of 
crime. Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the son of and 
once Africa advisor to former President Mitterrand, 
“was cleared of the charge that he knowingly fa-
cilitated arms shipments to Angola”, but “received 
a two-year suspended jail sentence (…) and was 
fined €375,000 for embezzlement”.21 According to 
The Times, Mitterand Jr “received US$2.6 million in 
kickbacks because he was a former chief of his fa-
ther’s secretive Africa cell, which oversaw relations 
between France and its former colonies”.22
20 International Chamber of Commerce, Clean Business is 
Good Business. The Business Case against Corruption, 2008, 
p. 2.
21 Shirbon, E, ‘French powerbrokers convicted over arms to 
Angola’, Reuters, 27 October 2009.
22 Sage A, ‘French establishment players convicted over 
Arms to Angola scandal‘, The Times, 28 October 2009.
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On 23 June 2010, Reuters reported that Finland 
“is to bring bribery and accounting fraud charges 
against a unit of defence group Patria linked to an 
arms deal in Egypt”. 23 While Patria, which is 73.2 per 
cent owned by the Finnish state, rejects the charges 
as “groundless”, the Office of the Prosecutor Gen-
eral has stated that “there are probable causes to 
suspect that [Patria] representatives have promised 
and given significant bribes to Egyptian officials”.24
In Italy Alessandro Bon, a former sales repre-
sentative for Berreta, the Italian gun manufacturer, 
has appeared before Italian courts regarding claims 
that he illegally sold military hardware to the Ira-
nian government, allegedly involving kickbacks to 
a politician which had to be paid every six months. 
According to the investigative report, at one point 
Bon stated that twice a year an Italian associate “has 
to pay a politician in Italy and he has not paid him 
yet (…) And I need the support of this politician, so 
send me the money and I will put aside the money 
for the politician”.25
Intra-EU transfers
German submarines
 
An investigation has been launched by German 
prosecutors into two submarine deals with Portu-
gal and Greece. 
In 2004, Portugal signed a deal with a German 
Submarine Consortium led by MAN Ferrostaal to 
purchase two submarines. This was accompanied 
by a €1.2 billion offsets contract which included 
direct offsets as well as projects in the naval, au-
tomotive and new technologies industries (for an 
explanation of offsets, see the box below). In July 
2006, the Portuguese Public Prosecution Service 
pointed out that a brokering intermediary had 
23 ‘Finnish defence firm in Egypt bribery case’, Reuters, 23 
June 2010.
24 Ibidem.
25 Rotella S, ‘Iran’s Efforts to Buy Embargoed Arms Revealed 
in Italian Case, ProPublica, 31 March 2010.
received a surprisingly generous payment in rela-
tion to the role it played,26 which caused Portuguese 
authorities to investigate the deal.27 In 2007, a Por-
tuguese daily published transcriptions of telephone 
conversations raising further suspicions about the 
legitimacy of certain payments.28 According to pub-
lic officials the investigation concerns cases of cor-
ruption, mismanagement, and laundering, mostly 
associated with the financing of political parties.29 It 
is alleged that offsets have served as a vehicle for 
undue payments. 
The investigation has thus far targeted offices 
of the companies and law firms involved, the Por-
tuguese MoD and Offset Commission, the private 
homes of senior staff and other individuals in-
volved in the tender.30 In autumn 2009, Portuguese 
prosecutors accused three German executives and 
seven Portuguese citizens of fraud and forgery of 
documents relating to automotive offset projects 
included in the deal. The case points out that pros-
ecutions will target offsets specifically, stressing the 
responsibility of those dealing with them, and that 
offset evaluation and audits are often inadequate. 
Offsets are “a counter-trade mechanism agreed 
between purchasing governments and supplying 
companies when the former acquire military equip-
ment or related services or works from the latter. 
They are frequently used as industrial (sometimes 
even social or economic) policy tools aimed at im-
proving balance-of-payments accounts and com-
pensating the purchaser’s economy (and tax pay-
ers) for a public investment that will not have an 
immediate direct impact on the wellbeing of the 
population. Offsets consist in packages valued to 
26 Portuguese daily Correio da Manhã, 20 July 2007.
27 Reported in Portuguese weekly newspaper, Sol, 1 Decem-
ber 2007.
28 Jornal de Notícias, 8 July 2007.
29 Interview with the Director of DCIAP, broadcasted on Por-
tuguese radio TSF, 1 October 2009.
30 Articles in the Portuguese daily Correio da Manhã, 22 
July 2008, 8 March 2009 and 12 September 2009; articles 
in Portuguese weekly Sol, 24 and 25 July 2007, and 29 
November 2008; article in Portuguese weekly magazine 
Sábado, 1 October 2009.
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a percentage of the acquisition contract and may 
take many forms, for example, agreements for co-
production, licensed production, subcontracting, 
training, technology transfer, or other investments 
in the purchasing country’s economy”.31
 
As observed by Nick Whitney, European defence 
expert at the European Council for Foreign Rela-
tions: “The arms trade is already an incubator of 
corruption (…) The best antidotes are transparency, 
and competition. But if you add offsets to the deal, it 
only gets murkier”.32 The Defence and Security Pro-
gramme of Transparency International has argued 
that “effective, efficient and transparent offsets re-
quire a stable framework, with little or no surprises 
for everyone involved; clear processes and goals for 
evaluation, valuation, monitoring and crediting of 
offsets; and flexible but comprehensive offsets con-
tracts that set clear paths for each situation”.33
Meanwhile, it is alleged that German defence 
contractors have also paid bribes to facilitate the 
sale of submarines. The investigation, which began 
in May 2010, is focusing on a deal –– part of a larger, 
complicated decade-old contract to provide Greece 
with a total of six submarines – struck between Ber-
lin and Athens in March as Greece lurched toward 
bankruptcy.34 Some EU officials have even accused 
Germany of “making their military dealings with 
Greece a condition for its involvement in the coun-
try’s bailout and profiting from Athen’s profligacy”, 
which the German Government denies.35
31 Tall references to offsets herein are based on Magahy B, 
Vilhena da Cunha F & Pyman M, Defence Offsets. Addressing 
the Risks of Corruption & Raising Transparency, International 
Defence and Security Programme of Transparency Inter-
national, April 2010.
32 On quote in ‘Probe into German-Greek Arms Deals Reveals 
Murky Side of Defense Sales’, Deutsche Welle, 12 August 
2010.
33 Magahy B. et al, Defence Offsets. Addressing the Risks of 
Corruption & Raising Transparency, London: Transparency 
International, 2010.
34 ‘Probe into German-Greek Arms Deals Reveals Murky Side 
of Defense Sales’, Deutsche Welle, 12 August 2010.
35 Ibidem.
In Greece, the MoD has decided in an unpre-
cedented move to refuse to extend the fulfilment 
period for offset agreements that are not on sched-
ule and has informed obligors that penalties will 
be applied. It has been suggested that this could 
be because the MoD is looking for an escape route 
out of the government’s deep financial crisis.36 This 
is new; the Greek Government has previously taken 
a more relaxed approach. Authorities have begun 
to calculate the penalties and cashing in the perfor-
mance bonds, which may affect offset contracts of 
almost €1 billion as well as credit lines for defence 
procurements. As a consequence, many suppliers 
have expressed concerns about their participation 
in future tenders until the current offset legislation 
has been revised. This case demonstrates that (1) 
offsets are important to how a country’s defence 
procurement is perceived by the rest of the world 
and that (2) in high-risk environments, i.e. countries 
with unclear offset guidelines, suppliers might take 
additional precautions, such as attempting to in-
clude limits on the penalties that may be applied 
where offset obligations are not met.37
BAE-Systems investigation
BAE Systems, the UK-headquartered aerospace 
and defence corporation, has been under inves-
tigation for a number of years, primarily by UK 
authorities, for corrupt practices in connection with 
a range of arms deals including aircraft to the Czech 
Republic, frigate refurbishment for the Romanian 
Government, a range of equipment to South Africa 
and the sale of a military air-traffic-control system 
to Tanzania. The UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) an-
nounced in December 2006 that it was to dis-
continue investigating allegations that BAE Systems 
had paid bribes to secure the “Al Yamamah” arms 
deal with Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. Worth poten-
tially as much as £80 billion (€90 billion at current 
36 ‘The Greek honey trap’, Countertrade & Offsets Journal, 12 
October 2009.
37 Again, see Magahy B. et al, Defence Offsets, op. cit., 2010.
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exchange rates),38 Al Yamamah is the UK’s largest 
ever arms export agreement.39 The SFO controver-
sially stated “the public interest” as the reason for 
ending the investigation,4 0 however the UK High 
Court ruled on 10 April 2008 that the SFO “acted 
unlawfully” when making this decision.41 This ruling 
was overturned by the House of Lords on 30 July.42 
The SFO, however, did not stop all of its inquiries 
but continued investigations into other contro-
versial BAE contracts in Chile, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, South Africa and Tanzania.43
Moreover, the Al Yamamah case did not end 
with the House of Lords decision. The US Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) launched its own investiga-
tion over BAE Systems’ conduct, and in February 
2010 BAE Systems reached a plea bargain in both 
the US (with the DOJ, paying US$400 million) and 
the UK (with the SFO, paying £30 million).4 4 In the US, 
BAE admitted to “making false statements to the US 
Government in relation to proposed deals in 2001 
involving Gripen fighter jets in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic”. US companies who were offering 
F-16 jets at the same time to governments in Cen-
tral Europe suspected their competition of offering 
bribes.45
38 Mike Turner, the then Chief Executive of BAE Systems, 
speaking at the 2005 Paris Air Show, said “We have £43 
billion from Al-Yamamah over the past 20 years and there 
could be £40 billion more,” on quote in O’Connel D, ‘BAE 
cashes in on £40bn Arab jet deal’, Sunday Times, 20 August 
2006.
39 ‘Al Yamamah’ <www.corruptionisacrime.com/
background>
40 ‘Timeline: BAE corruption probe’, BBC News, 26 June 2007.
41 ‘UK wrong to halt Saudi arms probe’, BBC News, 10 April 
2008.
42 ‘Lords says SFO Saudi move lawful’, BBC News, 30 July 
2008.
43 ‘BAE hopes its SFO settlement marks a new chapter’, BBC 
News, last updated 5 February 2010; ‘Lords overturn Saudi 
probe ruling’, BBC News, 30 July 2008.
44 O’Brian, R & Pelofsky, J, ‘BAE reaches settlement with U.S, 
Britain’, Reuters, 5 February 2010.
45 Jiřiĉná, K., ‘Gripen inquiry ordered reopened. Prosecu-
tor general calls for third probe into fighter jet deal’, The 
Prague Post, 5 May 2010.
BAE, the Czech Republic, and the Gripens
In the Czech Republic, there have been long-
running concerns about possible corrupt practices 
in connection with the planned purchase of 24 
JAS-39 Swedish Gripen fighter jets (the purchase 
ultimately fell through for economic reasons, as 
the Czech Government prioritised spending on re-
pairing flood damage from 2002). The jets were to 
be produced by SAAB, 21 per cent owned by BAE 
Systems, which was involved in the marketing side 
of the deal. The Czech Parliament did not approve 
the original funding, estimated at 60.2 billion Czech 
Koruna (approximately €2 billion), while related off-
set arrangements were criticised at the time of pur-
chase as being illusory, with two finance ministers 
criticising their execution.4 6 The first specific allega-
tions of corruption were made on Swedish televi-
sion in 2007, notably regarding an Austrian agent 
for BAE Systems.47 In May 2010, following two earlier 
investigations by Czech prosecutors, both of which 
were dropped,4 8 the Prosecutor General of the Czech 
Republic reopened the corruption inquiry.49
In July 2010, the Czech Prosecutor General asked 
the US for assistance with the inquiry.50 Swedish 
authorities have also looked into the corruption al-
legations that SAAB “offered huge, secret ‘commis-
sions’ to promote the sale of its Gripen fighter jet to 
the Czech Republic and Austria” in 2007.51 Although 
this investigation was closed, the Democratic Alli-
ance in Sweden recently asked “the chairman of the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Themba 
46 ‘Czech-BAE corruption probe worries Prague’, ISN Security 
Watch reported on Sero News, 28 February 2007.
47 Jiřiĉná, K., ‘Gripen inquiry ordered reopened. Prosecu-
tor general calls for third probe into fighter jet deal’, The 
Prague Post, 5 May 2010.
48 Lehane B, ‘US help sought in Gripen probe’, The Prague 
Post, 18 August 2010.
49 Fortado, L and Pirone S.: ‘Ex-BAE Lobbyist Charged With 
Alleged Bribes for Jets’ (Update 1), Bloomberg, 29 January 
2010. 
50 ‘Czechs ask US for help in jet fighters probe‘, AFP reported 
on Bloomsberg Businessweek, 12 August 2010.
51 Ekman, I, ‘Sweden’s squeaky-clean image sullied by scan-
dals’, The New York Times, 11 May 2007.
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Godi, for an urgent special hearing into the termi-
nation of the investigation into the arms deal”.52
Conclusion
Corruption, which is believed to be widespread 
in the arms trade, increases the cost of otherwise 
legitimate business. But more than that, it can 
skew decision-making processes and thus encour-
age poor procurement choices. It can even gener-
ate trade that otherwise would never have taken 
place, as purchases are approved purely to gener-
ate commissions for personal or other forms of il-
legitimate enrichment (see, for example, Arms Ex-
ports to South Africa, below). Yet the EU Common 
Position makes no reference to corruption. Mem-
ber States have expressed themselves anxious to 
stamp out corruption wherever possible, including 
in the context of arms transfers, and have signed up 
to various anti-corruption agreements.53 It would 
therefore be consistent with this stance for Member 
States to amend the Common Position and agree a 
new ninth criterion whereby prospective transfers 
would be refused where there existed a clear risk 
that they might involve corrupt practices. 
52 ‘DA wants hearing into closed arms deal probe’, Times Live, 
17 October 2010.
53 E.g. the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions; the UN Convention Against Corruption; and the 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Against 
Corruption.
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Arms exports to South Africa
Dreams Destroyed : The arms deal that promot-
ed corruption and undermined socio-economic 
development in the Rainbow nation.54
In late 1998, early 1999 South Africa’s nascent 
democratic government spent over €4.5 billion on 
arms that the country didn’t need and barely uses. 
Over €200 million of bribes were paid to senior poli-
ticians, officials, middlemen and the ruling party. 
The bribes were a key motivator in the deal.
The contracts were won by five EU governments 
and their nominated companies. The deal violated 
at least two criteria of the EU’s Common Position 
and has cost South Africa dear in terms of the so-
cio-economic opportunity cost and the damage 
wrought to the country’s democratic institutions 
and the rule of law.
The procurement process was fatally flawed, 
with the most expensive contract being awarded 
for a jet that didn’t make the original short-list and 
that the Air Force stated publicly they didn’t want. It 
was two and a half times the price of the preferred 
jet, but the company paid more than €100 million 
in bribes.
This significant amount of money was commit-
ted at a time when then President Mbeki claimed 
the country lacked the fiscal resources to provide 
life-saving medication to the almost 6 million peo-
ple living with HIV/AIDS, leading to, according to 
a Harvard University study, at least 355,000 avoid-
able deaths. The deal has, and will continue (until 
the contracts’ conclusion in 2018) to reduce South 
Africa’s GDP by anything between 0.1 and 0.5 of 
a per cent p.a. in an economic environment with 
more than 25 per cent formal unemployment. 
54 This account is drawn from Andrew Feinstein’s best-selling 
book on the deal and its consequences, After the Party: 
Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s Uncertain Future. 
London: Verso, 2009. Andrew Feinstein is a former ANC 
Member of Parliament who resigned after being stopped 
from investigating the arms deal.
This money could have funded, not only the 
life-saving medication, but also approximately 
33,000 new schools staffed with fully trained teach-
ers, 2 million new houses or 100,000 new jobs for a 
decade.
In order to cover up the massive corruption, key 
institutions of South Africa’s democracy and the 
rule of law were undermined, some fatally. These 
included the independence of Parliament, the ju-
diciary, the prosecutorial authorities, investigative 
and anti-corruption bodies. 
The arms deal was the template for a series of 
massive, corrupt transactions that have benefited 
the ANC and senior members of government, and 
which continue today. The country’s current Presi-
dent faced 783 counts of corruption in relation to 
the deal, which were controversially dropped ten 
days before he was elected. The Deputy President 
has recently lamented the corruption that contin-
ues to pervade the ruling party and government. 
This arms transfer, in violation of the Common 
Position, has severely weakened South Africa’s once 
hopeful democracy. Sadly, the South African experi-
ence is not unique.
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Big interest cases
The bigger it gets, the harder to say no
The following cases all seem to be examples 
where the size of the deal and their value to EU 
industrial interests are creating huge pressures 
on licencing authorities to interpret the criteria of 
the Common Position liberally. In most cases re-
gional stability is a major issue. Additionally, in 
some cases there are concerns about diversion and 
development. 
Fuelling the South Asian arms race 
India and Pakistan shook the world when they 
tested nuclear bombs in 1998, giving their prob-
lematic relationship another explosive twist. Ten-
sions between the two have run high many times 
ever since they became independent in 1947, with 
three wars fought and a number of military stand-
offs, such as in 2001-2002, after India held Pakistan 
responsible for a militant attack on the Indian par-
liament in December 2001. After the attacks by Pa-
kistani militants in Mumbai in 2008 tensions grew 
again, but fortunately defused eventually.
Apart from their rivalry that mostly centres 
on the status of Kashmir, both countries also face 
huge internal problems. Pakistan has been strug-
gling with both Afghan and home-grown Islamic 
militants that have surged over the past few years. 
American attacks inside Pakistan with unmanned 
aircraft on major figures of the militancy have not 
improved the situation, undermining the position 
of the already unstable Pakistani government. India 
in turn has in recent years labelled a Maoist insur-
gency as the main internal security threat.
Also, both India and Pakistan are developing 
countries that face huge developmental challenges 
– often mentioned as a root cause for militancy to 
blossom. Despite India’s much-clamoured econom-
ic growth large sections of society are still locked 
in a vicious cycle of poverty, illiteracy and poor 
health. The UNDP’s Human Development Index cur-
rently ranks India 134th and Pakistan 141st out of 182 
countries.55 
Many political observers see South Asia as 
potentially the most explosive region in the world. 
Indo-Pakistani rivalry has led to constant high 
levels of military expenditure and major procure-
ment programmes that run in the billions of euros. 
For decades both countries have been among the 
world’s largest arms purchasers. For both the 2000-
2009 and 1990-2009 periods SIPRI ranks India as 
the world’s second largest importer and Pakistan 
as 13th.56 While Russia has been India’s predominant 
source of weapons, as has China been for Pakistan, 
European countries have also had a significant share 
in transfers to both countries. Cancelling its arms 
embargoes against both countries post-9/11, the US 
has emerged as a new rival to existing suppliers. 
This case focuses on two major European arms 
export deals with South Asia: the export of spy 
planes to Pakistan and the UK sale of Hawk fighter 
aircraft to India, and considers how both of these 
may cause problems in terms of the EU arms trans-
fer criteria. 
Swedish spy planes for Pakistan
Pakistan had long been looking to buy Saab sur-
veillance aircraft, but is said to have been rejected 
several times under Sweden’s military export poli-
cies.57 Nevertheless, on 15 October 2005 Saab signed 
a contract to supply six Saab 2000 turboprop aircraft 
equipped with Erieye airborne surveillance systems 
to Pakistan at a value of 8.3 billion Swedish Kronor 
(around €850 million), although the deal was appar-
ently delayed a few days because of a devastating 
55 United Nations Development Programme, ’Human Devel-
opment Report 2009 - HDI rankings’ <http://hdr.undp.org/
en/statistics>
56 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms 
Transfers Database that can be accessed from <http://
www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>
57 ‘Sweden finalises AEW&C contract with Pakistan’, Defense 
Industry Daily, 07 April 2008, 
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earthquake that had just hit Kashmir.58 For finan-
cial reasons, related to that earthquake,59 Pakistan 
slashed some arms purchases, including one Erieye 
Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft, 
bringing the order value down to around €700 mil-
lion.60 One of the five aircraft is in basic transport 
configuration – without the AEW&C system – and 
was delivered in 2008. The first AEW&C aircraft ar-
rived in Pakistan in late 2009 with the remaining 
three slated for delivery in 2010.61
Saab’s Erieye surveillance radar – built on either 
Saab or Brazilian Embraer aircraft - has been one of 
Sweden’s top arms export successes of the past 15 
years. The system has been built for Sweden, Brazil, 
Greece, Mexico and Pakistan with new orders since 
late 2009 from Thailand, the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia.62 In terms of both sustainable de-
velopment and regional stability, the Pakistani deal 
has been the most controversial sale.
Major arms consumer
Pakistan has always been a major importer of 
military equipment but especially so over the past 
few years, with a place firmly in the top ten of the 
world’s recipients. Islamabad has, for example, been 
upgrading 46 older F-16 fighters as well as buying 
58 ‘Ibidem; Hewson R, ‘Saab sale of Erieye radar to Pakistan 
given go-ahead’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 June 2006 ‘Im-
portant order secured’, Saab press release, 22 June 2006; 
Kärrman J, ‘Saab mörkade vapenkontrakt’, Aftonbladet 
[Swedish daily], 19 Oct 2005.
59 Bokhari F, ‘Islamabad backs Swedish AEW&C deal’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 31 May 2006.
60 ‘Saab renegotiate Surveillance contract’, Saab press re-
lease, 28 May 2007.
61 Jennings G, ‘Pakistan receives second Erieye AEW&C air-
craft’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 May 2010; ‘Pakistan’s First 
Saab 2000 Erieye Delivered’, Air Forces Monthly, Feb 2010.
62 Greece, Mexico and Brazil haven all chosen Brazilian Em-
braer aircraft, the others Saab aircraft. See e.g. Hewson R, 
‘Saudi Arabia signs up for Erieye system’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 13 Oct 2010; Defence Industry Daily, ‘Sweden 
Finalizes AEW&C Contract With Pakistan’, 7 April 2008; 
‘UAE Buys Saab’s Erieye AEW&C Aircraft’, Defence Indus-
try Daily, 17 Nov 2009; ‘Thailand Buying JAS-39 Gripens, 
AWACS’, Defence Industry Daily, 27 January 2010; <http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erieye_radar>
18 new ones from Lockheed Martin, as part of a 
US$5.1 billion deal.63 Pakistani F-16s have been used 
extensively in anti-Taliban operations since 2009.6 4
China has been another major supplier, with 
Pakistan purchasing in recent years 36 J-10 fighter 
aircraft for US$1.4 in 200965 as well as four Sword-
class frigates for US$700-750 million.66 Pakistan also 
signed a US$278 million contract with China for 
four AEW&C aircraft in December 2008, similar to 
but less advanced than the Swedish.67 China and 
Pakistan are also jointly producing JF-17 fighters of 
which Pakistan plans to buy 150-250.68 
Pakistan is also a major European export desti-
nation. In 2008, at least €685 million worth of ex-
port licences were granted by EU Member States, 
with France (€283 million), Austria (€155 million)69, 
Germany (€93 million), the UK (€39 million) and 
63 Capaccio T, ‘Pakistan steps up use of Fort Worth-made 
F-16s in fight against insurgents’, Bloomberg, 17 December 
2009. Earlier Pakistan had planned to buy 75 new F-16s, 
but brought the number down to 18 as a consequence 
of the October 2005 earthquake; see Ansari U, ‘Pakistan 
Spending Falls With Economy’, Defense News, 22 Septem-
ber 2008.
64 Warnes A, ‘On the edge of something big’, Air Forces 
Monthly, July 2010; Capaccio T, ‘Pakistan steps up use 
of Fort Worth-made F-16s in fight against insurgents’, 
Bloomberg, 17 December 2009.
65 Bokhari F, ‘China to sell Pakistan 36 fighter jets’, Financial 
Times, 10 November 2009; Jon Grevatt, ‘Pakistan seeks 
Chinese loan for fighter purchase’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
3 December 2008. A first batch of 42 JF-17 aircraft was 
agreed to buy for $1 billion; see ‘Pakistan 42 FC-1 Deal 
‘Biggest’’, Aviation Week Beijing Airshow shownews, 23 Sep-
tember 2009.
66 Bokhari F, ‘Pakistan receives first Sword-class frigate’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 August 2009, Minnick W, ‘Paki-
stan’s New Frigate Launches’, Defense News, 14 April 2008.
67 Bokhari F, ‘Pakistan still plans to buy Erieye aircraft’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 21 January 2009.
68 A first batch of 42 JF-17 aircraft was agreed to buy for $1 
billion; see: ‘Pakistan 42 FC-1 Deal ‘Biggest’, Aviation Week 
Beijing Airshow shownews, 23 September 2009.
69 An Austrian official has explained that this was mostly 
about one big licence for trucks that eventually was never 
exercised and that a similar licence today would likely not 
be rewarded. Still in 2008 there was clearly no reason not 
to do so (private correspondence with Austrian official, 
March 2010).
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Sweden (€36 million) leading the charge.70 In 2007 
EU licences were worth €862 million and €1,361 mil-
lion in 2006, €903 million of which was accounted 
for by Sweden.71 Germany is said to be close to ap-
proving the purchase of Type 124 submarines built 
by shipbuilder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft 
(HDW), for which a preliminary export licence is said 
to have been provided; the Green Party reportedly 
raised development issues regarding the deal.72
Close to (civil) war
Pakistan has experienced over half a century of 
rivalry with neighbouring India, with three wars and 
a number of near-war confrontations. In 1998 the 
two nations tested nuclear weapons and brought 
the prospect of a nuclear war closer than ever since 
the end of the Cold War. Pakistan has a troubled 
democratic history, with a number of military coups 
including the most recent led by Pervez Musharraf 
in 1999, which lasted until 2008. Islamist militancy 
has grown largely beyond control over the past few 
decades, with the Pakistani Taliban extending their 
power base along the border with Afghanistan to 
further inside the country, including the Punjab and 
Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi.73 Attempts to counter 
the Islamist offensive, supported by high numbers 
of targeted killings by US-operated Reaper armed 
drones have so far only increased fears of a civil 
war. In a recent report Amnesty International has 
strongly criticised both sides. “Nearly 4 million peo-
ple are effectively living under the Taliban in north-
west Pakistan without rule of law and effectively 
70 Eleventh EU annual report on arms exports. Note that 
these figures fail to take account of UK open licences, as 
these do not place upper limits on the value or quantity 
of equipment that may be transferred. In 2008, the UK 
issued 9 open licences for transfers of controlled goods to 
Pakistan.
71 Ninth and Eleventh EU annual reports on arms exports. 
The UK issued 17 open licences for transfers of controlled 
goods to Pakistan in 2007, and 25 in 2006.
72 Ansari U, ‘Germany-Pakistani Sub Deal on Course’, Defense 
News, 25 May 2009.
73 See e.g. Bokhari F, ‘Lahore attacks fuel concern over Pun-
jab’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 June 2010.
abandoned by the Pakistani government”.74 One 
teacher interviewed by Amnesty said: “The govern-
ment just gave away our lives to the Taliban. What’s 
the point of having this huge army if it can’t even 
protect us against a group of brutal fanatics? They 
took over my school and started to teach children 
about how to fight in Afghanistan. They kicked out 
the girls from school, told the men to grow their 
beards, threatened anybody they didn’t like. Our 
government and our military never tried to protect 
us from this”.75
According to a UN study Pakistan had the high-
est number of internally displaced people in the 
world in 2009. Some three million people out of 170 
million fled their homes because of the Taliban in-
surgency and the country’s military response.76
Development lost
Adult illiteracy in Pakistan is at 46 per cent, while 
38 per cent of children under five years are under-
weight.77 Making things worse, Pakistan has faced 
major natural disasters in recent years, with a huge 
toll in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. 
The tremendous flooding in the summer of 2010, 
the worst in the country’s history, as at late August 
had killed about 1,600 people and affected some 
16.8 million.78 In 2005 an earthquake in northern Pa-
kistan caused massive devastation, including nearly 
75,000 deaths.79 Swedish NGOs have on several oc-
casions strongly denounced Swedish efforts to win 
the SAAB Erieye AWACS contract, especially in the 
light of the earthquake.
74 ‘Millions suffer in ‘human rights free zone’ in northwest 
Pakistan’, Amnesty International, 10 June 2010.
75 ‘Ibidem.
76 ‘Pakistan: U.N. Report Finds High Levels of Displacement’, 
Reuters, 17 May 2010.
77 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2009 – Pakistan’, 
<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_
sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html>.
78 ‘Pakistan floods: Senior UN figure criticises response‘, BBC 
News, 22 August 2010. 
79 ‘Overview: Quake aftermath’, BBC News, 2 November 2005.
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Pakistan’s public debt situation, including mili-
tary debts, improved during the first half of the 
last decade,80 partly because of sustained high GDP 
growth and a more favourable credit position after 
9/11. However, both its recent military operations 
in the country’s north, as well as a number of very 
big arms contracts that have been concluded since 
about 2005 have put the government budget un-
der pressure. Foreign reserves crashed from US$15.7 
billion in early 2008 to US$8.8 billion in September 
2008.81
Pakistan’s military spending has been consist-
ently high and far from transparent, with the offi-
cial budget partially classified.82 As noted by Defense 
News, “The government provides no overall break-
down of military spending. In 2006 the defence 
budget was described in a closed-door session to 
the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and 
Defence Production.” In constant (2008) dollars the 
budget has increased from around US$4 billion in 
the last half of the 1990s up until 2001, to $4.8 – 5.3 
billion between 2003-2009, but according to SIPRI 
these figures reflect “current spending only (i.e. ex-
clude capital spending)”.83 Recent reports suggest 
increasing levels of defence spending.8 4
Ignored export criteria
The huge Swedish deal, which would seem to 
be of a piece with many other big-ticket arms con-
tracts, should ring various alarm bells in relation 
to criteria 4 and 8 of the EU Common Position (the 
“regional peace, security and stability” and “sustain-
able development” criteria respectively). Pakistan is 
a developing country with a far from stable govern-
ment that is more busy with counter-insurgency 
80 Xiaoqin Fan E, Pakistan’s Public Debt: A Brief Overview, Asian 
Development Bank, 2007.
81 Ansari U, ‘Pakistan Spending Falls With Economy’, Defense 
News, 22 September 2008.
82 Ibidem.
83 The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milex-
data.sipri.org/result.php4>
84 See e.g.: Ansari U, ‘Pakistan Increases Defense Spending in 
New Budget’, Defense News, 14 June 2010.
warfare, matching India’s military capability and in 
maintaining a balancing act vis-à-vis the US, than 
with improving education, health and other ba-
sic human security needs for its people, including 
those in the tribal areas.
The acquisition is a new asset in the military’s in-
ventory and widely regarded as an answer to arch-
rival India’s 2004 deal with Israel for three Phalcon 
AEW&C, nicknamed the “eye in the sky”, the first 
of which arrived in May 2009.85 “Analysts say the 
purchase (…) is part of India’s efforts to achieve air 
dominance over its rival, Pakistan”, according to a 
BBC article; “only a few non-NATO countries have 
Awacs and critics say it is a bad omen for the arms 
race in South Asia”.86
Pakistan itself has recently voiced concerns of a 
spiralling arms race. “New war doctrines, tremen-
dous boost to the defence spending, induction of 
new sophisticated weapons systems, these are ele-
ments that are prejudicial to regional security and 
stability”, according to Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary 
Salman Bashir.87
Another BBC news report observed that “the 
Saab-2000 aircraft will boost the Pakistani military’s 
early warning capabilities in the event of hostilities 
with India. The aircraft can be used to provide in-
formation on all three spheres of military conflict 
– aerial, naval and land based. Our correspondent 
says the Awacs planes and advanced F-16 fighter-
bombers soon to arrive from the US will provide a 
qualitative edge to the Pakistan air force against its 
numerically superior adversary. Pakistani military 
officials say the planes also have a greater range 
than similar aircraft in the Indian military and can 
85 See e.g. Bokhari F, ‘Islamabad backs Swedish AEW&C deal’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 31 May 2006. The second and third 
aircraft are due to be handed over in 2010.
86 ‘Indian air force gets AWACS plane’, BBC News, 28 May 
2009. 
87 ‘Pakistan Sounds Warnings Over India Buildup’, AFP, 25 
February 2010; and ‘India Unveils $32B Defense Budget’, 
AFP, 26 February 2010.
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be used as airborne command centres in case of a 
possible nuclear conflict”.88
Some supplier countries however often seem to 
hold a more cynical view that as long as both parties 
arm themselves with similar amounts of weapons 
regional stability will be maintained – and western 
industries secured of a continuing flow of business. 
While Sweden and other EU Member States, includ-
ing for example the Netherlands, stopped issuing 
new arms export licences after the South Asian nu-
clear tests, they resumed a few years later. However, 
Sweden stopped new licences again in November 
2007, as did Switzerland, apparently in response to 
a severely deteriorating internal situation. All these 
considerations however never stopped the Erieye 
deal.
Pakistan’s development indicators are such that 
EU Member States should exercise extreme cau-
tion when considering large-value exports to Paki-
stan, and indeed it is hard to see how this particu-
lar transfer could have been approved. Matters are 
further complicated when one considers the previ-
ously mentioned similar deal Pakistan has signed 
with China. It would seem that the Chinese aircraft 
appear to cost only 25-30 per cent of the Swedish 
Erieye AEW&C aircraft. 89 Even acknowledging that 
Swedish technology is superior to Chinese, it raises 
yet more concerns about the cost-effectiveness and 
sense of the Swedish deal.
Stockholm claims that it sees criterion 8 as neo-
colonial, or at least interfering with a democratically 
elected government.90 But especially this last ele-
ment was lacking at the time the deal was agreed, 
when Pakistan, a country which history is marked by 
decades of political interference by the military, was 
ruled by a military dictatorship. Moreover, although 
when the deal was first agreed Sweden may have 
been operating under the EU Code, which did not 
88 ‘Pakistan gets first AWACS Plane’, BBC News, 9 December 
2009.
89 See Bokhari F, ‘Pakistan still plans to buy Erieye aircraft’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 January 2009.
90 Interview with ISP (Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic 
Products) official by Saferworld, 2007.
have legal force, Sweden continues to prosecute 
this deal even though now legally obliged under 
the Common Position to implement criterion 8. 
One further issue may be relevant here. It was 
recognised at the time of negotiating the contract 
that technology could spill over to Pakistan’s close 
defence partner China, which at the time was build-
ing an airborne radar that “outwardly resembles the 
Erieye radar in almost every way”. However Saab 
said at the time that “security issues regarding the 
Erieye in Pakistan will be covered in a government-
to-government agreement”.91 Whether that is a wa-
terproof arrangement remains to be seen.
UK Hawk trainer jets to India
The UK and India traditionally have had close 
ties, in terms of arms trade as well as in develop-
ment relations. Over the past decade major mili-
tary aircraft sales have made up for most of these 
exports; as recently as July 2010 India announced 
the purchase of 57 Hawk military trainer jets, all of 
which are to be manufactured in India.92 While slow-
ly but steadily developing an independent nation-
al arms industry, India at the same time is a huge 
developing country where hundreds of millions of 
people daily struggle below subsistence level to 
make a living. Despite more than a decade of high 
economic growth, development indicators still re-
veal poor performance in many areas, while at the 
same time India’s defence budget has experienced 
years of substantial growth.
With €270 million worth of standard individual 
arms export licences (SIELSs) granted as well as a 
further 196 open individual export licences (OIELs) 
over the four years from 2005 to 2008,93 India is one 
of the largest UK customers. Potential new orders 
are looming; BAE Systems’ Eurofighter Typhoon is 
 
91 Hewson R, ‘Saab sale of Erieye radar to Pakistan given go-
ahead’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 June 2006.
92 Jennings G, ‘India to buy more Hawk AJTs from BAE Sys-
tems’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010.
93 EU Annual Consolidated Reports 2005-2008.
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competing in the contest to deliver 126 fighter jets 
worth an estimated US$10 billion.94 It is understood 
that India has also “lodged a firm expression of inter-
est” to buy one of the state-of-the-art 65,000 tonne 
aircraft carriers planned for manufacture in the UK, 
in a move that could help solve part of London’s de-
fence budget problems.95 Most recently India signed 
a €560 million contract for 12 AugustaWestland 
AW101 Merlin helicopters for the Air Force, for VIP 
transport.96 The Merlin is manufactured at factories 
in England and Italy.97
The main running UK arms export programme 
for India is for 66 BAE Systems Hawk trainer/combat 
aircraft worth US$1.1 billion, of which 42 are being 
produced in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd 
(HAL). Before the original deal was signed in 2004, 
the UK Government received strong criticism from 
MPs and the NGO community as it admitted that the 
Hawks could be modified for nuclear use.98 The pro-
gramme has been plagued by delays and assembly 
problems and HAL has been seeking compensation 
from BAE.99 The accident-prone Indian Air Force has 
at least for some time been forced to curtail training 
as a result of the delays.10 0 Many of these delays, fric-
tions and complaints appear to have been settled 
as the purchase of another 57 jets – all to be locally 
built - was announced by India at the 2010 Farn-
borough Airshow. Contracts were signed in India a 
few days later, when the largest British delegation 
94 Grevatt J, ‘India to downselect fighter jet by mid-2010’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 March 2010; Misquitta S, ‘Defense 
Contractors Target Big Jump in India’s Military Spending’, 
The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2009.
95 Webb T, ‘Royal Navy aircraft carrier may be sold to India’, 
The Guardian, 16 November 2009.
96 Bedi R, ‘AgustaWestland secures Indian AW101 contract’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 March 2010.
97 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AgustaWestland_AW101>.
98 Norton-Taylor R, ‘British plane sales to India raise fears of 
nuclear use’, The Guardian, 23 April 2002.
99 Bedi R, ‘HAL seeks compensation over Indian Hawk de-
lays’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 February 2010; Mathews N, 
‘Hawks Not Soaring’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 16 
November 2009.
100 Bedi R, ‘Hawk delay sparks IAF training review’, Jane’s De-
fence Weekly, 26 August 2009.
since independence, led by Prime Minister David 
Cameron, visited India.101 
Continuing military build-up
Indian defence spending in absolute terms has 
increased by 67 per cent over the last decade, from 
about US$21.9 billion in 2000 to US$36.6 billion in 
2009.102 In 2009 a massive 34 per cent budget in-
crease was approved on the grounds that the “se-
curity environment has deteriorated considerably” 
referring to the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.103 
In February 2010 India announced another four per 
cent increase for its 2010-11 budget.10 4
India remains largely dependent on arms im-
ports and for decades it has been one of the world’s 
top recipient states, second only to China for both 
the 1990-2009 and the 2000-2009 periods.105 Ac-
cording to SIPRI, over the past ten years the most 
important suppliers have been Russia (by far), the 
UK, Israel, Uzbekistan and Poland.106 The USA is a re-
cent entry to the Indian market. Substantial further 
increases in procurement have been scheduled.107 
101 Raguvanshi V, ‘British Prime Minister, CEOs Woo Defense 
Contracts in India’, Defense News, 2 August 2010; Jennings 
G, ‘India to buy more Hawk AJTs from BAE Systems’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Bedi R, ‘Doubts surround 
IAF Plans to acquire additional Hawk 132s’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 1 April 2009.
102 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://milexdata.
sipri.org/result.php4>
103 Grevatt J, ‘India ups defence budget’, Jane’s Defence Week-
ly, 15 July 2009; Dutta S, ‘26/11 oils wheels of arms bazaar’, 
The Telegraph [Indian daily], 12 February 2009.
104 ‘India Unveils $32B Defence Budget’, AFP, 26 February 
2010.
105 The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milex-
data.sipri.org/result.php4>
106 Ibidem.
107 Dreazen Y J & Sharma A, ‘U.S. Sells Arms to South Asian 
Rivals’, Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2010; Misquitta S, 
‘Defense Contractors Target Big Jump in India’s Military 
Spending’, Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2009; Srivastava S, 
‘Indian arms spree on the fast track’, Asia Times, 4 June 
2009.
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For the period 2010-2022 purchases worth a total of 
US$80-100 billion have been planned.108
It is part of India’s defence industry policy 
that it should develop an independent industrial 
base, however this has not so far gone smooth-
ly.109 Licenced production programmes have been 
plagued by delays and immense cost increases, 
partly caused by absorption of technology prob-
lems.110 Similarly, home-grown Indian weapon de-
velopment programmes have experienced huge 
delays and financial setbacks, with the Arjun tank 
and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) the most strik-
ing examples.
“The volume of deliveries to India and Pakistan 
has increased significantly in recent years and will 
continue to rise during the next five years,” accord-
ing to SIPRI.111 India often justifies its massive arms 
procurement with reference to perceived threats 
from both China and Pakistan,112 while Pakistan has 
repeatedly voiced its concerns over India’s military 
build-up.113 The conditions for continuing arms rac-
ing are well established. 
108 Raghuvanshi V, ‘Bureaucracy Remains Hurdle To Rapid 
Arms Procurement’, Defense News online, 1 March 2010’; 
Bedi R, ‘India keeps shooting itself in the foot’, Jane’s De-
fence Weekly, 21 October 2009.
109 See e.g. problematic cooperation between Mahindra and 
BAE Systems; EADS and Larsen&Toubro. Also see: Mis-
quitta S, ‘Defense Contractors Target Big Jump in India’s 
Military Spending’, Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2009.
110 Bedi R, ‘India approves additional payment for delayed 
subs’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 March 2010; Pandit R, 
‘Desperate step? Govt OKs 2000cr more for Scorpenes’, 
The Times of India, 7 March 2010; Raghuvanshi V, ‘India’s 
Scorpene Submarine Program Plagued by Delays’, Defense 
News, 7 September 2009.
111 Holtom P, et al, ‘Trends in international arms transfers, 
2009’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2010.
112 See e.g. Raghuvanshi V, ‘Shifting Geopolitics Realigns 
Indian Relations’, Defense News 1 March 2010; Bedi R, ‘India 
seeks more Sukhois to keep up with rivals’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 14 October 2009.
113 ‘Pakistan Sounds Warnings Over India Buildup’, AFP, 25 
February 2010.
Military vs human development
Human development in India has steadily im-
proved over the past decade but certainly not as 
fast as its economic growth. A staggering 400 mil-
lion people – 37 per cent of India’s population of 
1.1 billion – have now officially been recognised 
as poor by India’s Planning Commission.114 Recent 
statistics from the Oxford Poverty and Human De-
velopment Initiative (OPHI) for the UNDP classify 55 
per cent of India’s population as poor.115 The country 
ranks only 171 of 175 countries in terms of public 
health spending per person.116 Every year 400,000 
Indian babies die within 24 hours of birth.117 Child 
malnutrition rates are higher than in many sub-
Saharan African countries. In India, 42.5 per cent of 
children under five are underweight, as compared 
to 7 per cent in neighbouring China where similarly 
high economic growth rates have strongly con-
tributed to sharply decreased malnutrition rates.118 
According to UNICEF and the World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO), every year in India an estimated 
387,000 children under five die of diarrhoea, by far 
the highest number in the world.119 A World Food 
Programme report in early 2009 noted that India 
is still home to “more than a fourth of the world’s 
hungry, 230 million people in all”.120 The latest Global 
Hunger Index described hunger in the Indian state 
of Madhya Pradesh “extremely alarming”; “serious” 
rates of hunger persisted across Indian states that 
had experienced most economic gains in recent 
years, including Maharashtra and Gujarat.121 UNICEF 
114 Time Magazine, Vol. 157, No. 17, 3 May 2010, p. 7.
115 Shrinivasan R, ‘55% of India’s population poor: Report’, 
The Times of India, 15 July 2010.
116 ‘Saving Children’s Lives In India – Every One’, Save the 
Children, Briefing Paper.
117 ‘Babysterfte in India enorm hoog’, De Volkskrant [Dutch 
daily], 6 October 2009.
118 Sengupta S, ‘As Indian Growth Soars, Child Hunger Per-
sists’, New York Times, 13 March 2009.
119 Out of a total of 1.5 million deaths. ‘Diarrhea: Why Chil-
dren are Still Dying and What Can Be Done’, UNICEF/WHO, 
October 2009.
120 Sengupta S, ‘As Indian Growth Soars, Child Hunger Per-
sists’, New York Times, 13 March 2009.
121 Ibidem.
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has been critical of high military budgets in the re-
gion at the cost of social protection. “A number of 
countries in South Asia decide to invest in the mili-
tary and not to increase investment in their peo-
ple,” according to Daniel Toole, UNICEF’s regional 
director.122 According to the UN MDG Monitor, as at 
August 2010, in India none of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) had been achieved or 
are “very likely to be achieved, on track”.123
The UK Government would seem to acknowl-
edge the huge development challenges India faces. 
“In 2008/09 India continued a pattern of receiving 
by far the greatest amount of Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) bilateral assistance to 
an individual country (£297m) […]. Iraq (£353m), In-
dia (£339m) and Afghanistan (£178m) were the top 
three recipients of UK net bilateral Overseas Devel-
opment Assistance in 2008”.124
High levels of both foreign aid and arms exports 
are symbolic of the UK’s ambiguous approach to 
development issues in India. While India has expe-
rienced sustained high levels of economic growth, 
many development issues, including health and 
education have not yet been properly addressed, 
while at the same time the military budget has 
grown significantly in absolute terms. British arms 
manufacturers have profited from this develop-
ment, thanks to a liberal arms exports policy that 
has reflected a strong tendency to allow the arms 
industry to profit from India’s sharply increased de-
fence spending, ignoring many of the persistent de-
velopment issues.
122 Lamont J, ‘Unicef attacks India’s record on poverty’, Finan-
cial Times, 2 June 2009.
123 UN MDG Monitor - India, <http://www.mdgmonitor.org/
country_progress.cfm?c=IND&cd=356>.
124 ‘Statistics on International Development 2008/09, section 
4: Where does UK Expenditure on International Develop-
ment go?’, Department for International Development 
(DFID, UK).
Conclusions
Both India and Pakistan belong to the world’s 
lower-income countries. Sustained high economic 
growth should have reduced many development-
related problems, however underdevelopment re-
mains a huge issue, as does Pakistan’s highly unsta-
ble political climate. Sustained rivalry between the 
two nuclear-armed countries is used as a pretext 
for high military spending, fuelling an arms race 
and hampering human development. European 
countries, as well as the US and China, have shown 
little restraint in arming Pakistan, apparently com-
fortable with maintaining an escalating balance be-
tween the two states, and are also prone to justify-
ing sales to Pakistan as helping to combat Islamic 
militancy. Not only do these justifications appear 
problematic in the context of Common Position ob-
ligations; it is far from clear that they are likely to 
deliver their intended outcomes. 
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Supplying Venezuela
In the past five years, European industry has built 
warships for the Venezuelan navy. Some govern-
ments in Europe, and elsewhere, saw these deals as 
a threat to regional security. Nevertheless, authori-
ties in states where these contractors are based 
seemed content to ignore these concerns. 
The Venezuelan market for military 
equipment becomes an issue
In 2003, the first year for which the Consolidated 
Report reported on licences denied, EU states ap-
proved 51 licence applications for exports to Ven-
ezuela and refused three.125 This mixed pattern in 
export approval persisted in the next few years, 
but the relative weight of denied licences increased 
(Table 1 summarises information included on Ven-
ezuela in the Consolidated Reports from 2003 on). 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
# (new) licences approved 36 51 38 41 85 26 20
value of (new) approved 
licences 
(in € million)
50 50,1 119,3 118,7 267,4 39,3 183,3
value of actual sales 
(in € million)127
19,7 16,4 6,3 23,2 16,9 18,0 42,0
# licences denied N/A 3 6 5 11 12 10
criteria denials 2(1)
3(1)
7(2)
3(1)
7(1)
1(2)
3(1)
4(2)
5(1)
7(3)
1(1)
2(2)
3(3)
4(7)
5(6)
7(3)
1(1)
4(8)
5(8)
7(4)
8(2)
3(1)
4(8)
5(5)
7(4)
125 Sixth EU Consolidated Report (2004).
126 Data compiled from the corresponding EU Council’s an-
nual reports, published in the sixth (2004), seventh (2005), 
eighth (2006), ninth (2007), tenth (2008) and eleventh 
(2009) EU Consolidated Reports.
127 As reported data on some EU countries’ actual sales are 
known to be incomplete, the figures in this column ought 
to be interpreted cautiously.
 
 
Some of these denials referred to criterion 7, the 
existence of a risk that the exported equipment be 
diverted (…) or exported under undesirable condi-
tions. Such denials were consistent with evidence 
that rifles supplied to the Venezuelan military by 
European manufacturers had been diverted to Co-
lombian guerrillas included in the EU Terrorism List.
Venezuelan support to groups that undermine a 
neighbouring state was highlighted in the US State 
Department Country Terrorism Reports. But these 
reports also began to portray Venezuela as a risk 
in and of itself. Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez 
repeatedly made provocative statements about the 
US and made no secret of his intention to develop 
relations with Iran. This led the then US Secretary 
of State in 2006 to certify the Venezuelan Govern-
ment was “not fully cooperating in efforts to fight 
terrorism”.128 As a consequence, the US imposed a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism, 
2006.
Table 1: Exports that EU states authorised to Venezuela (2002-2008).126
R H E T O R I C  O R  R E S T R A I N T ?32
ban on the export of military goods and services 
to Venezuela, including re-sales of all weapons and 
equipment containing US technology or compo-
nents. The ban affected pending sales in the US and 
elsewhere. For example, the Israeli military industry 
lost a $200 million contract to upgrade Venezue-
lan F16 fighter planes, and from early 2007, Israeli 
authorities no longer allowed the export of ‘own 
military technology’ to Venezuela, in response to 
President Chávez’ increasingly close ties with Iran.129 
The US encouraged its transatlantic partners to 
practice similar restraint, including when selling mili-
tary hardware that did not contain US components. 
Comparison of data from 2005 and 2006 on li-
cences granted and refused for arms exports to 
Venezuela (see Table 1) shows contradicting ten-
dencies. EU exporting states saw reason to deny 
more export licences, on grounds that began to 
include regional security issues (criterion 4). The 
altered policy climate may also have discouraged 
potential exporters from applying for licences for 
Venezuela, which would suggest even more “lost 
opportunities” for EU-based arms companies than 
is reflected in the 11 export licences that EU states 
formally denied in 2006, and 12 denials they report-
ed in 2007. On the other hand, that restraint and the 
licences denied by EU authorities coincided in 2006 
with €16 million worth of military sales to Venezuela 
and the approval of 85 new licences, representing a 
potential trade figure of almost €270 million - by far 
the highest value of European exports authorised 
to Venezuela since the EU Council began publishing 
the Consolidated Reports, and possibly the highest 
ever annual value. Such figures suggest that while 
the US arms ban on Venezuela may have contribut-
ed to stop some European exports to Venezuela, its 
indirect effect may have been to open new market 
opportunities for those eager to replace Venezue-
la’s former suppliers, such as Israel. These and other 
market opportunities could still be grasped by in-
dustries based in EU countries if authorities down-
played the risk that others ascribed to Venezuelan 
foreign policy.
129 ‘Israel joins U.S. Arms Ban on Venezuela’, Defense News, 1 
February, 2007.
Even before the US ban on arms for Venezuela 
was put in place, President Chávez had reached 
out to suppliers in countries assumed to be under 
friendly regimes, such as the Spanish Government 
that Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero began heading 
in 2004. Prime Minister Zapatero was also Secretary 
General of Spain’s socialist workers’ party (PSOE). 
In October 2005, his Defence Minister José Bono 
signed a contract to sell Venezuela ships as well as 
light-medium transport aircraft and maritime sur-
veillance aircraft. In response to US State Depart-
ment concern over the contract, Spanish Minister 
Bono explained the aircraft and the ships were in-
tended to be used for the protection of the Ven-
ezuelan Exclusive Economic Zone and of shipping 
lanes, to fight drug trafficking and provide medical 
support to civil units. 
The Spanish reassurances did not stop the US 
from breaking the deal that had been signed with 
EADS CASA, since the electronics and engines of all 
the aircraft that Venezuela sought to buy contained 
US-made components.130 But the larger part of the 
Spanish contract with Venezuela, that is a €1,2 bil-
lion deal for the state-owned Navantia wharf to 
construct and sell to Venezuela 4 coast patrol ves-
sels and 4 larger ships, that all concerned were care-
ful to label “Economic Area Vessels” or POVZEE, was 
shielded more effectively. Navantia planned to fur-
nish the ships with Swiss-made Oerlikon machine 
guns and Italian Oto Melara 76mm guns, but prom-
ised not to install combat systems that contained US 
technology.131 The promise helped the deal pass the 
US arms export ban for Venezuela. Clearing the deal 
with Spanish authorities in compliance with the EU 
arms export control regime was not expected to en-
counter problems. A Spanish pre-licence notification 
was enough for Navantia and the Venezuelan navy 
to sign off on 25 May 2006, and begin construction 
at the shipyard and the auxiliary industry around 
the San Fernando-Puerto Real shipyard near Cadiz. 
130 ‘Love on the Rocks: CASA’s $600M Venezuelan Plane Sale 
In Heavy Turbulence’, Defense Industry Daily, 14 February 
2006.
131 González M, ‘Francia suministrará el sistema de combate 
de los buques para Caracas’, El Pais 13 March 2006.
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Arming the deal
The ban on selling US-designed combat systems 
did not mean that Navantia intended the ships to 
arrive in Venezuela without state-of-the-art com-
bat capability. The Spanish company subcontract-
ed other European companies to install radar and 
combat systems that do not contain US technology. 
Quoting “naval sources close to the project”,132 de-
fence journals reported the ships were being pro-
vided with the Tacticos combat management sys-
tem and STING EO radar electro-optical fire-control 
directives and Mirador electro-optical sensors for 
search and target tracking. Moreover, all eight ships 
built for the Venezuelan navy were to be equipped 
with covert surface search radar based in Thales-
NL’s scout technology, complemented with the 
SMART-S Ml2 E/F band 3-D surveillance radar on the 
four larger ships and with VARIANT 2-D radar on the 
four smaller vessels.
In mid-2006, the Dutch branch of Thales indus-
tries requested a formal export licence to install 
these particular radars and combat systems on 
ships under construction in Spain for an end-user in 
Venezuela – a deal worth over €190 million.133 Delib-
eration over the licence was not taken lightly. Dutch 
Defence Minister Henk Kamp aligned himself to the 
US position and publicly voiced his concern that 
Venezuela could pose a “Falkland conflict-type mili-
tary threat to the security of the Netherlands Antil-
les and Aruba”.134 He referred to President Chávez’ 
claim that The Empire prepared to invade Venezuela 
from US military facilities at these island territories 
that are located at only a stone’s throw off the Vene-
zuelan coastline, but are part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. That expectation, or paranoia, in turn, 
is taken to have motivated Venezuela to bolster its 
armed forces and prepare countermeasures. Some 
even surmised President Chávez’ ‘Bolivarian’ desire 
to liberate the isles from the Dutch. Coincidentally, 
132 Janssen Lok J , ‘Thales deal helps thaw Dutch-Venezuelan 
relations’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 June 2006. Revista 
Tecnología Militar n°2 (2006) covered the deal as well.
133 Rijksoverheid (Economische Zaken), Maandrapportages 
militaire goederen in 2006, 15 January 2007.
134 Janssen Lok J, ‘Thales deal helps thaw Dutch-Venezuelan 
relations’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 June 2006.
the entire Dutch armed forces were deployed to 
these isles from late May to mid June 2006, to stage 
a grand exercise, called Joint Caribbean Lion. The 
exercise was designed to have the Dutch forces pre-
vent a hypothetical neighbouring country from in-
vading the isles.135 Nevertheless, in the fall of 2006, 
the Netherlands gave Thales the green light to sup-
ply the Venezuelan navy, after Dutch Foreign Min-
ister Bernard Bot visited Caracas and was assured 
of Venezuelan respect for the isles’ sovereignty. 
Approval of the export licence for the combat and 
radar system was then presented as a strategy to 
improve Dutch-Venezuelan relations.136
This was not the only export licence the Neth-
erlands authorised for Venezuela,137 nor the last. In 
2007 and 2008, Dutch authorities extended the du-
ration of the licence for Thales, and the expected 
value of the sales to be made under that licence in-
creased to €255 million.138 It later appeared that the 
Netherlands had authorised another €65 million 
worth of exports as part of the same scheme, but in 
its reporting had ‘mislabelled’ the additional licence 
as for equipment destined for Spain, rather than the 
end-user in Venezuela.139 
Only in 2008, after Navantia completed con-
struction of the first of the eight vessels, did trans-
fers of radar and combat systems under these Dutch 
licences begin. These transfers were worth €20 mil-
lion in 2008, according to the Consolidate Report 
135 The exercise was described in ‘Joint Caribbean Lion’, De 
Landmacht, (4), n° 6, July 2006, pp. 4-9; and ‘Joint Caribbe-
an Lion bevrijdt’, Alle Hens - Maandblad van de Koninklijke 
Marine, July/August 2006, pp. 4-18.
136 Janssen Lok J, ‘Thales deal helps thaw Dutch-Venezuelan 
relations’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 June 2006.
137 Other sales to Venezuela relate to 3 Defender ground-
based air defence systems produced for the Venezuelan 
Air Defence Command that Thales-NL produced with an 
Israeli contractor only months before Israel banned its 
own exports to Venezuela.
138 Rijksoverheid, Maandrapportages militaire goederen in 
2007 & 2008. 
139 Private communication from civil servant at the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 12 October 2010, entailing 
a commitment to correct the matter in the next official 
reporting.
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published in November 2009,14 0 which was roughly 
half of that year’s reported EU sales to Venezuela. 
The remaining Dutch sales to the Venezuelan navy 
are understood to have taken place in the course of 
2009, as no extension of the licence was requested 
beyond that date. In their report on 2009, Spanish 
authorities already included a formal authorisation 
to export ‘warships’ to Venezuela valued at €945 
million, but they do not record the actual sale had 
already taken place.141 The first of these ships was 
formally handed over to the Venezuelan navy in 
March 2010.142 
Out of control?
The incorporation of a fleet of heavily armed 
European-made ships into the Venezuelan navy 
should not be seen as the inevitable outcome of a 
process that began more than half a decade ago, 
when members of the Spanish and Dutch govern-
ments had no reason to doubt Venezuela intended 
to deploy the ships for defensive purposes only. 
The concerned European governments had means 
to halt this process, and could have used these had 
they been convinced of the need to. Instead, Span-
ish authorities formally authorised export of the 
fleet in 2009. The Netherlands approved several 
extensions to the licence it had already obtained 
in 2006. Each of these extensions would have been 
contingent on evaluation of the latest state of af-
fairs, including an assessment of the risks named 
under criteria 4 and 5 in the EU Code and Common 
Position on arms exports. To that effect, the rele-
vant authorities evaluate “the recipient’s intentions, 
as well as whether the import is an appropriate and 
proportionate response to the recipient country’s 
need to defend itself (…) Member States shall deny 
140 11th EU Consolidated Report, 2009. The sales are reported 
under ML5, that category covers radar and combat 
systems.
141 (Spanish) Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, Es-
tadísticas Españolas de exportación de material de defensa, 
de otro material de producción y tecnologías de doble uso, 
año 2009. Anexo 1, ‘Estadísticas de exportación de mate-
rial de defensa año 2009’, p. 57.
142 ‘Navantia entrega el primero de los cuatro buques a la 
Armada Venezolana’, El Mundo [Venezuelan daily], 2 March 
2010.
an export licence if there is a clear risk that the in-
tended recipient would use the proposed export 
aggressively against another country or to assert by 
force a territorial claim”.143 
Although the Spanish and Dutch authorities 
cannot have failed to notice how developments in 
Venezuela took a problematic turn, neither sought 
to halt the deal. In March 2008, the Chávez regime 
made its first threat to send tanks, troops and Rus-
sian combat aircraft across the Colombian border 
to stage a war that would adversely affect regional 
security and threaten territories under EU Member 
States’ responsibility, such as the Netherlands An-
tilles. Similar threats followed at later date. These 
developments seriously undermined the belief 
that the Venezuelan navy would restrict its use of 
the new ships to defensive purposes only, as had 
been assured by the European governments that 
cleared the deal in 2006. Since then, the Venezuelan 
Government all but ceased describing Netherlands-
linked isles off the Venezuelan coast in unfriendly 
terms. Yet its navy is getting equipped to patrol 
the seas around these isles with Spanish ships that 
have Dutch radars and combat systems aboard. The 
Dutch navy that is deployed to guard these isles also 
voiced serious concern over three submarines that 
Venezuela was negotiating to buy from Russia.14 4
In Dutch parliamentary debate at the end of 
2009, Secretary for Economic Affairs Heemskerk 
ensured he made best efforts to balance out gov-
ernmental ‘responsibility towards industry’ with 
concern over stability in the Western hemisphere.145 
This explanation is revealing. Both the EU Code and 
the Common Position that replaced it state that 
while “Member States, where appropriate, may (…) 
take into account the effect of proposed exports on 
their economic, social, commercial and industrial 
interests, these factors shall not affect the application 
of the … criteria” (emphasis added), which includes 
143 User’s Guide, pp. 61-64.
144 Klopper R, ‘Marine beducht voor Venezuela’, De Telegraaf 
[Dutch daily], 12 August 2008.
145 Tweede Kamer, Wapenexportbeleid - Verslag van Algemeen 
Overleg, 06 October 2009.
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criterion 4 (regional stability).14 6 The job of govern-
ment in this situation is not one of balancing, it is to 
honour its commitments and obligations. 
Secretary Heemskerk added that he had in fact 
already denied a licence for Venezuela. On closer 
inspection, that denial concerned decoy launching 
systems, its intended importer was Navantia and 
the end-user was listed as the Venezuelan navy.147 
Importer and end-user to that deal are identical to 
those to which the Dutch branch of Thales is author-
ised to export by way of the licence that was first ap-
proved in October 2006 and extended several times 
after. Yet this denial should not be confounded with 
a (denied) extension of that original licence. This de-
coy launching system is not a Thales product. The 
deal to install a decoy system on the ships involved 
a different Dutch company and was not included 
in the original contract for which export authorisa-
tion was requested in 2006. This denial may have 
detracted attention from the other business that 
proceeded as planned in 2006, when Venezuela’s 
bellicose turn was still harder to predict and not all 
members in the Dutch government shared the fears 
that had motivated the US to put an arms export 
ban in place, nor the grounds that other EU mem-
ber states had stated for denying export licences to 
Venezuela.
Conclusion
The case does not show the EU arms control 
mechanism to have brought consistency in Mem-
ber States’ arms export policy and practice towards 
Venezuela. Formal export denials were given for 
relatively modestly-priced military goods and the 
consultancy procedure and other means may have 
prevented Member States supplied the military 
goods that others European export authorities had 
146 Paragraph 10 of the EU Code, and Article 10 of the Com-
mon Position.
147 The denial is listed on p. 32 of the Rapport over het  
Nederlandse wapenexportbeleid 2009, published by Dutch 
Rijksoverheid in June 2010. In private communication, a 
Thales company spokesperson explained this company 
was not affected by the denial, which concerned a  
product to be exported by another company.
already denied, but the system did not prevent 
large one-of-a-kind deals that Spain and the Neth-
erlands approved to a recipient country that the 
concerned states’ policy makers condemned and 
that was assessed unfavourably on several criteria 
of the export control instruments. 
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Mistral warships for Russia
In August 2009 the chief of the Russian General 
Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, announced that Rus-
sia was in negotiations with France to buy at least 
one Mistral class amphibious assault ship and then 
possibly to acquire another three ships to be jointly 
built in Russia.14 8 The deal for the first ship was re-
ported to be worth anywhere from €300 million to 
€600 million.149
In December 2009 it was reported that Spain 
and the Netherlands had entered the bidding for 
the contract,150 but then in March 2010, French Pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France was 
in “exclusive talks” for the sale of the ships.151 More 
recently, in August 2010, it was announced that the 
Russian Ministry had decided to put the purchase 
out to tender.152 
A Mistral-class ship is capable of transporting 
and deploying 16 helicopters, four landing barges, 
up to 70 vehicles including 13 main battle tanks, 
and 450 soldiers, and can be used as an amphibious 
command ship. The deal, which would be the first-
ever major military equipment sale by a NATO state 
to Russia, has been controversial from the start. 
While France has argued in the context of the deal 
that Russia must be treated like a partner and not a 
threat in Europe, both the US and other EU Member 
States, most notably the Baltic States, have raised 
concerns. Matters have not been helped by the Rus-
sian Navy’s commander, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, 
stating that had the Mistral ships been available in 
2008, the Russians would have defeated Georgia 
148 See, for example, ‘Russia set to purchase large French war-
ship-topbrass’, RIA Novosto, 26 August 2009; and ‘France 
defends decision to sell Russia amphibious warships’, 
France 24, 9 February 2010.
149 ‘Russia set to purchase large French warship-topbrass’, RIA 
Novosto, 26 August 2009.
150 ‘French, Dutch enter Russian carrier bid’, United Press Inter-
national (UPI), 23 December 2009.
151 ‘Russia: Mistrals Must Be Sold Fully Equipped’, Defence 
News, 25 March 2010.
152 ‘Russia throws open French warship buy to tender’, AFP on 
Defence News, 9 August 2010.
“within 40 minutes”, and Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin assuring reporters during a visit to Paris in No-
vember that “if we purchase this armament, we will 
use it wherever deemed necessary”.153
In the US, in December 2009, Congresswoman 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the top Republican on the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a bill 
that stated “France and other Member States of 
NATO and the EU should decline to sell major weap-
ons systems or offensive military equipment to the 
Russian Federation”, while several Senators from 
both the Republican and Democrat parties drafted 
a letter to the French Embassy calling on France to 
refuse the sale.154 Defence Secretary Robert Gates, 
when in Paris in February 2010 was described by 
Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell as having 
“made [US] concerns very clear” on the arms sale to 
French officials.155
Latvia and Lithuania have also expressed grave 
misgivings about the sale. Lithuanian Defence 
Minister, Rasa Jukneviciene, has revealed that “Our 
lawyers consider that such a sale would allow am-
biguous interpretations in regard of compliance 
with several important criteria of [the EU Common 
Position]”156 and has suggested “[i]t is time for the EU 
and NATO to formulate a more clear and firm policy 
on rules for military export control. There are no 
clear rules now”.157 Latvian Defence Minister, Imants 
Liegis, has urged consultation among allied coun-
tries when NATO members consider selling power-
projection equipment to non-allies.158 He has said 
that “[t]he EU and NATO should only sell their mili-
153 Cody E, ‘Critics say proposed sale of French Mistral ship to 
Russia will harm region’, The Washington Post, 3 February 
2010.
154 Rogin J, ‘Proposed French arms sale to Russia faces 
mounting opposition on Capitol Hill’, Foreign Policy: The 
Cable, 18 December 2010.
155 Shanker T, ’Gates voices concern about warship sale to 
Russia’, New York Times, 8 February 2010.
156 Rettman A, ‘French warship deal opens wound in EU and 
NATO’, EU Observer, 11 February 2010.
157 Rettman A, ‘Latvia and Lithuania call for tighter EU rules 
on arms sales’, EU Observer, 25 February 2010.
158 Hale J, ‘Caution Urged on Sales to Non-NATO Members’, 
Defence News, 28 June 2010.
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tary equipment and weapons to third countries if it 
does not create risks of regional security tension”, 
and that “EU Member States should consult among 
themselves on issues that might compromise the 
security of other Member States before clinching 
strategic and military deals”.159
France has attempted to alleviate these misgiv-
ings by repeatedly stating that the ships will be sold 
without sensitive equipment such as command 
and navigation systems and weaponry.160 However 
Russia seems to have a very different view. General 
Staff Chief, First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai 
Makarov, has stated that “Russia’s leadership and 
Defense Ministry have a clear position on the issue. 
Should a final decision be made on Mistral, we will 
purchase this ship only if it is fully equipped – with 
all control and navigation means and armaments. 
The only exception is helicopters. They will be do-
mestically made. Everything else is to be made to 
their standards completely”.161 Admiral Vladimir Vy-
sotsky was reported to have said in July 2010 that 
there was “no point” in the purchase of the French 
ship unless this involved transfer of technology.162 It 
would seem it is this disagreement that has prompt-
ed Russia to put the contract out to further tender. 
This case raises once again the difficulty EU Mem-
ber States seem to have in reconciling the prospect 
of very high-value defence sales with the obliga-
tions of the EU Common Position. Time and again 
the specifics contained in the Common Position 
criteria appear to be ignored when the commercial 
stakes are high enough, despite the fact that Article 
10 of the Common Position is unambiguous in stat-
ing that “[w]hile Member States, where appropriate, 
may also take into account the effect of proposed 
exports on their economic, social, commercial and 
industrial interests, these factors shall not affect 
159 Rettman A, ‘Latvia and Lithuania call for tighter EU rules 
on arms sales’, EU Observer, 25 February 2010.
160 See, for example, ‘France defends decision to sell Russia 
amphibious warships’, France 24, 9 February 2010.
161 ‘Russia will only buy fully-equipped Mistral from France–
Gen. Staff chief’, Ria Novosti, 25 March 2010.
162  ‘Russia throws open French warship buy to tender’, AFP 
on Defence News, 9 August 2010.
the application of the above criteria”.163 Moreover, it 
would seem likely that the current economic envi-
ronment will be increasing the pressure to prioritise 
support for the defence industry over strict applica-
tion of the Common Position. 
This case is unusual in that the drive to export 
is being pursued despite fellow EU Member States 
publicly expressing their disquiet over what this 
could mean for their own security. This would seem 
to be the last circumstance in which Member States 
should be approving or promoting transfers, and, 
as highlighted by the comments from the Latvian 
and Lithuanian Defence Ministers, suggests a fun-
damental weakness in the existing EU consulta-
tion mechanisms. Currently, consultations are only 
required in the event that one EU Member State is 
considering an application to transfer controlled 
goods for what is an “essentially identical transac-
tion” to one already refused by another Member 
State, which is not the case here. But it is difficult 
to think of a more appropriate occasion to consult 
with EU partners before a military equipment sale 
than when they feel this has implications for their 
own security. 
163 EU Common Position, 2008. 
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The emerging North African 
military build-up
Over the past few years Algeria and Morocco 
have signed a number of very large arms contracts, 
including fighter aircraft and major warships. Rela-
tions between Algeria and Morocco have been cool 
for decades. As noted in 2006 in the North African 
Journal: “The region’s governments clearly do not 
like Algiers decision to pump billions of dollars on 
defence, accusing it of starting a dangerous arms’ 
race spiral in the region (…) The whole situation, 
although it may not escalate from a military stand-
point, is likely going to worsen political and diplo-
matic relations in the region”.16 4
Libya, with the EU arms embargo removed in 
2004, is following suit. Smaller initial contracts are 
being followed up by much larger deals. With no 
direct security threat, such increasing sales to the 
three Maghreb countries risk fuelling a regional 
arms race that may actually worsen the security 
situation, with consequences for the wider region. 
All three countries have an abysmal record in 
terms of human rights. Many EU Member States ap-
pear to justify arms trade with these countries with 
reference to EU or NATO cooperation programmes 
around migration control, piracy or anti-terrorism. 
This chapter focuses mainly on the largest recent 
European contract in the region – the sale of Dutch 
frigates to Morocco, while putting it in the perspec-
tive of a wider arms build-up, including many re-
cently announced agreements and contracts with 
EU Member States. 
164 Daoud A, ‘North Africa’s Own Defense Buildup: Regional 
Risk or Legitimate Decision?’ The North Africa Journal, 21 
April 2006
Dutch frigates for Morocco
Early 2008 Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding 
won an order from the Moroccan government to 
build and design three Sigma-class frigates.165 A few 
weeks earlier the Dutch export credit agency Atra-
dius Dutch State Business had agreed to insure the 
financial side of the deal.166 An export licence worth 
€555 million was granted in September 2009.167
Reportedly the vessels would be needed for pa-
trol and coast guard tasks and to enable joint opera-
tions with NATO navies.168 Armaments that include 
MICA and Exocet missiles (both supplied by Euro-
pean missile maker MBDA) and a 76mm Oto Melara 
canon however suggest more offensive capabili-
ties as well.169 The Sigmas supplement two frigates 
bought from France in 2002.170
The deal clearly builds on Morocco’s aim to build 
closer military ties with both the EU and NATO, 
which have been steadily increasing over recent 
years. For example, for its support in the War on 
Terrorism, the US government designated Morocco 
‘major non-NATO ally’ in 2004171 and NATO agreed 
in 2008 “to enhance NATO-Morocco cooperation 
against terrorism and to develop interoperability 
between NATO and Morocco military forces”.172 In 
October 2009 another agreement was signed over 
165 ‘The Royal Moroccan Navy Orders Three Sigma Class Frig-
ates’, Damen News, 20 February 2008.
166 ‘Uitgereikte polissen’, <http://www.atradiusdutchstate-
business.nl/Images/EKVpolissen2008_tcm1008-130101.
pdf>
167 See export control website of the Dutch government  
<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
exportcontrole-strategische-goederen#ref-ez>
168 ‘Morocco goes Dutch’, Strategy Page, 15 February 2008; 
‘Opsteker voor Schelde’, [regional Dutch daily] PZC,  
8 February 2008. Also see: ‘Algeria, Israel, Morocco To Join 
NATO Navy Patrols’, Reuters, 7 April 2006; ‘Talks Open  
Between NATO and Med Partners’, AFP, 7 April 2006.
169 Janssen Lok, J, ‘Morocco’s Dutch Frigate Order is Con-
firmed’, Aviation Week’s Ares Defense Blog, 8 February 2008.
170 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa.
171 ‘U.S. names Morocco major non-NATO ally’, Reuters, 4 June 
2004
172 ‘NATO and Morocco sign agreement on Operation Active 
Endeavour’, NATO Press Release, 22 October 2009.
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a Moroccan contribution to NATO’s anti-terrorism 
mission, Operation Active Endeavour.173 As part of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Morocco 
is bolstering security and military cooperation with 
the EU.174 While the European Commission acknowl-
edges that the internal situation is deteriorating,175 
Morocco is allocated €654 million under the ENP’s 
2007-2010 programme.176
With NATO and EU cooperation a main goal, 
Morocco appears to have set its sights on western 
weapons, at a significantly higher price, compared 
to alternatives from Russia, South Korea or China, 
or the western military surplus market. The sale of 
frigates is also at odds with the current naval trend 
for smaller size craft for coastal operations. Howev-
er, Dutch shipyard Damen is looking for exports in 
this sector too. Not long after the Moroccan Sigma 
deal was secured, one of its regional directors was 
quoted as saying: “Small patrol boats are cheaper 
for poorer North African countries, and easier to op-
erate and integrate”.177
Military spending in Morocco is high at 3.4 per 
cent of GDP, slightly higher than in Algeria (3 per 
cent), but – according to the most recently avail-
able data – still much higher than in Libya (1.3 per 
cent) and Tunisia (1.3 per cent).178 In constant terms 
military spending rose from US$1.4 billion in 2000 
to US$3.14 billion in 2009.179 Quoting Moroccan state 
173 Ibidem
174 See e.g. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Af-
rica; ‘EU Mulls Deeper Policy Cooperation with Morocco’, 
Reuters, 22 March 2006; ‘European Neighbourhood And 
Partnership Instrument, Morocco Strategy Paper 2007 – 
2013’, p.10 <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/
enpi_csp_morocco_en.pdf>
175 Progress Report (‘Rapport de Suivi Maroc’) of 23 April 
2009 (SEC(2009) 520/2) at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_520_fr.pdf>
176 ‘European Neighbourhood And Partnership Instrument, 
Morocco Strategy Paper 2007 – 2013’, p.10 
177 Kahwaji R, ‘Officials: Regional Navies Prefer Small Patrol 
Boats’, Defense News, 24 March 2008.
178 SIPRI Military Expenditure data available at <http://milex-
data.sipri.org>
179 Ibidem; Achehbar S, ‘Enquête sur les Forces armées roy-
ales’, TelQuel nr. 351, 13-19 December 2008; ‘Morocco dou-
bles military budget’, Afrol News, 9 December 2008.
media Jane’s Defence Weekly identified a US$1 bil-
lion defence budget increase for both 2010 and 
2011.180 Unlike Algeria and Libya, Morocco has no 
energy revenues and thus less financial flexibility 
and is said to have sought Saudi aid to cover some 
US$3 billion of its procurement costs. “Morocco 
can’t proceed with major projects unless it has a 
multi-year commitment from the Saudis to pay for 
aircraft and naval platforms,” according to an uni-
dentified industry source.181
Human security and corruption
Preoccupied with military security, Morocco fails 
to deliver on human security issues. According to 
the UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Index (HDI)182 
Morocco is ranking number 130 out of 182 coun-
tries; 19 per cent of the population is living below 
the national poverty line. Adult literacy has slightly 
improved but is still very low at 55 per cent.
Morocco has also fallen down Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index, from a 
72nd out of 180 countries surveyed in 2007 to a 85th 
position in 2010.183 Many Moroccans consider cor-
ruption as systemic, especially affecting the armed 
forces.18 4 “Corruption is a structural matter and an 
integral part of the ‘security state’,” according to 
Abdullah Kamoune of the Moroccan Human Rights 
Association (AMDH).185 A few controversial cases 
have surfaced in the media in recent years, linking 
the military to corruption and other illegal activi-
ties. In January 2009 80 people, most of them mili-
tary and police forces, including naval officers, were 
arrested for involvement in hash smuggling by ac-
180 Gelfand L, ‘Morocco increases defence budget to compete 
regionally’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 March 2010.
181 ‘Morocco’, Middle East Defense Newsletter, vol.5 no.48, 15 
December 2008
182 Covering 2007 data
183 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 
2010.
184 Adolf S, ‘Marokkaans leger kampt met corruptie’, [Dutch 
daily] NRC Handelsblad, 15 September 2006; El Ouali A, 
‘Corruption-Morocco: Worries Rise With It’, IPS, 21 Febru-
ary 2006.
185 Ibidem.
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cepting bribes from smugglers.186 A few weeks later 
three civil rights activists that had been involved in 
anti-corruption protests were detained on charges 
of having discredited the police and “offending 
magistrates”.187 
Export policy considerations
In recent answers to parliamentary questions 
the Dutch government has elaborated on sustain-
able development aspects (criterion 8) and the re-
gional security (criterion 4). It has justified the ex-
port of the three frigates referring to an improving 
situation in areas of rural development and educa-
tion. It further reported that “Morocco is changing 
step by step into a stable, increasingly democratic 
and internationally participating neighbour of the 
EU”.188 In terms of regional stability it explained that 
both Algeria and Morocco are modernising their 
ageing military equipment and that any expansion 
of their assets is directed to “internal fight against 
terrorist organisations” (Algeria) or to more effi-
ciently counter-piracy (Morocco); “both efforts the 
Dutch government applauds”.189 
While migration control rather than piracy is 
likely to be the focus for the Dutch-built frigates, 
it also fails to explain why these frigates are armed 
with air defence and surface-to-surface missiles. 
And – in the case of Algeria – it is completely un-
clear how Sukhoi fighter aircraft, Kilo-class sub-
marines and main battle tanks (see section below) 
will help resolve Algeria’s internal problems. Finally, 
the answers also fail to acknowledge that recent 
arms purchases have significantly pushed up mili-
tary expenditure in both Morocco and Algeria, and 
are likely to continue to do so. 
186 Chmirou Y, ‘Démantèlement d’un important réseau de 
trafic de drogue: Les 10 jours qui ont changé la lutte anti-
drogue au Maroc!’, La Gazette du Maroc, 23 January 2009; 
‘Arrestaties bij marine Marokko’, [Dutch daily] NRC Han-
delsblad, 26 January 2009.
187 ‘Activisten gearresteerd in Marokko’, [Dutch daily] NRC 
Handelsblad, 10 March 2009.
188 Answers to parliamentary questions on the Dutch Arms 
Exports Annual Report 2009, 10 August 2010.
189 Ibidem.
Spiralling regional arms purchases
While the Dutch sale of frigates has been the 
largest European sale to Morocco, the North Afri-
can country concluded a number of other big arms 
deals recently. Despite the loss of the frigate tender 
to their Dutch rival, French yard DCNS finalised a 
deal later in 2008 for one FREMM frigate, costing 
€470 million and to be delivered in 2013.190 The air 
force is modernising and expanding mostly through 
US-sourced weapons, such as Lockheed Martin F-16 
aircraft and 24 Hawker Beechcraft T-6C Texan II air-
craft, jointly worth over US$1 billion.191 Meanwhile, 
ageing Mirage F1 fighters are being modernised by 
France for €350 million.192 Furthermore on order for 
the air force are four Italian/American C-27J Spar-
tan transport aircraft worth an estimated US$130 
million, one Gulfstream 550 for the Air Force’s ‘VIP 
Squadron’ (at US$142 million),193 and three Boeing 
CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters, adding to 
nine older C model versions already in service, for 
an estimated US$134 million.194
190 Hammick D, ‘DCNS finalises FREMM deal with Morocco’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 April 2008‘, Lewis J, ‘Algeria 
advances talks with France for FREMM purchase’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 27 February 2008; Janssen Lok J, ‘Three 
Sigma’, Aviation week & Space Technology, 28 January 2008; 
Lewis J, ‘Morocco becomes first FEMM export customer’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 31 October 2007. <http://www.
defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4185>
191 Gelfand L, ‘Morocco seals trainer aircraft FMS agreement’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 September 2009; U.S. DoD 
Contracts, 22 December 2009 <http://www.defense.gov/
contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4185>
192 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
193 ‘Morocco – Gulfstream G-550 Aircraft’, Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency News Release, 18 May 2009.
194 ‘Morocco Seeking CH-47Ds’, Air Forces Monthly, January 
2010.
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Table 2: Arms transfer agreements with Algeria, 
Libya and Morocco (2002-2009, total value in 
millions current US$).195
2002-2005 2006-2009
Algeria 600 6,800
Libya 900 1,600
Morocco 700 4,700
Morocco’s spending spree is certainly not taking 
place in isolation, but fits in a pattern of increased 
defence spending in North Africa – especially Alge-
ria, Libya and Morocco - resembling a regional arms 
race.196 Algeria and Morocco follow each other’s 
moves closely, and both have similar procurement 
programmes. Algeria has agreed a US$7.5 billion 
package deal with Russia, including 28 Su-30 jet 
fighters,197 180 T-90 tanks, two submarines and sev-
eral air defence systems. To sweeten the deal, Mos-
cow forgave Algeria’s US$4.74 billion of Soviet-era 
debt.198
A similarly large deal has been won by Anglo-
Italian helicopter manufacturer AgustaWestland 
which reportedly will supply up to 100 helicopters, 
worth up to US$5 billion, to meet the country’s 
“battlefield and internal security requirements”.199 A 
number of European shipyards have negotiated to 
195 Figures in this table are sourced from Grimmett R,  
‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Countries’, 
Congressional Research Service, 10 September 2010.
196 See e.g. Persson S and Mbogo S, ‘Libya arms deal, just in 
case’, AfricaReview.com, 16 February 2010; Carney D, ‘Arm-
ing the Maghreb’, ISN Security Watch, 17 November 2009; 
Nativi A, ‘Market demand’, Defense Technology Internation-
al, October 2009; Daoud A, ‘North Africa’s Own Defense 
Buildup: Regional Risk or Legitimate Decision?’ The North 
Africa Journal, 21 April 2006.
197 Worth US$2.5 billion; see: ‘Russia completes delivery of 
Su-30 fighters to Algeria’, RIA Novosti, 18 November 2009.
198 Carney D, ‘Arming the Maghreb’, ISN Security Watch, 17 
November 2009; 
‘Algerian Arms Deal Brings Russia $7.5 billion, Gas Market 
Leverage’, Defense Industry Daily, 14 May 2009.
199 Ripley T, ‘AgustaWestland wins 100-helo Algerian order’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 September 2009; ‘AgustaWest-
land Wins Huge Algerian Contract’, Air Forces Monthly, 
October 2009. Also see Carney D, ‘Arming the Maghreb’, 
ISN Security Watch, 17 November 2009.
supply four stealth frigates, including technology 
transfers.20 0 The U.K. government signed a military 
cooperation accord with Algeria in October 2009, 
hoping it will spur further sales of helicopters and 
ships.201
Libya’s first major arms purchases have only 
recently been signed following the lifting of long-
standing EU and UN arms embargoes in 2003/2004 
after Tripoli declared to give up its weapons of mass 
destruction programmes. Russian Prime Minister 
Putin in early 2010 announced a US$1.8 billion deal 
with Tripoli, reportedly including 12-20 Sukhoi fight-
er aircraft, six Yak-130 light combat aircraft, S-300 air 
defence systems and a Kalashnikov manufacturing 
facility.202 In late 2007, France announced a prelimi-
nary agreement with Libya over a €4.5 billion arms 
package, including 10-14 Rafale fighters, 2 Gowing 
corvettes and 8-12 Tiger attack helicopters, among 
many more items.203 No firm contract has so far been 
signed though. However it appears that Paris has 
delivered 100 MILAN-3 anti-tank missiles to Tripoli 
in 2009, in a deal worth €168 million.20 4 Dassault is 
also said to be working on the overhaul of Mirage 
fighter aircraft.205
The biggest military-related deal with an EU 
Member State to date has been a €300 million con-
tract Italy’s Finmeccanica signed with Libya in late 
2009.206 Finmeccanica and AgustaWestland – each 
200 ‘Algeria seeks European stealth frigates’, UPI, 2 October 
2009; Kingston T, ‘Fincantieri Polishes Offer for Algeria’, 
Defense News, 24 August 2009
201 Arezki Himeur M and Gelfand L, ‘UK signs accord with 
Algeria in pursuit of sales’, Jane’s Defence Weekly,  
4 November 2009.
202 ‘Russia confirms Libyan timeline’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 
June 2010; ‘Tripoli’s Shopping List’, Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 22 February 2010; ‘Russia and Libya Sign $1.8 
Billion Arms Deal’, Military Technology, 3/2010; Gelfand L, 
‘Libya close to finalising major Russian arms deal for $2bn’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 February 2010
203 ‘Russia and Libya Sign $1.8 Billion Arms Deal’, Military Tech-
nology, 3/2010.
204 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milexdata.
sipri.org/result.php4>
205 Warnes A, ‘Libyan Mirage F1s Returning to Service’, Air 
Forces Monthly, December 2009.
206 Kington T, ‘Libya, Finmeccanica Sign Border Control Deal’, 
DefenseNews.com, 7 October 2009.
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for 25 per cent - have also created joint venture 
LIATEC (Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Com-
pany) with the Libyan Company for Aviation In-
dustry; it hopes to use it as leverage to win orders 
from the Libyan air force.207 LIATEC has already done 
upgrades for at least three Chinook helicopters.208 
Spanish company ITP has signed a contract to ser-
vice and repair Libyan C-130 Hercules transport 
aircraft.209
The UK has issued arms export licences for Libya 
since at least 2007, including water cannons for riot 
control and internal security. According to the UK 
Strategic Export Controls annual report of 2008 this 
happened despite “concerns with Libya’s human 
rights record”.210 William Hague, the then shadow 
and now current Foreign Minister said in Septem-
ber 2009 “Arms exports controls are designed to 
protect fundamental human rights principles. Re-
laxing the rules to accommodate Libya in this case 
is wrong”.211 However the DSO export promotion or-
ganisation had made Tripoli a prime target for UK 
arms transfers.212
207 Warnes A, ‘Liatec In Strong Position’, Air Forces Monthly, 
December 2009
208 Warnes A, ‘Upgraded Chinooks in Service’, Air Forces 
Monthly, December 2009
209 Suggested to be worth up to EUR 23 million. ‘ITP expands 
Libya helos contract’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 March 
2010.
210 Quoted in Elliott F, ‘Sale of riot equipment to Libya ‘waved 
through’ in spite of fears’, The Times, 8 September 2009.
211 Elliott F, ‘Sale of riot equipment to Libya ‘waved through’ 
in spite of fears’, The Times, 8 September 2009.
212 Baldwin T, ‘Political help behind Libya arms trade, says of-
ficial’, The Times, 5 September 2009; Chuter A, ‘Britain: We 
Were No. 2 Exporter In ‘08’, Defense News, 9 June 2009.
Human rights organisations in Belgium in 2009 
successfully challenged a €11.5 million transaction 
of small arms to Libya, with the Council of State 
concluding that a transitional government could 
not grant export licences, but also noting that the 
weapons could be used for human rights violations 
and would risk diversion. However, soon after, the 
new government granted a new export licence, 
with negotiations pending for new exports up to 
€111 million over five years.213
In June 2010 Amnesty International stressed the 
continuing dire human rights situation, with Brus-
sels negotiating a pact with Libya on areas includ-
ing migration and asylum.214 Back in 2004 the EU 
lifted its arms embargo partly under pressure from 
Italy which wanted “to supply Tripoli with surveil-
lance equipment to help prevent illegal immigra-
tion. Italy’s long coastline makes it a major target for 
African migrants trying to reach Europe by boat”.215
213 ‘Belgian Court suspends export licences to Libya’, GRIP 
press release, Brussels, 19 November 2009.
214 ‘Phillips L, ‘Europe’s cosy relations with Libya crushing hu-
man rights, says Amnesty’, EUObserver.com, 23 June 2010.
215 Bowley G, ‘EU agrees to end arms ban on Libya’, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 12 October 2004. Also see: Castle S, 
‘EU ends arms trade ban with Libya’, The Independent, 12 
October 2004.
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German-Israeli armaments 
cooperation: sea, land and air
For many years Berlin has paid large parts of 
Israeli purchases of five Dolphin class submarines 
built by German HDW, a yard owned by Thyssen 
Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS). Germany has under-
written a substantial part of Israel’s Dolphin subma-
rines, including all of the costs of the first two ves-
sels, and half of the costs of the third, and one-third 
(or around €330 million) of the fourth and fifth in 
a 2005 deal, that will be delivered in the next few 
years.216 These Dolphins will be equipped with fuel-
cell air-independent propulsion. In addition Germa-
ny has promised to procure Israeli weapons techno-
logy worth another third of the costs of the last two 
submarines, to ease Israeli hard currency burdens 
associated with the procurement.217
Most recently Germany has been approached by 
Israel to help develop a funding scheme for another 
major naval procurement. Israel wanted to buy a 
sixth Dolphin sub and two enlarged Meko corvettes 
to be equipped as missile defence ships. These 
would have been build by another TKMS subsidi-
ary, Blohm + Voss at Hamburg. Media reports in July 
2010 said that no agreement was reached and pre-
liminary discussions had ended. Israel hoped, Ger-
many would again cover one third of the costs of 
the deal, which has been estimated worth €1.2 bil-
lion.218 It is unclear whether the German government 
decided not to fund additional ships at this point 
for economic reasons or because it would have set 
a precedence for Germany to financially support an-
other class of Israeli warships which could have in-
cluded a much larger number of ships than the two 
requested by now. 
216 Ben-David A, ‘Israel orders two more Dolphin subs’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 30 August 2006.
217 Eg. Germany leases Heron surveillance UAVs for its troops 
in Afganistan.
218 Opall-Rome B, ‘Israel Sub Deal Falls Through, Leaving 
Acquisition Plans Adrift’, Defense News, 19 July 2010; Ben-
David A, ‘Germany dampens Israel’s naval plans’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Opall-Rome B, ‘Israel Seeks 
German Arms-Aid Deal’, Defense News, 18 January 2010.
Significantly, after a 2009 reorganization, TKMS 
and Blohm + Voss have become part of a strategic 
venture with Abu Dhabi MAR (ADM) of the United 
Arab Emirates, which has no diplomatic ties with 
Israel. The strategic partnership yet awaits German 
governmental approval.219 This acquisition problem 
comes as the Israeli Navy adds new missions to its 
traditional one of coastal defence. The Israeli Navy 
now routinely deploys to more distant waters, such 
as the Western Mediterranean, the Red Sea and pos-
sibly the Gulf.220 Also, during Israel’s 2008-2009 war 
in Gaza, warships provided fire support for ground 
forces and launched precision strikes against rock-
et sites and other targets and more recently in at-
tempts to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza. 
In May 2010 nine people were killed and dozens 
wounded in a raid on the largest of a several ship 
Turkish flotilla, transporting aid and igniting inter-
national pressure against Israel’s blockade of Gaza.
Many more Israeli weapons contain German 
technology. For example, the Saar 5 corvette, hit 
by a Hezbollah missile in July 2006, had an MTU 
engine.221 The same company’s engines are also in-
stalled in the Israeli Super Dvora and Shaldag class 
fast patrol crafts.222 
The Dolphin submarines have Atlas Elektronik 
heavy torpedoes for sea-based targets.223 They are 
delivered via the USA, so that US military aid can be 
used for the financing. Israel can employ the sub-
marines in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf region 
for reconnaissance and for traditional naval warfare. 
They can bring combat divers into position for op-
erations, lay underwater mines, and fire Harpoon-
missiles at targets at sea and on land. 
219 Schulte S, ‘Details emerge of TKMS, ADM strategic part-
nership’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 August 2010; Opall-
Rome B, ‘Israel Sub Deal Falls Through, Leaving Acquisi-
tion Plans Adrift’, Defense News, 19 July 2010.
220 Opall-Rome B, ‘Israel Sub Deal Falls Through, Leaving  
Acquisition Plans Adrift’, Defense News, 19 July 2010.
221 ‘Eilat Class Sa’ar 5 Multimission Corvettes, Israel’, Naval 
Technology.com, s.d.
222 ‘$15,5M for Israeili Fast Patrol Boat Propulsion’, Defense 
Industry Daily, 18 May 2006.
223 ‘Submarines’, Global Security.org.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2005-8
Belgium 14.233 .512 5.409 1.407 21.049
France 72.219 89.140 126.271 75.034 362.664
Germany 20.358 19.558 28.371 25.084 93.371
Poland .567 6.678 3.850 7.008 17.536
Romania 16.669 15.455 32.124
United Kingdom 33.455 5.928 6.790 31.555 77.728
Total EU 145.404 127.149 199.409 162.262 634.224
Licences granted 439 610 1,018 833 2,900
Licences denied 14 27 28 22 91
 
Israel is an undeclared nuclear power. It sees 
the Dolphin submarines as a part of its strategic 
potential. Since it became known that the Dol-
phin subs have four larger 650mm in addition to 
the standard 533mm tubes and that Israel tested a 
cruise missile with a range of 1,000-1,500 kilometres 
off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2000, many observers 
assume that Israel wants to place some of its nucle-
ar weapons on submarines, where they will be near-
ly invulnerable.225 Since the submarines are mobile, 
they can cover many more and much more distant 
targets. In supplying these submarines, Germany 
risks contributing to nuclear proliferation, since it 
supplied a weapons platform that could be used for 
nuclear missiles. 
German technology at war
The Israeli air force bombarded targets in Leba-
non in 2006. The Israeli army pushed into Lebanese 
villages and cities that they regarded as Hizbollah 
 
224 Table sourced by EU Consolidated Reports on the years 
2005-2008. Romania was not a member of the EU before 
2007.
225 Also see Eshel D, ‘Urgent need’, Defense Technology Inter-
national, May 2010.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strongholds. The Israeli navy blockaded the country 
at sea. During all these operations, German military 
technology was used. Israel’s Merkava 3 and 4 tanks 
for example contain many elements that have their 
origin in German Leopard 2 tanks. These include 
the turret stabilisation system, which made the 
Leopard the first tank able to shoot while driving 
cross-country. It includes the armour (cooperation 
with the German engineering firm IDB-Deisenroth), 
the engine and the gearbox supplied by Renk of 
Augsburg. The tank’s engines were developed by 
MTU and assembled from the individual parts by 
an American licensee, from where they were sent to 
Israel.
The Heidelberg firm AIM-Infrarot-Module makes 
infrared modules for reconnaissance, targeting, 
and firing that are installed in combat planes’ com-
ponents, such as the LANTIRN targeting systems, 
or in helicopter systems such as TADS, that is used 
in the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunship. With the 
aid of the module weapons can be aimed and fired 
very precisely. Israel’s flying weapons systems, 
such as the F-16 fighter-bombers and Apache are 
equipped with these components. Similarly, the 
company Zeiss Optronic cooperates with the Is-
raeli firm Rafael in the production and marketing 
of Litening and Recce Light of reconnaissance and 
Table 3: Values of EU arms export licences to Israel (selected countries, 2005 - 2008, in € millions).225
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targeting systems, which are also successful export 
products.226
Many of the German components finally ending 
up in Israel do not appear in German government 
reports on Germany’s exports to Israel. Since they 
are subcomponents to larger components or weap-
ons build in third countries such as the US, they are 
often reported as exports to these countries. This is 
likely true for Germany’s annual reports to the EU 
Council as well. From these reports it becomes clear 
that looking at the last four available years (2005-
2008), Berlin is one of the EU’s main suppliers of 
arms to Israel. No submarines were exported dur-
ing these five years. However in years, during which 
submarines are delivered (e.g. 1999/2000) Germany 
is by far the largest supplier among the EU Mem-
ber States, since submarines are currently valued 
around €400-500 million apiece. Thus a single sub-
marine represents a larger export than the sum of 
all EU exports in any given year. Submarine 4 and 5 
are likely to receive an export licence in 2011. 
The security situation vis-à-vis the Palestinians 
has been clear for many years. Despite recent large-
scale military operations and an obvious dominance 
of its military forces, most recently shown in Opera-
tion Cast Lead in Gaza, Israel continues to have rela-
tively easy access to EU-origin military equipment. 
While a few countries have exercised real restraint, 
still 18 countries granted 833 export licences to Is-
rael in 2008, worth €162 million. France, the UK, Ger-
many and Romania are the main exporters. From 
these reports, due to lack of specific information on 
end-users, it is impossible to tell how much of the 
goods exported under these licences are for use by 
the Israeli military.
226 ‘Rafael RecceLite reconnaissance pod (Israel), Airborne 
systems - Observation and surveillance - Reconnaissance 
systems’, Jane’s Military & Security Assessments; ‘Rafael 
marks sale of the 1000th Litening Pod’, press release, 
ASDNews, 18 Oct 2010; and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
LITENING_targeting_pod>
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Inconsistencies
The previous cases brought to light the consid-
erable financial pressures that can be applied to EU 
Member States’ authorities to take decisions that 
would appear to run counter to the EU Code/Com-
mon Position. These cases hint at disagreements 
and difference of opinion among Member States. 
In the following cases, this overarching econom-
ic rationale seems absent. Nevertheless, transfers 
are still being authorised that apparently run coun-
ter to the spirit and letter of the EU instruments, in 
particular transfers to a number of actors involved 
in armed conflict where there are concerns about 
their conduct. The policy and practice for transfer-
ring military goods to those actors is seen to lack 
consistency across the EU. Some cases discussed 
also indicate inconsistency between the words and 
actions of a single Member State.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005-2008
Austria 14 893 14 907 29 800
Bulgaria 2 095 769 903 064 2 998 833
Czech Rep. 2 482 000 1 584 000 633 667 17 304 739 22 004 406
France 1 160 365 159 293 1 319 658
Germany 550 667 550 59 668 159
Hungary 50 000 50 000
Italy 15 716 15 716
Latvia 784 784
Lithuania 16 906 16 875 158 493 30 136 222 410
Netherlands 91 349 91 349
Poland 94 498 60 074 191 668 50 758 396 998
Slovakia 20 382 192 328 173 016 1 867 158 2 252 884
Spain 355 3 915 780 3 916 135
U.K. 5 526 784 3 027 140 588 307 7 887 421 17 029 652
TOTAL 8 206 797 6 739 310 4 091 621 31 959 056 50 996 784
227 Table sourced by the EU Council Consolidated Reports for 
the years 2005-2008. Bulgaria became a member of the EU 
in 2007.
EU military supplies to the Sri 
Lankan civil war
Decades of civil war have left deep scars all over 
Sri Lanka. At least 70-80 thousand people have died 
in the war. After a 2002 ceasefire brokered by Nor-
way was formally ended in January 2008 by the gov-
ernment, the conflict was clearly heading towards a 
new phase of violence.228 According to the govern-
ment the rebels had used the peace pact “to rearm 
and regroup. It now aims to crush them by the end 
of the year”, the BBC reported at the time.229 For that 
reason Colombo needed weapons itself and thus 
went out shopping. While it was crystal clear that 
the conflict was about to re-escalate, EU Member 
States were willing to allow arms and ammunition 
to flow to Sri Lanka during 2008. In the spring of 
2009 the offensive by Colombo crushed the Tamil 
rebel forces, with devastating humanitarian con-
sequences. It is estimated that over 20,000 people 
228 Buerk R, ‘Sri Lanka ceasefire formally ends’, BBC News, 16 
January 2008.
229 Ibidem.
Table 4: Value of granted export licences by EU Member States to Sri Lanka (2005 - 2008, in €).227
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ML 1 ML 3 ML 4 ML 6
Bulgaria 2 160 739 912 160 992
Czech Republic 7 361 079 2 545 907 6 580 689
Slovakia 1 867 158
Spain 3 915 780
U.K. 2 530 95 676
lost their lives during the last months of the conflict, 
many of them civilians.231 
EU arms transfers
Though non-EU members have supplied most of 
Sri Lanka’s arms over the past years, a few EU states 
have transferred significant amounts of military 
goods to the war-torn nation. The Czech Republic 
and the UK stand out as the EU’s largest suppliers, 
while Slovakia’s decision in 2008 to transfer rockets 
was also noteworthy. While Sri Lanka seems to be a 
clear case of an intensely problematic destination 
– a civil war, visibly escalating towards the final of-
fensive in early 2009, as well as well-documented 
accounts of human rights abuses – EU countries 
granted export licences worth €32 million in 2008; 
eight times more than in 2007 (see table 4). Also in 
2008, about one out of four licence requests was 
denied (table 5). 
230 EU Council Consolidated Report for the year 2008. The ML 
numbers refer to the categories of armament described in 
the EU Common Military List: ML 1 = Smooth-bore weap-
ons with a calibre of less than 20mm; other arms with a 
calibre of 12.7mm or less; ML 3 = Ammunition and fuse 
setting devices; ML 4 = Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, mis-
siles and other explosive devices; ML 6 = Ground vehicles.
231 Philip C and Evans M, ‘Times photographs expose Sri 
Lanka’s lie on civilian deaths at beach’, Times Online, 29 
May 2009.
The Czech Republic has a history of supplying 
arms to Sri Lanka and is the EU’s foremost exporter 
to Colombo.232 Colombo was the single largest desti-
nation for Czech arms export licences in 2008, with 
a value of over €17 million.233 The 2008 deliveries in-
cluded 20,000 7.62mm ‘version 58 automatic weap-
ons’, which were shipped through the port of Rot-
terdam in November 2008.234 As production of this 
type appears to have terminated in the 1980s, this 
transfer has likely come from surplus stocks.
These automatic weapons were shipped through 
the port of Rotterdam in or after No vember 2008.235 
The Dutch government has a policy not to interfere 
with transit that comes from EU and NATO partner 
states, even when the transfer would have been 
refused if the equipment was being sourced out 
232 See: Athas I, ‘Sri Lankan arms spending set to reach record 
levels’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 October 2008 and SIPRI 
arms transfers database, which mentions a number of 
army material transfers, often in aid and often specified 
“against LTTE rebels”. Also see: ‘Czechs reject Amnesty 
International criticism over arms exports’, BBC Monitoring 
Europe – Political, 14 May 2004, excerpt from report by 
Czech Radio 1 - Radiozurnal, in Czech, 1000 gmt 14 May 
2004; ‘Czech Republic Does Not Control Enough Arms Ex-
ports – AI’, Czech News Agency CTK, 13 May 2004; Spritzer 
D A, ‘Arms’ length’, The Prague Post, 20 November 2003; 
‘Arms exports to Sri Lanka in line with Czech law – minis-
try’, CTK news agency, 20 April 2001; ‘Sri Lanka Gets Czech 
Arms Supplies’, AFP, 15 April 2001.
233 “Annual Report on the Czech Republic’s Control of Exports 
of Military Equipment and Small Arms for Civilian Use 
– 2008.
234 Notification of 4 November 2008, Dutch government tran-
sit data 2008, also see the ‘Annual Report on the Czech 
Republic’s Control of Exports of Military Equipment and 
Small Arms for Civilian Use – 2008’, annex 4.
235 Ibidem.
Table 5: Value of export licences to Sri Lanka from selected EU Member States for selected cat-
egories of military goods in 2008, in €.230
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of the Netherlands – very likely to have been the 
case here. This transfer via Dutch territory there-
fore highlights a systemic deficit of such a policy: 
Why allow a transfer of military equipment through 
one’s territory if one would not grant an export li-
cence for that same equipment to that same desti-
nation? While a certain amount of loyalty and trust 
among partner countries is understandable, that 
should not imply that a government should turn a 
blind eye to controversial arms shipments that pass 
through their territory.
A Czech Industry and Trade Ministry spokes-
man confirmed these exports to Sri Lanka, while 
underlining that mostly due to pressure from the 
Foreign Ministry several other requests were re-
jected.236 In its 2009 annual report on arms exports 
the Czech government elaborates further on its Sri 
Lankan arms exports: “The Czech Republic was also 
among those Member States that were criticized 
for exporting military equipment to Sri Lanka. The 
[MZV -Ministry of Foreign Affairs] has been consist-
ently monitoring the conflict between the right-
fully elected Sri Lankan government and the LTTE 
separatist movement, which is included on both the 
UN’s list of terrorist organizations and the EU’s simi-
lar list. From the start of 2008, after the Sri Lankan 
government ended its ceasefire agreement and the 
conflict gradually started to heat up in the northern 
parts of the island, the MZV started reviewing all ex-
port license applications in a highly restrictive fash-
ion. This resulted in a growing number of rejected 
applications. Starting mid-2008, the MZV temporar-
ily suspended the export of large calibre weapons 
and ammunition”.237
Also a Mi-24 ‘Hind’ attack helicopter, extensively 
used in the war, 238 was transferred from the Czech 
Republic via Rotterdam in 2008, according to Dutch 
236 ‘Czech officials block many arms deals with Sri Lanka – 
Ministry’, Czech news agency CZK, 20 May 2009 (translated 
report).
237 ‘2009 Annual Report on the Czech Republic’s Control of 
Exports of Military Equipment, Small Arms for Civilian Use 
and Dual-Use Items and Technologies’.
238 ‘Mil Mi 24, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24#Sri_
Lankan_Civil_War_.281987.E2.80.932009.29>
governmental transit data.239 As no Czech sale of 
(second hand) Mi-24s has been reported - Sri Lan-
ka’s Mi-24’s were sourced from Russia and Ukraine 
in the late 1990s24 0 - it may be that maintenance or 
modernisation work on the Mi-24 has been carried 
out in the Czech Republic.
The UK has also been a significant exporter of 
military equipment to Sri Lanka over the whole 
of the decade preceding the Sri Lankan Govern-
ment’s 2009 military offensive. During the period 
2004-2008 the UK authorised transfers of inter alia 
semi-automatic pistols, heavy machine guns, sub 
machine guns, small arms ammunition, weapon 
sights, components for semi-automatic pistols, 
components for heavy machine guns, components 
for general purpose machine guns, components for 
assault rifles, components for submachine guns, 
gun mountings, armoured all-wheel drive vehicles, 
military utility vehicles, military transport aircraft, 
components for combat aircraft, technology for the 
use of combat aircraft, technology for the produc-
tion of combat aircraft, components for military 
training aircraft, components for military transport 
aircraft, components for military aero-engines, 
components for combat helicopters, equipment for 
the use of combat helicopters, technology for the 
production of combat helicopters, components for 
military utility helicopters, components for naval 
light guns, general naval vessel components and 
military/infrared thermal imaging equipment.
The UK acknowledged the aggravating situation 
in its 2007 annual report on arms exports,241 but ap-
pearing before a parliamentary committee in April 
2009 the then UK Foreign Minister Bill Rammell 
claimed that all the sales were legitimate based on 
evidence available at the time and further observed 
that “[i]f you went back through history, bluntly we 
 
239 ‘Notification of 11 March 2008’, Dutch government transit 
data 2008.
240 see e.g. <http://www.deagel.com/equipment/Combat-
Helicopters-Mi-24-a000751.aspx>.
241 2007 UK Annual Report on Arms Export, case study 5, p.15
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Table 6: Arms export licence applications in the EU for Sri Lanka (2005 - 2008)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 - 2008
Applications 93 140 116 129 478
Granted 85 117 93 96 391
Refused 8 23 23 33 87
 
would not sell arms to anybody because of what 
has happened in the past”.242 This, however, was a 
fundamentally disingenuous response. The applica-
tion of relevant existing and past evidence – which 
is entirely feasible without going “back through his-
tory” – is a critical aspect of the risk assessment EU 
Member States are obliged to take for all prospec-
tive arms transfers, as a cursory glance at the User’s 
Guide or denial notification system will reveal. And 
in the case of Sri Lanka, this evidence available at 
the time was clearly disturbing.
The Times reported the Government’s primary 
concern in authorising the 2008 deal was based on 
a concern that “countries, such as China, would take 
its place”.243 Apart from the fact that China has been 
an arms supplier to Sri Lanka for a long time, the ar-
guments as well as their timing clearly do not show 
much consideration of the then situation in Sri Lan-
ka. If true, the report in The Times raises some funda-
mental questions about the UK’s understanding of 
its commitments under what was then the EU Code. 
Slovakia meanwhile licensed, and delivered, 
10,000 rockets worth over €1 million to the Sri 
Lankan Armed Forces General Staff in 2008. When 
questioned about this deal, a Slovak government 
representative stated that it ‘was justified as there 
was no UN embargo on Sri Lanka, the government 
 
 
 
242 Minutes of Evidence. ‘Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 
(2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, 
Quarterly Reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of 
export control legislation, question 154’, UK Parliamentary 
Committees on Arms Export Controls, 22 April 2009.
243 Page J, ‘Britain sold weapons to help Sri Lankan army de-
feat Tamil Tigers’, The Times Online, 2 June, 2009.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
had the right to defend itself and that the LTTE was 
a banned terrorist organisation’.24 4 Just as the UK 
Government seemed blind in the case of Sri Lanka 
to the way the EU system is supposed to func-
tion, this suggests that in this case Slovakia was 
no less confused than the UK about how the EU 
arms transfer control system is supposed to work. 
The question of whether a prospective recipient is 
subject to embargo is only one part of one of eight 
criteria Member States are now obliged to apply, 
which for the most part address the conduct of the 
recipient rather than the possible target. If the Slovak 
Government had properly gone through all criteria 
they should have denied a licence for this deal.
Sri Lanka obviously is a controversial destination, 
also for export control officials, as can be seen from 
the relatively high and increasing number of licences 
refused (table 6). The denial rate has increased over 
the past few years from 8.6 per cent of all applica-
tions for Sri Lanka in 2005 to 25.6 per cent. 
Denials come from both EU Member States that 
have not licenced any arms exports to Sri Lanka over 
this period, as well as the main supplier countries. 
For all denied licences criterion 3 (internal situation; 
tensions and armed conflict) concerns have been 
 quoted, often besides other criteria, such as human 
rights concerns (criterion 2).
244 Nicholson T, ‘Slovak rockets sold to war-torn Sri Lanka’, 
Slovak Spectator, 7 April 2008; ‘Attack on arms sale to Sri 
Lanka’, BBC News, 10 April 2008.
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‘Appalling disregard for civilian safety’
More than 25 years of civil war between Sri Lan-
ka’s government forces and secessionist Tamil guer-
rilla’s (commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, or LTTE) 
came to an end in May 2009 after a massive govern-
ment offensive defeated the last Tamil strongholds 
in the north of the island. “International concern 
was raised about the fate of civilians caught up in 
the conflict zone during the final stages of the war, 
the confinement of some 250,000 Tamil refugees 
to camps for months after the war, and allegations 
that the government had ordered the execution of 
captured or surrendering rebels”.245
Such allegations have been made by e.g. Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), which called the “disregard 
for civilian safety appalling”.24 6 HRW has also docu-
mented the Government’s shelling of heavy artil-
lery into the no-fire zone in northern Vanni, where 
at the time some 100,000 people were trapped by 
the Tamil Tigers.247 Many similar incidents were re-
corded by the US State Department in its report 
to the US Senate.24 8 However, according to the In-
ternational Crisis Group (ICG) there “have been no 
investigations into any of the credible allegations 
of violations of human rights law by senior govern-
ment and the LTTE leaders over the course of the 
war”.249 In a May 2010 report the ICG accused both 
sides of war crimes.250 The Sri Lankan army was also 
accused of extra-judicial killings of captured Tamil 
fighters; a video leaked to a news station in August 
2009 appeared to show Sri Lankan soldiers in the 
act of executing a group of men believed to be Ta-
245 ‘Sri Lanka Country Profile’, BBC News, page last updated 16 
March 2010.
246 ‘Sri Lanka: Disregard for Civilian Safety Appalling’, HRW 
news release, 3 February 2009.
247 ‘Sri Lanka: Stop Shelling No-Fire Zone’, HRW news release, 9 
April 2009.
248 ‘Report to Congress on Incidents During the Recent Con-
flict in Sri Lanka’, US Department of State, 2009 available at 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131025.
pdf>. 
249 ‘Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace’, International Crisis Group, 11 
January 2010.
250 ‘War Crimes in Sri Lanka’, International Crisis Group, Asia 
Report No. 191, 17 May 2010.
mil fighters251 in a move that was apparently ordered 
“from the top”.252 
It has also been alleged that elements in the Sri 
Lankan Government (GSL) gave material support 
to other armed groups in the east of the country, 
such as the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), 
which supported it in its war against the LTTE. This 
material support included providing the groups 
with arms from its stockpiles and stockpiles of the 
LTTE discovered in the north of the country as well 
as colluding with them in the abduction of child 
soldiers.253 In addition, the GSL armed villages to the 
east of the country which were perceived to be un-
der threat from the LTTE during the war. However, 
there are no records of how many were distributed 
and no attempt at disarmament has been made 
since the conclusion of the war.
Accusations of human rights violations have not 
been restricted to war-time. The Emergency Regula-
tions (2000) and Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), 
both of which give the GSL powers of arbitrary ar-
rest and detention for national security purposes 
and have been criticised by human rights organi-
sations worldwide, are still in force more than one 
year after the end of the civil war. The EU recently 
suspended Sri Lanka from its Generalised System 
of Preferences Plus (GSP Plus) trading scheme as a 
result of that government’s refusal to demonstrate 
improvements in human and civil rights.254
251 See, for example video available at <http://link.
brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bct
id=35256686001> 
252 Miller J, ‘Sri Lanka Tamil killings ‘ordered from the top’, 
Channel 4 News, 18 May 2010.
253 ‘Complicit in Crime’, Human Rights Watch, 23 January, 
2007; See also ‘Tamil People’s Liberation Tiger (TMVP/
Karuna Group)’, Transnational and Non-State Armed 
Groups <http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/
ViewGroup?id=18>
254 Leahy J, ‘Sri Lanka shrugs off EU move on trade’, Financial 
Times, 6 July 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3d-
f41cc-88b9-11df-aade-00144feabdc0.html>.
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(Post-)War budget
In spite of all this, Sri Lanka still continues to 
spend large amounts on its army. Colombo’s war 
budget increased significantly over the past years, 
from around US$1 billion (constant 2008 figures) 
from 2002-6, partly as a consequence of the 2002 
ceasefire, to US$1.5 billion in 2009, or a 50 per cent 
increase in real terms.255 Media have reported even 
higher spending, quoting government sources. Ac-
cording to the BBC, “Sri Lanka’s defence expendi-
ture has soared in recent years – to 166.4bn rupees 
(US$1.48 billion) in 2008. This amounts to about 5 
per cent of GDP, nearly double that spent by India 
and Pakistan”.256 Based on information from the Ap-
propriations Bill the 2009 defence spending was 
set at US$1.6 billion, a record level.257 Later in 2009 
– after the end of the war – the military budget was 
raised with an additional “33 billion rupees (US$ 287 
million) to pay for hardware and beef up security 
in former conflict zones”.258 The Sri Lankan defence 
budget for 2010 has been estimated at US$1.64 
billion.259
A significant part of defence spending was 
made available for arms procurement prior to and 
in anticipation of the 2008 – 2009 government of-
fensive.260 The Sri Lankan Defence Secretary Gotab-
haya Rajapakse confirmed in August 2009 – af-
ter the Tamil defeat – that further increases were 
needed for modernization of the military and for 
payments made on hardware bought on credit. “I 
don’t see an immediate need to reduce the defense 
spending next year”, he said. “We have cut down on 
our ammunition purchases. But we need to bring in 
255 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milexdata.
sipri.org/result.php4>
256 ‘Q&A: Post-War Sri Lanka’, BBC News, page last updated 25 
January 2010; Athas I, ‘Sri Lanka records 20% budget rise’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 November 2007.
257 Athas I, ‘Sri Lankan arms spending set to reach record 
levels’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 October 2008.
258 ‘Sri Lanka raises defence budget by 20%: report’, AFP, 8 
October 2009.
259 Mallawarachi B, ‘Sri Lanka retains heavy defense budget’, 
Associated Press, 29 June 2010. 
260 Karniol R, ‘Sri Lanka set to boost air assets for northern 
strike’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 August 2007.
new technology to upgrade our military capacity”.261 
Again in early 2010 there have been reports of a 
US$300 million credit from Russia to realise a sweep-
ing modernisation programme.262
Development lost
Human development has clearly suffered of 
the ongoing war, if only because of the huge op-
portunity costs spent on the conflict, but possibly 
more so because in terms of lives lost, lack of ac-
cess to basic needs for the displaced people, as well 
as major material damage due to the fighting. Po-
tentially one of South Asia’s richest countries, it has 
yet to overcome a number of development-related 
problems. With sustained increases in the defence 
budget Sri Lanka seriously risks missing the MDG 
(Millennium Development Goals) targets.
Further export considerations
While the Czech and UK governments have re-
ported their exports to Sri Lanka in their annual 
arms export reports, Sri Lanka itself is much less 
transparent. It last reported to the UN register of 
Conventional Arms in 1996, for the year 1995.263 In 
terms of corruption Sri Lanka also has a poor perfor-
mance, “indicating a serious corruption problem in 
the public sector”.26 4
Reporters Without Borders has frequently raised 
alarm over serious press freedom breaches over the 
past years, including threats of, as well as factual ar-
rests.265 It spoke of a media crackdown on the eve of 
the 2010 presidential elections.
261 ‘Sri Lanka Plans for Increased Defense Spending’, AFP, 19 
August 2009.
262 ‘Russian Deal - Sri Lanka to upgrade military capability 
with Russian credit: report’, Lanka Business Online, 7 Febru-
ary 2010, mentioning a Sunday Times report.
263 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, <http://
disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF> 
264 Transparency International, ‘Sri Lanka is 92nd in the Cor-
ruption Index’, Sri Lanka Press Release, 23 September 2008, 
<http://www.tisrilanka.org/?p=361>
265 Reporters Without Borders <http://www.rsf.org/en-
pays79-Sri_Lanka.html>
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Reasons for allowing military goods to be ex-
ported to Sri Lanka may differ across the Member 
States, justifying arms exports because of the fight 
of an elected government against a terrorist organi-
sation, clearly ignores the wider context in which an 
export licence request should be considered. “The 
EU has on numerous occasions condemned both 
the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government for gross 
human rights violations. Normally this would trans-
late into denials of the sale of military equipment to 
these actors, but that has not been the case”, said 
SIPRI researcher Siemon Wezeman. “The scale of the 
transfers is not on the same level as other powers, 
but the EU needs to get its act together on this for 
its own moral integrity”.266
266 Philips L, ‘While condemning Sri Lanka violence, EU still 
sells arms to government’, EU Observer, 19 May 2009.
French arms transfers to Chad
There has been a French connection to a num-
ber of recent arms transfers to Chad, most notably 
armoured vehicles, but also ammunition, trucks and 
aircraft. In addition, the role of Belgium in the sup-
ply of the armoured vehicles raises questions about 
how EU Member States should take final end-use 
into account for transfers that are initially bound for 
another Member State. 
War, autocracy and underdevelopment
Chad has suffered through years of civil war, 
military coups and autocratic rule. With the crisis 
on its eastern border with Darfur and conflict over 
a booming oil business in the south, the country is 
far from stable and only a paper democracy.267 In the 
aftermath of a February 2008 coup attempt several 
opposition politicians were arrested. Many pro-de-
mocracy and human rights advocates have fled.268
Chadian Arabs have been cooperating with the 
Sudanese Janjaweed militia, one of the main players 
in the conflict in Darfur. The Darfur war spilled over 
to Chad in 2006, including an attack by Chadian re-
bels on the capital N’djamena, which was launched 
from Darfur and the Central African Republic (CAR). 
Again in 2008 rebels unsuccessfully attacked the 
capital.269 Rebel leaders have blamed the interna-
tional community for allowing president Deby to 
portray himself as the protector of Darfur.
The UN’s attitude towards Chad with regard to 
Sudan has been mixed. In 2008, the UN panel of ex-
perts monitoring implementation of the UN arms 
embargo on Darfur concluded that weapons had 
reached Darfur via Chad and on that basis recom-
mended that the UN arms embargo on Darfur be 
267 Polgreen L, ‘Gun Battles in Chad’s Capital as Rebel Forces 
Storm In’, The New York Times, 3 February 2008.
268 Polgreen L, ‘Rebels Border War Prolongs Darfurs Misery, 
The New York Times, 13 April 2008.
269 Polgreen L, ‘Gun Battles in Chads Capital as Rebel Forces 
Storm In’, The New York Times, 3 February 2008.
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expanded to include Chad.270 However, in reaction 
to the abovementioned rebel attack on N’djamena 
in 2008, the UN Security Council ‘called upon Mem-
ber States to provide support, in conformity with 
the UN Charter, as requested by the Government 
of Chad’.271 SIPRI noted that “even though this state-
ment did not explicitly mention military aid, it could 
be interpreted as legitimising arms transfers.272
In a surprise twist, after Deby made a surprise 
visit to Sudan in February 2010, both sides appear to 
have “put an end to all the problems” between the 
countries.273 Earlier the two sides had already agreed 
to start common border patrols. In July 2010, Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) member Chad made 
headline news for not arresting visiting Sudanese 
president al-Bashir, indicted by the ICC for war 
crimes and genocide in Darfur.274 While Chad has a 
chance “to escape the political and military crisis 
of the last five years (…) Déby’s rigid control of po-
litical space and recurrent problems in the electoral 
process could plunge the country into turmoil once 
again”, according to the International Crisis Group.275
Already in 2008, responding to the wave of 
violence in – both by opposition and govern-
ment forces – that hit Chad, in particular the capi-
tal N’Djaména. Amnesty International called on 
all governments not to supply arms to Chad when 
there is reason to believe that they could contribute 
270 United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of 
Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) 
concerning the Sudan’, included in Letter dated 7 No-
vember 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 591 
(2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2008/647, 11 November 2008, p. 91.
271 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, S/PRST/2008/3, 4 February 2008.
272  Wezeman P D, ‘Arms flows to the conflict in Chad’, SIPRI 
Background Paper, August 2009.
273 ‘Sudan and Chad to end hostilities’, BBC News, 10 February 
2010.
274 ‘Bashir warrant: Chad accuses ICC of anti-African bias’, BBC 
News, 22 July 2010.
275 International Crisis Group, ‘Chad: Beyond Superficial Sta-
bility’, Africa Report Nº162, 17 Aug 2010. 
to human rights violations or violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law.276
Ranked 175 out of 182 by the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index, Chad faces massive develop-
mental challenges. Despite significant oil revenues 
– since 2003 the main source of export earnings – 
poverty has not been cut over the past decade. Life 
expectancy at birth is still less than 50 years and 
adult literacy stands at only 32 per cent.277 Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions In-
dex (CPI) ranks Chad 171 out of 178 countries – the 
few countries that score worse include Iraq, Sudan, 
Myanmar/Burma, Afganistan and Somalia.278 Jane’s 
Information Group assessed Chad as the fourth 
least stable territory in the world, in both 2008 and 
2009.279 According to SIPRI, Chad’s defence budget 
exploded from 1 per cent of GDP around 2004 to 
6.6 per cent in 2008; from US$71 million in 2005 to 
US$611 million in 2008. In 2009, as oil prices fell, mil-
itary spending fell back to US$412 million.280
In 2001 the World Bank provided financing to 
Chad to support development of the Chad-Came-
roon pipeline carrying crude oil to the Gulf of Guin-
ea, with a specific agreement that substantial oil 
revenues would be directed to poverty reduction. 
It was touted as a test case for oil-revenue manage-
ment in Africa,281 but as it turned out much of the 
proceeds were spent on weapons and payments to 
276 Amnesty International, ‘Double Misfortune – Deepen-
ing human rights crisis in Chad’, December 2008 (AFR 
20/007/2008), p. 64.
277 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2009 – Chad’, <http://
hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/
cty_fs_TCD.html>
278 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 
2010’.
279 Shared with Zimbabwe in 2008 and Afghanistan in 2009; 
see Gilmour A, ‘State of the Nations’, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, January 2010.
280 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milexdata.
sipri.org/result.php4>; Wall R et al, ‘Budget Blades’, Avia-
tion Week & Space Technology, 7 June 2010.
281 ‘Chad wants oil money for arms’, www.news24.com, 19 
April 2006 [article no longer available online].
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senior military aides.282 Interviewed by French daily 
Le Figaro, Deby said: “Why shouldn’t Chad be al-
lowed? We are going to buy weapons. We’re going 
to do it openly”.283 Following repeated disputes be-
tween the World Bank and the Chadian government 
on compliance with the agreement, the Bank’s in-
volvement in the project ended in 2008.28 4
EU arms transfers to Chad
In such circumstances, it would seem sensible 
for EU Member States to exercise extreme caution 
with regard to supplying Chad with military equip-
ment, and while many EU states do not export any 
arms to Chad, this is not universally the case. France 
has been Chad’s main EU arms supplier in recent 
years. Transactions authorised have included the 
re-transfer of 82 ex-South African, armoured vehi-
cles armed with 90mm light weapons, which were 
refurbished in Belgium.285 
First reported on by Chadian media, a contract 
for 82 AML-90 armoured vehicles, built under li-
cence in South Africa as Eland-90, was signed on 
5 September 2006 by Chadian President Deby and 
a South African company.286 121 Eland vehicles had 
been transferred from South Africa to Belgium in 
1999 and 2002 respectively, reported by South Af-
rica to the UN register of conventional arms.287 Their 
282 Styan D, ‘Hanging Chad’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Febru-
ary 2008; ‘Chad needs oil money for arms’, BBC News, last 
updated 19 April 2006.
283 As quoted in ‘Chad ‘needs oil money for arms’, BBC News, 
last updated 19 April 2006.
284 World Bank, ‘World Bank statement on Chad–Cameroon 
pipeline’, Press release no. 2009/073/AFR, 9 September 
2008.
285 Wezeman P D, ‘Arms flows to the conflict in Chad’, SIPRI 
Background Paper, August 2009; Mampaey L, ‘Commerce 
d’armement triangulaire Belgique-France-Tchad: limites et 
lacunes de la réglementation belge et européenne’, GRIP, 
Brussels, February 2008.
286 Mampaey L, ‘Commerce d’armement triangulaire Bel-
gique-France-Tchad’, GRIP, Brussels, February 2008; 
‘Double Malheur – Aggravation de la crise des droits 
humains au Tchad’, Amnesty International, December 2008 
(AFR 20/007/2008), p. 60.
287 Belgium only reported the import of 115 pieces in 1999, 
see <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF>.
submission reads that the sale was to “End User: 
SABILEX”, which it would seem reasonable to pre-
sume refers in fact to the Belgian defence contrac-
tor SABIEX.288
It is unclear exactly what knowledge the Wal-
loon government289 had of the final destination 
when the licence was awarded for the transfer of 
the vehicles to France, but it is clear it was comfort-
able hiding behind formal arguments that because 
this was a transfer to an EU country an end-user 
certificate was not necessary, and thus an Interna-
tional Import Certificate (IIC)290 was used.291 Quoted 
in a local newspaper, a spokesman for the Walloon 
Prime Minister said: “It was important for us to ver-
ify whether France was really the final destination 
of these goods. After the goods were delivered at 
French subsidiary of the producer’s premises, the 
matter was in the hands of the French political au-
thorities. It was for them to decide whether or not to 
re-export these goods, the Walloon government no 
longer had a say in this (…) We would not accept the 
French to instruct the Walloon Region or provide us 
with moral advice. Conversely, we shouldn’t meddle 
in France’s foreign policy vis-à-vis third countries”.292
Ignoring for the moment the apparent contra-
diction between the Prime Minsiter’s first sentence 
and the rest of his statement, this illustrates a seri-
ous flaw in the licensing system, if states are able 
to avoid conducting a proper end-use evaluation or 
even taking account of known end-use risks in cases 
288 SABIEX website’s homepage says “Réalise en collaboration 
avec l’Agence wallone á l’Exportation” (‘in collaboration 
with the Walloon Export Agency’) <http://www.sabiex.
com/>
289 In Belgium, the Walloon, Brussels and Flemish regional 
governments each have their own arms transfer control 
authorities. 
290 An IIC declares that the importing company will seek ap-
propriate licences from its own government in case of 
re-export.
291 See e.g. Amnesty International, ‘Double Misfortune – 
Deepening human rights crisis in Chad’, December 2008 
(AFR 20/007/2008).
292 Author translation from quote cited in Mampaey L, ‘Com-
merce d’armement triangulaire Belgique-France-Tchad: 
limites et lacunes de la réglementation belge et euro-
péenne’, GRIP, Brussels, February 2008, p.5.
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where the immediate recipient is within the EU. This 
case therefore also raises questions about the im-
plementation of the 2009 directive on simplifying 
terms and conditions of transfers of defence-relat-
ed products within the Community, with regards to 
end-user information requirements.293 It may give 
impetus to arms exporting companies to set up 
local branches in EU countries where the licensing 
system is known to be more flexible towards ex-
ports out of the Union.
France subsequently reported to the UN register 
a 2007 transfer of 40 armoured combat vehicles to 
Chad, plus the export in 2008 of 25 armoured per-
sonnel vehicles.294 While the first transfer is likely 
to refer to the Eland vehicles, the latter point to a 
transfer of other armoured vehicles from France.295 
It remains unclear why France did not report the 
transfer of the other 42 Elands to Chad. According 
to news reports the transferred vehicles were des-
tined directly for the fight against Chadian rebels.296
These are not the only arms transferred to Chad 
with French involvement. France has acknowl-
edged that it facilitated emergency supplies of 
ammunition from Libya to Chad in February 2008, 
when rebels were fighting in the capital.297 In 2009 
Renault Trucks – part of the Volvo Group – received 
orders for 116 trucks from the Chadian MoD,298 with 
the company noting that the “new contract is im-
portant for Renault Trucks Defense in this troubled 
293 ‘Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and condi-
tions of transfers of defence-related products within the 
Community’.
294 France has not reported any transfers to Chad to the UN 
Register for the years 2003-2006 and has not yet reported 
over 2009. Belgium in recent years did not report to the 
UN Register any transfer of such vehicles to France or 
Chad. Chad itself last reported to the Register in 1995.
295 Information obtained from SIPRI, February 2010.
296 Quoted in ‘Double Malheur – Aggravation de la crise des 
droits humains au Tchad’, Amnesty International, Decem-
ber 2008, AFR 20/007/2008, p. 62.
297 Wezeman P D, ‘Arms flows to the conflict in Chad’, SIPRI 
Background Paper, August 2009.
298 ‘Chad: a new contract for Renault Trucks Defense’, Renault 
Trucks Defense press release 26 November 2009. It is not 
known whether they are MilSpec trucks or not.
area of Africa”.299 The Singapore office of Eurocop-
ter – the predominantly French helicopter branch 
of EADS – started delivering to Chad the first three 
of six refurbished ex-Singaporean Air Force Fen-
nec helicopters in late 2009.30 0 Most recently it was 
reported that two ex-French armed forces EMB-312 
Tucano aircraft – originally built by Brazilian com-
pany Embraer – are being prepared for delivery to 
the Chadian air force.301
Military role of France and the EU
France has maintained a military presence in 
Chad for most of its post-colonial history. While for-
mally only guarding Chad’s territorial sovereignty, 
with 1,200 troops operating reconnaissance and 
ground attack aircraft under Operation Epervier, 
which already began in 1986 to defend against 
Libyan intervention,302 France has been drawn into 
the country’s internal problems as well. In 2006, the 
French Government admitted that its Mirage fighter 
aircraft had fired warning shots at rebels advancing 
on the capital, though it insisted it had not actually 
been involved in the fighting.
In March 2008, EUFOR, the European Union mili-
tary force set up to distribute humanitarian aid and 
to protect refugees and UN personnel and equip-
ment, started operations in Chad.303 The Mission 
included troops from 23 of the EU Member States 
involved, though it was dominated by the French.30 4 
299 ‘Chad: a major contract notified to Renault Trucks De-
fense’, Renault Trucks Defense press release, 6 January 2009.
300 See SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (last accessed 30 Janu-
ary 2010); ‘Chad Air Force Expansion Continues’, Air Forces 
Monthly, February 2010.
301 ‘Former French Tucanos for Chad and Mauritania’, Air 
Forces Monthly, September 2010.
302 Styan D, ‘Hanging Chad’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Febru-
ary 2008.
303 EUFOR TCJAD/RCA webpage at <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1366>
304 Plus third party syayes Russia, Croatia and Albania. Lauren 
Gelfand [with additional reporting by Grzegorz Holdano-
wicz], ‘EU ends mission in Chad/CAR with handover to UN’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 March 2009; Goldirova R, ‘EU 
approves military force in Chad’, EU Observer, 29 January 
2008.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2005-2008
Bulgaria 2 042 965 2 042 965
Czech Rep. 4 000 4 000
Denmark 25 606 25 606
France 2 678 756 3 395 801 3 506 969 12 979 250 22 560 776
Greece 11 780 11 780
Portugal 23 743 609 843 452 334 1 085 920
U.K. 344 400 261 800 606 200
TOTAL 2 706 499 3 421 407 4 461 212 15 748 129 26 337 247
 
It is therefore of interest whether France has “con-
sidered how their arms exports to Chad could affect 
their credibility as neutral participants in the EU and 
UN-sanctioned multinational peacekeeping forces 
in Chad”, as arms transfers expert Pieter Wezeman 
notes.306 Bjørn Seibert, a researcher with extensive 
knowledge of the mission, notes that the roots of 
the instability have not been properly addressed 
with the EU providing substantial infrastructure as-
sets and financial assistance to Deby.307 In 2009 EU-
FOR was absorbed into the UN MINURCAT mission.308 
In 2010 Deby demanded that UN troops withdraw 
before the end of the year.309
305 Ibidem.
306 Wezeman, P, ‘Arms flows to the conflict in Chad’, SIPRI 
Background Paper, August 2009.
307 Gelfand L. [with additional reporting by Holdanowicz G], 
‘EU ends mission in Chad/CAR with handover to UN’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 18 March 2009.
308 Ibidem
309 ‘UN begins troop withdrawal from Chad and CAR’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Dunin A, ‘Intel Brief: The 
Chad Withdrawal’, ISN Security Watch, 18 May 2010.
Conclusion
Chad is one of the poorest and least stable 
countries in the world, with internal and external 
armed conflicts, with no proper democratic system 
in place, and with a UN panel recently naming the 
Chad Government as in breach of an embargo. De-
pending on the specific nature of a possible trans-
fer, as many as seven of the eight Common Position 
criteria could form the basis of a decision to refuse 
(it seems unlikely that criterion 5 – national security 
of the Member States – would be grounds for a de-
nial). Most EU Member States have indeed followed 
a restrictive policy towards Chad, which can be seen 
from the limited number of supplying countries, as 
well as denied export licences: 13 between 2005 
and 2008, with 51 licences granted.310
The glaring exception has been France, which 
has granted export licences worth €22.5 million 
from 2005-2008, out of a total value of €26.3 million 
by all EU Member States as reported in the Consoli-
dated Reports on those years. French NGOs have re-
peatedly criticised the French government for hav-
ing allowed for continuing arms exports to Chad, 
noting that these have been worth more than the 
310 EU Consolidated Annual Reports 2005-2008
Table 7: Value of granted export licences by EU Member States to Chad (2005 – 2008, in €).305
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amount Chad has dedicated to, for example, com-
bating child mortality and AIDS.311 
The French policy to exports to Chad is worrying 
in its own right, suggesting that for whatever rea-
son, France is willing to apply a very liberal inter-
pretation of the Common Position when it comes to 
arms transfers to its ex-colony. This becomes even 
more problematic when placed alongside the ap-
parently more restrictive policies of France’s partner 
EU States; the Common Position states clearly in its 
preamble that Member States “are determined to 
set high common standards” (emphasis added) and 
“intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote 
convergence in the field of exports of military tech-
nology and equipment”.312 
This discrepancy of policy, when combined 
with the apparent willingness of Belgium in the 
case of the refurbished armoured vehicles to leave 
France completely responsible for onward export, 
highlights a potential problem with the EU Direc-
tive on intra-community transfers. The Directive is 
designed to liberalise intra-EU trade on the under-
standing that high common arms transfer control 
standards will be applied at the EU’s external bor-
der. Where Member States do not apply high com-
mon standards, the dangers are obvious. 
311 ‘Rapport au Parlement sur les exportations d’armement 
2008: transparence de façade pour un contrôle en chute 
libre’, contrôlez les armes (French Control Arms coalition) 
press release, 28 September 2009. 
312 Common Position, preambular paragraphs 3 and 5 
respectively.
Bulgarian attack helicopters for Mali
Media in early April 2008 reported the use 
of two Malian Mi-24s in a “bloody air strike that 
marked an escalation of a conflict that has rumbled 
on for months deep in the Sahara”.313 The armed hel-
icopters had attacked Tuareg rebel positions near 
Kidal in the Sahara, during which “dozens of rebel 
fighters were killed or wounded in the attack, the 
first of its kind in the conflict” according to a mili-
tary source; a Malian newspaper reported that 62 
people had been killed in the fighting.314 “They had 
started deploying mines on the road from Gao to 
Kidal to stop all traffic. They were planning an am-
bush on a military convoy from Gao, so the army 
had to take the offensive”, a Malian military official 
explained to Reuters.315 According to the Air Forces 
Monthly magazine it is unclear “whether the Mali 
Republic Air Force (FARM) has its own pilots trained 
to fly these Hinds or if foreign mercenaries are be-
ing used to operate them on their behalf”.316
From its surplus stocks Bulgaria sold four Mi-24D 
‘Hind’ attack helicopters to Mali that were delivered 
between mid-2007 and November 2009.317 Moreover 
Bulgaria supplied 78 armoured combat vehicles.318 
While little has been reported on the value of indi-
vidual deals, according to the EU’s consolidated re-
ports of the years concerned Bulgaria issued export 
licences for Mali worth a total €13.8 million in the 
years 2007 and 2008. Figures of 2009, which are not 
yet available, are likely to include more licences as 
the last two Mi-24s were only delivered in late No-
vember 2009. SIPRI’s database reports a €5.7 million 
value for the sale of these two Mi-24s. Bulgaria has 
313 Sarrar, S, ‘Mali, rebels agree truce after bloody air strike’, 
Reuters, 3 April 2008.
314 Ibidem.
315 Tiemoko Diallo, ‘Mali helicopters strioke Tuareg rebels, 
several dead’, Reuters, 2 April 2008.
316 Second Mali Hind in Service’, Air Forces Monthly, October 
2008.
317 Two More ex-Bulgarian Hinds for Mali AF’, Air Forces 
Monthly, January 2010; ‘Second Mali Hind in Service’,  
Air Forces Monthly, October 2008.
318 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milexdata.
sipri.org/result.php4> for Mali and the Bulgarian reports 
to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2007-9.
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almost been Mali’s sole arms supplier over the past 
years, apart from a 2005 Czech transfer of three sur-
plus Mi-21 fighter aircraft.319
The Mi-24 attack helicopter is equipped with a 
23mm or 30mm twin-barrel gun and can launch 
missiles from six underwing pylons. The Mi-24, 
dubbed Hind by NATO, was widely deployed in Af-
ghanistan by the Soviet Army in the 1980s. In the 
1990s Russian Mi-24s were utilized to smash the re-
bellion in Chechnya.
Mali has been the stage of a series of confron-
tations with Tuareg rebels, the last between 2007-
2009. It was the most recent of a series of insurgen-
cies by formerly nomadic Tuareg populations. Alge-
ria helped negotiate an August 2008 Malian peace 
deal, which was broken by a rebel faction in Decem-
ber and crushed by the Malian military. A new peace 
deal was agreed in February 2009.320 The Tuareg 
group ADC has since joined the Malian government 
in its fight against Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). 
The peace deal appears to be part of Algeria’s strat-
egy to help the Malian government tackle the AQIM 
presence in its country. In May 2009, Algiers pro-
vided Bamako with military equipment ahead of 
a Malian army operation against an AQIM base in 
northern Mali.321 Also US troops have been training 
Malian armed forces in counter-insurgency opera-
tions from a base in Timbuktu since 2003, including 
the delivery of supplies of 4WDs, communications 
and radar equipment.322
For decades Mali has been one of the world’s 
poorest countries and among the least developed. 
319 See SIPRI’s arms transfers database for Mali
320 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuareg_Rebellion_%282007
%E2%80%932009%29
321 Gelfand L and Arezki Himeur M, ‘Saharan neighbours 
join forces against Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’, Jane’s 
Information Group, 19 August 2009; ‘Mali’s Tuareg tribes-
men join fight against Al-Qaeda’, Jane’s Information Group, 
22 July 2009; Arezki Himeur M and Gelfand L, ‘Mali gets 
Algerian help to fight Islamist insurgency’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 13 May 2009; ‘Algeria and Mali target al-Qaeda’, 
BBC News, 6 May 2009.
322 Van der Aa G, ‘Smokkel ontzien graag’, [Dutch daily] NRC 
Handelsblad, 13 January 2007; ‘Gunmen seize Mali military 
base’, ISN Security Watch, 23 May 2006.
The UNDP Human Development ranking puts Mali 
currently number 178, with only the Central Afri-
can Republic, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Niger 
performing worse in terms of human development. 
Life expectancy is 48.1 years on average and Mali 
has the world’s lowest adult literacy rate at 26.2 per 
cent.323
Because of economic growth Mali’s military ex-
penditure has been relatively stable around 2 per 
cent of GDP over the past decade. However, in real 
(2008 US$) terms it has significantly grown from 117 
million in 2002 to US$182 million in 2009.324
Bulgaria reported to the UN’s Arms Register the 
2008 transfer to Mali of 15 BRDM plus 14 BTR ar-
moured combat vehicles “without armaments”; in 
2007 it reported another 20 armoured “reconnais-
sance vehicles”, plus two Mi-24Ds.325 Bulgaria also 
reported the 2009 Mi-24 deliveries. Mali itself has 
never reported any arms imports to the UN Register.
In conclusion, the transfer of four ex-Bulgarian 
Mi-24 attack helicopters to Mali has significantly 
strengthened Mali’s air force adding a new attack 
capability to an inventory of only five much smaller 
utility/transport type helicopters.326 Moreover the 
Mi-24s were quickly used in a bloody air attack 
against Tuareg rebels and likely to sustain a linger-
ing conflict between government and rebel forces. 
Therefore the Bulgarian Mi-24 transfers raise seri-
ous criteria implementation questions. Firstly be-
cause these exports were either fulfilled or agreed 
at a time the Malian armed forces were fighting a 
Tuareg rebellion. Secondly the first two helicopters 
were used in combat shortly after their delivery, but 
before the other two were transferred. No public 
information could be found on how the Bulgarian 
government has judged the transfers in this con-
text, nor about its evaluation of Mali’s poor record 
in the area of human development.
323 http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_
sheets/cty_fs_MLI.html
324 http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
325 http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF
326 I.e. 1 Mi-8, 2 Mi-4s and 2 Z-9s; see: ‘World Defence Alma-
nac’, Military Technology 1/2009.
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The role played by EU companies 
in facilitating clandestine 
shipments of T-72 Tanks and 
related equipment to Southern 
Sudan 2007-2008
This study details the role played by companies 
based or registered in two EU countries - the UK and 
Germany - in facilitating a series of large consign-
ments of tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launch sys-
tems, rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles 
to the government of Southern Sudan, via illicit di-
version through Kenya. Not only do such transfers 
risk fuelling armed conflict and serious violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, but may also have breached existing EU em-
bargoes, which have been in place for the whole of 
Sudan since 1994. 
It is apparent that many governments via intel-
ligence and diplomatic channels, including the UK, 
the USA and Germany, were seemingly aware that 
these deals were of a clandestine nature and were 
likely being diverted from Kenya by road and rail 
to armed forces in Southern Sudan. Despite such 
knowledge, in the case examined below, Member 
States appear to have failed to meet their obliga-
tions tohelp prevent serious breaches of existing 
EU sanctions via companies operating within their 
jurisdictions.
The case also clearly demonstrates the key role 
that ancillary services such as transport and logis-
tics play in the clandestine delivery of arms, and 
highlights deficiencies in current levels of EU export 
control regulations over these types of activities.
Documents, field research and interviews for this 
case were undertaken by researchers working for 
the Small Arms Survey and Amnesty International 
UK. A more detailed analysis of weapons flows into 
the Sudan can be found in Mike Lewis’ paper for the 
Small Arms Survey, 2009.327
Sudan: risks of grave violations 
of international humanitarian 
and Human rights law
The 20-year Sudanese civil war (1983-2003) was 
a brutal conflict, which left at least two million peo-
ple dead and displaced a further four million from 
their homes.328 Serious human rights abuses were 
committed by all sides in the conflict,329 including 
the deliberate targeting of civilians, forced con-
scription, the use of child soldiers, ‘scorched-earth’ 
policies and blocking the delivery of food aid. The 
use of heavy weaponry, including indiscriminate 
shelling and bombing of civilian areas was a key fea-
ture of the conflict. Civilians are still being killed and 
abducted as a result of ongoing clashes between 
armed communities, militias and military units in 
the region with weapons continuing to be used to 
fuel serious human rights violations. Between May 
and June 2008, forces from both sides initiated di-
rect conflict in the provincial capital, Abyei, displac-
ing an estimated 50,000 people. In February 2009, 
clashes between SAF and SPLA contingents of the 
Joint Integrated Units stationed in Malakal, south-
ern Sudan, reportedly left around 62 dead (at least 
31 of whom were civilians) and 94 wounded (at 
least 21 of whom were civilians), according to UN re-
ports.330 UN military observers stated that both SAF 
and SPLA forces used main battle tanks and small 
arms in the fighting.331 In both cases it was reported 
that both sides used tanks to launch their attacks.332 
327 Lewis M, Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows, 
Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper, September 2009, 
available through <http://www.humansecuritygateway.
com/documents/SAS_SudansPostCPAArmsFlows.pdf>
328 See International Crisis Group on Sudan.
329 See Amnesty International Reports on Sudan.
330 Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 17 April 
2009 (S/2009/211).
331 Video Sudan / Malakal Fighting, UNIfeed news release, 25 
February 2009; Lt Paul Morrison, ‘Battle rages around UN 
Military Observers in southern Sudan’, National Defence 
and the Canadian Forces (website), 20 February 2009.
332 See ‘Sudan agreement on Abbey reached’, BBC News, 28 
November 2008. 
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Any non-declared import of weaponry to South 
Sudan is a violation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 by the Sudan 
Government and the authorities of South Sudan 
was brokered in large part by Kenya. According 
the CPA’s implementing procedures, signed at Na-
ivasha, Kenya on 31st December 2004, “replenish-
ment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or 
military equipment” would violate the terms of the 
CPA unless it had been approved via a joint military 
committee and under the oversight and coordina-
tion of the UN mission in Sudan.333
Significant quantities of arms have also been 
supplied to the Government of North Sudan in re-
cent years, particularly from China and Russia which 
have fuelled killings and grave human rights viola-
tions in the Darfur region and elsewhere.334 In the 
run-up to the long-awaited referendum in Febru-
ary 2011 on the possible secession of the South, 
it is clear that large scale re-arming by North and 
South Sudan is likely to re-ignite major armed con-
flict which clearly risks indiscriminate attacks on ci-
vilians and other serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law. 
The role of German and UK companies 
in facilitating clandestine shipments 
of weapons to Southern Sudan 
between 2007 and 2008
 
In September 2008, a Ukrainian-operated ship, the 
MV Faina, bound for Mombasa (Kenya), was hijacked 
by Somali pirates. The Faina was carrying a large 
cargo of artillery, small arms and T-72 tanks loaded 
at Oktyabrsk (Ukraine). There had been widespread 
speculation, including a public statement from the 
US Navy’s 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean, that the 
cargo on board was destined not for the Kenyan 
333 See sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.8, 9.6, 10.1.1 to 10.1.9 of Annex 1 
of the Permanent Ceasefire and Security arrangements 
implementation and modalities and appendices, singed at 
Natives, Kenya on 31st December 2004. 
334 See for example, Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious 
human rights violations in Dafur, Amnesty International, 
May 2007 and Blood at the Crossroads: Making the case for a 
global Arms Trade Treaty, Amnesty International, Septem-
ber 2008. 
Armed Forces, but for the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GOSS).335 This was denied by the Kenyan Min-
istry of Defence, which claimed that ‘GOSS’ stood 
for a (previously unheard of) department within the 
Kenyan Ministry of Defence called ‘General Ordi-
nance Supply and Security”.336 
Documents have since come to light, includ-
ing shipping manifests, charter documents and 
a Ukrainian export permit, showing that the MV 
Faina’s cargo was only one of at least three major 
maritime arms shipments since September 2007, 
fulfilling at least three arms contracts, with ‘MOD/
GOSS’ contract numbers, signed with a Ukrainian 
arms exporter, SSSFTF ‘Ukrinmash’, on 29 Decem-
ber 2006 and 15 February 2007 respectively.337 The 
first contract included ZU-23-2 (23mm) and ZPU-4 
(14.5mm) anti-aircraft guns; BM-21 ‘Grad’ 122mm 
multiple launch rocket systems, mounted on URAL 
trucks; RPG-7V rocket-propelled grenades; and 
at least 5 containers full of AKM assault rifles. The 
second contract consisted of T-72M1 and T-72M1K 
(command version) main battle tanks, along with 
spare parts, tools and accessories. The third con-
tract included 13,926 rounds of 125mm tank ammu-
nition, suitable for T-72 tanks.338 
Reports made by Ukraine to the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms (UNRCA) in 2007 and 2008 show 
exports of 110 T-72 Tanks to Kenya, which is likely to 
represent the total number of tanks exported as part 
335 Associated Press (2008), BBC (2008).
336 We have been unable to identify any reference to this 
department on any available Kenyan MOD documenta-
tion we have been able to locate from prior to the Faina’s 
seizure.
337 SSSFTF Ukrinmash is a subsidiary of Ukraine’s main state-
owned arms exporter, Ukrspetsexport.
338 The contract numbers are Contract No. MOD/GOSS/
ARMS/06-07-3/87-K dated 29 December 2006 and Con-
tract No. MOD/GOSS/T-72/06-07-5/9-1K dated 15 February 
2007 and Contract No. MOD/GOSS/ARMS/07-08-5/35-1K 
dated 5 May 2008. Freight/Cargo manifest for Faina dated 
1 September 2008; Mate’s Receipts for MV Beluga Endur-
ance, issued in Oktyabrsk, Ukraine, 18 December 2007; 
Ukraine State Service on Export Control, One-Time Export 
Permit No. 26290101 dated 3 August 2007. 
R H E T O R I C  O R  R E S T R A I N T ?62
of these contracts.339 To date, the Kenyan authorities 
have only acknowledged delivery of the 33 tanks 
and other weapons from the MV Faina and not the 
previous two unreported shipments and their con-
tents. That currently leaves 77 T-72 tanks and the 
other items of heavy weaponry, artillery systems 
and small arms and light weapons unaccounted for 
by the Kenyan authorities. Kenya has also failed to 
submit any returns to the UNRCA showing the im-
port of any heavy weaponry from Ukraine.
The two previous shipments arrived in the port 
of Mombasa in October 2007 and January 2008. The 
first arrived on board the MV Radomyshl, which de-
parted from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk on 14 
September2007 and arrived in Mombasa, Kenya, on 
29th October 2007.34 0 The Radomyshl was operated 
by the Danube Shipping Company of the Ukraine 
(UDASCO), but was ‘time chartered’,341 more particu-
larly by a UK-registered company Marine Energy 
Trading Company Ltd (METCO).342 It has not been 
possible to determine the controlling ownership of 
METCO: the charter contract was arranged by two 
Latvian-based consultants, representing two British 
Virgin Islands-registered companies whose owner-
ship is kept secret under BVI law.343
The second shipment arrived on board the 
German-operated MV Beluga Endurance, which 
departed Oktyabrsk on 12 December 2007 and ar-
rived in Mombassa on 12 January 2008. The Beluga 
Endurance was operated by German company Be-
luga Shipping GmbH, but Time Chartered by Ace 
339 See Ukraine reports to the UN register of Conventional 
Arms for calandar years 2007 and 2008, available at http://
disarmament.un.org/un_register.nsf
340 Interview, Kenya Port Authority official, Mombasa, 6 May 
2009; interview, shipping agent for MV Radomyshl, Mom-
basa, 6 May 2009.
341 A Time Charter is an agreement to hire the ship for a 
stated period of time or for a specified round-trip voyage 
or, occasionally, for a stated one-way voyage.
342 Time charter contract for MV Radomyshl between Marine 
Energy Trading Company and UDASCO, obtained by Am-
nesty UK.
343 Time Charter Contract dated 7 August 2007 and support-
ing documentation; company documentation for Ireland 
& Overseas Acquisitions Ltd and Milltown Corporate Ser-
vices Ltd.
Shipping Ltd of the Isle of Man, closely associated 
with Ukrainian company Phoenix Transport Servic-
es. A spokesperson for Phoenix Transport Services 
told researchers that “the only reason of using Ace 
Shipping Co during the vessel’s chartering is the 
simplification of accounting, as the Ukrainian tax 
legislation is one of the most complicated in the 
world”.34 4
Representatives from Beluga Shipping told re-
searchers the original charter was to move “general 
construction equipment” from Ukraine to Kenya and 
not military equipment. On arriving at Oktyabrsk 
and on discovering that the consignment was in fact 
a large array of weapons and munitions, immediate 
enquires were made to relevant government de-
partments in Germany and they were informed that 
it was likely these arms were bound for South Sudan. 
According to Beluga Shipping, despite an EU embar-
go and clear concerns over the nature of this cargo, 
the German authorities did not make any request to 
stop the delivery.345  
This and other research has highlighted a current 
deficiency in German export controls on transpor-
tation which appear to only cover German-flagged 
ships, but not ships which are owned or operated 
by German firms, but are foreign flagged in other 
Jurisdictions. In this case, the Beluga Endurance, 
while operated by a Germany company was flagged 
in Antigua and Barbuda.34 6 
Evidence that Ukrainian tanks were 
diverted to Southern Sudan
Compelling evidence, including analysis of 
satellite imagery, triangulated with eye witness 
344 Email communication to Amnesty International, Decem-
ber 2008.
345 Interviews conducted on 12 November 2008.
346 Section 4 of Act Implementing Article 26(2) of the Basic 
Law (‘War Weapons Control Act’), 20 April 1961, as amend-
ed by the Announcement of 22 November 1990 (Federal 
Law Gazette I, p. 2506) (as amended by Article 3 of the law 
of 11 October 2002, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3970). For 
further detail of this legal loophole, see Amnesty Inter-
national, Deadly Movements: Transportation Controls in the 
Arms Trade Treaty (ACT 30/015/2010), fn.30
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testimony and interviews with military sources 
close to the SPLA in Southern Sudan also strongly 
suggests that the weapons delivered on the MV 
Radymshyl and the MV Beluga Endurance were 
clandestinely transferred by road and rail through 
Kenya via the town of Lokichoggio on the Kenya/
Sudan border. For example, eyewitnesses described 
a series of night time convoys of low load vehicles in 
late 2007 and February 2008 with tanks clearly visi-
ble either under tarpaulin sheets or plywood cover-
ings: dates corresponding to the arrival of these two 
shipments.347 Further eyewitnesses reported seeing 
tanks matching the description of explosive-reac-
tive-armoured T-72s in early 2009 in two locations 
around Juba in southern Sudan. One military source 
close to the SPLA described to a researcher in some 
detail the political and military considerations of 
the purchase of these weapons following a visit by 
then SPLA Chief of Staff Lt Gen. Oyei Deng Ajak and 
other senior SPLA officers to Ukraine in early 2006. 
In July 2009, Jane’s Defence Weekly published a 
series of satellite imagery showing for the first time, 
photographic evidence of newly delivered tanks in 
SPLA bases near Juba in Southern Sudan.34 8 One im-
age captured on 17 May 2009 clearly showed the 
presence of 12 new tracked vehicles with a size ra-
tio consistent with T-72 tanks and much larger than 
the older T-55/Type 59 tanks that were previously 
used by SPLA forces.349 Analysis of satellite images 
taken from Kahawa barracks outside Nairobi, Ken-
ya, in March 2009 clearly show the presence of 33 
T-72 tanks that were oﬄoaded from the MV Faina. A 
comparison of the images taken from Kahawa and 
Juba clearly show that the vehicles are of the same 
dimensions and shape,350 and further indicate that at 
least some of the first two shipments of T-72 tanks 
were indeed delivered to Southern Sudan. Finally, 
in July 2009 an SPLA spokesperson, while denying 
347 Interviews were conducted with numerous sources, in-
cluding senior military commanders, experts and advisers 
working with the SPLA forces in Southern Sudan as well as 
individuals working for transport and freight forwarding 
companies connected with these deliveries.
348 See special report by Gelfand L & Puccioni A, Janes De-
fence Weekly, 8 July 2009.
349 Ibidem.
350 Ibidem.
that the Faina’s cargo was theirs, confirmed publicly 
to Jane’s Defence Weekly in late May 2009 that the 
SPLA had acquired T-72 tanks “since last year and 
some even earlier”.351
Conclusions
Sudan has been subject to a comprehensive EU 
arms embargo since 1994. The involvement of the 
UK and German companies raises serious concerns 
about EU governments’ ability and willingness to 
implement and enforce this embargo as well as pro-
visions contained within the EU common position 
relating to armed conflict, diversion and violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law.
Improvements in EU export controls are needed 
to better regulate companies involved in the trans-
port of arms to destinations where there is a sub-
stantial risk the arms will be used for violations of 
human rights. As stipulated in the 2007 UN Panel 
of Experts report on arms brokers, EU controls on 
arms brokering activities should be strengthened 
to include controls over closely associated activi-
ties such as transportation, freight forwarding, bro-
kering and handling agents. To avoid jurisdiction-
based loopholes, it is vital that controls apply to 
all companies based, operating or registered in EU 
countries, as they already do for some categories of 
weapons in the UK, for example.352
Several governments appear to have had strong 
intelligence that suggested a large scale and clan-
destine delivery of weapons to Southern Sudan. 
This includes a public statement by the USA, and in-
formation apparently passed to the German govern-
ment by a transport provider during the shipments. 
A further transport services provider involved in 
the shipments who told researchers that the ship-
ments were destined for Southern Sudan, acts as a 
consular official for a European government.353 It is 
clear that credible intelligence is a key tool in the 
351 Ibidem.
352 UK Export Control Order 2008.
353 Confidential interview with transport service provider, 
May 2009.
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risk assessment process and in wider efforts to stop 
weapons deliveries that risk contributing to grave 
breaches of international law. In this case, German 
authorities made no attempts to intervene and stop 
weapons being delivered by a German shipping 
company, despite being consulted by the company 
prior to departure from the Ukraine.
This research has provided further evidence of 
the role that “shell” or “brass plate” companies play 
in facilitating clandestine arms deliveries. Given that 
the EU is at the forefront in efforts to curb illicit arms 
proliferation, it is of serious concern that such com-
panies can easily register in EU jurisdictions with-
out any efforts by EU governments to investigate 
or prosecute these companies even when their in-
volvement in illicit arms deals come to light.354 There 
should be greater regulatory oversight, including a 
registering of all arms brokers and ancillary services, 
and more rigorous company registration and vet-
ting process for any EU company wishing to trade in 
conventional weapons.
354 For further examples, see Amnesty International, Deadly 
Movements: Transportation Controls in the Arms Trade Treaty 
(ACT 30/015/2010), fn.30.
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Diversion
What exactly is meant by ‘diversion’?
Military goods sometimes end up in a differ-
ent place than where the exporter shipped them. 
The case described in the previous section illus-
trates the matter in some respect. Europeans were 
reminded of this diversion problem in 2009 after 
FARC guerrilla forces were discovered to possess 
Swedish AT-4 anti-tank rocket launchers,355 which 
they had used in at least one attempted attack on 
the Colombian presidential plane. Sweden had au-
thorized the export of these rocket launchers to the 
Venezuelan armed forces in the late 1980s. It is hard 
to prove whether and to what extent these Vene-
zuelan armed forces were complicit in the diversion 
of the arms to guerrilla forces in Colombia almost 
20 years later. What is certain and relevant to the is-
sue discussed here, is they failed to prevent a large 
number of AT-4s leaking from their arsenals, to reg-
ister which pieces went missing, and to notify the 
Swedish export authorities what had happened.356 
The EU arms transfer control system describes 
diversion as a situation whereby military goods au-
thorised for export to a clearly identified end-user, 
are passed on to a different end-user within the 
same buyer country – ‘internal diversion’- or are re-
exported under undesirable conditions to a third 
country. To avoid diversion, exporting states are 
recommended to conduct post-shipment control 
through delivery verification certificates and on-
site inspections. It is also suggested they request 
end-user certificates that contain a clause prohib-
iting unauthorised re-export. Such clauses may ei-
ther ban all re-export, or make re-export subject to 
agreement in writing of the authorities of the origi-
nal exporting country and demand a commitment 
355 ‘Colombia seizes rocket launchers from FARC’, Jane’s Intel-
ligence Weekly, 22 July 2009.
356 Private communication from the Swedish arms export 
agency, November 2009.
by the final consignee to provide a delivery verifica-
tion certificate.357
More preventive action is due when a licence ap-
plication is being considered. Before approving an 
export, authorities must make a judgement about 
whether or not that export entails an acceptable 
risk of diversion, as set out in article 2, criterion 7 
of the Common Position. According to the 11th 
Consolidated Report, diversion was the most com-
monly stated ground to refuse an export licence; it 
was identified as a basis for denial in 179 out of the 
319 export licences denied in 2008. German export 
authorities made the majority of these denials (113 
in 2008).
The User’s Guide recommends that when as-
sessing diversion risks EU exporting states take 
into account the effectiveness of control policies 
in the destination country as well as the importer’s 
reputation in respecting re-export provisions. But 
European authorities are not guaranteed to have 
all information they need to make that judgement, 
since importers that have failed to honour a re-ex-
port provision in the past could as well fail to notify 
the country of first export about the military goods 
that went missing with or without their complicity. 
To avoid ill-informed European authorities continue 
approving licences to unreliable importers, all EU 
Member States are encouraged to exchange infor-
mation regarding countries of concern on a case-
by-case basis through COARM, and to seek ‘addi-
tional information relevant to measuring diversion-
ary risks from a wide variety of sources’.358 
357 Recommendations quoted in this section are from the 
User’s Guide, pp. 19-21.
358 User’s Guide, p 87.
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Country Value ML1 
exports 
(in €million)
# approved ML1 
licences / # all 
ML
# denied ML1 
licences
# denials stating 
crit. 7
Austria 117 1326 / 1850 10 8
Belgium 282 631 / 1202 2 1
Bulgaria 129 99 / 438 0 0
Czech Republic 18 97 / 1044 0 0
Denmark 7 4 / 337 0 0
France 27 86 / 6159 4 1
Germany 177 4530 / 16054 46 42
Hungary 34 76 / 261 0 0
Italy N/A N/A / 1469 5 5
Poland 8 25 / 345 2 2
Portugal 21 N/A / 1131 3 3
Romania 16 108 / 589 0 0
Spain 45 215 / 693 0 1
Sweden N/A 62 / 685 1 1
United Kingdom 184 2127 / 10417 9 6
Total 1069 10803/ 44634 81 69
The User’s Guide moreover demands special 
caution when scrutinising applications to export 
advanced military hardware. These applications 
should be considered suspicious if the stated end- 
user is not assumed to have the level of develop-
ment that is required to use and maintain that 
equipment. Applications of that nature could sig-
nal a potential problematic re-export. Addition-
ally, exporting countries must consider ‘the risk of 
such technology or equipment being diverted to 
terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists’.360 
But such problematic end-users are probably more 
interested in items such as SALW and ammunition, 
most of which are in common use and would not be 
classified as of an advanced military nature. 
359 Table built with data from the 11th Consolidated Report. 
In this table, only the EU countries reporting ML1 licences 
worth over €5 million are listed separately, but the bot-
tom-most row on total number of licences and the value 
thereof incorporates the smaller value EU small arms ex-
porters as well.
360 User’s Guide, p. 88. Since 2001, the EU defines its own  
Terrorism List.
Approving and denying exports of SALW 
Exports of SALW of a smaller calibre are easily 
identified in the Consolidated Report, where they 
are categorised by the Common European Military 
List (ML) under ML1. According to the latest Consoli-
dated Report, authorisations for such exports repre-
sented slightly less than a quarter of all the export 
licences EU authorities approved in 2008. The coun-
tries that reported export licences for small arms 
worth over €5 million in 2008 are listed in Table 8.
The authorities of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Spain are 
seen to devote a substantial share of their  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: European ML1 export licences approve and denied in 2008.359
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Region Sub-region # ML1  
licences 
approved 
# ML1 licences 
denied 
Crit 7 among 
grounds for 
denial
% crit.  
7 denials /  
# approved
Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 323 10 10 3,1
North Africa 62 5 2 3,2
America Central America & 
Caribbean
109 3 2 1,8
North America 2033 0 0 0
South America 284 2 1 0,4
Asia Central Asia 72 0 0 0
North East Asia 247 4 2 0,8
South Asia 212 16 13 6,1
South east Asia 265 4 3 1,1
Europe EU 2217 0 0 0
Other European 
countries
3350 21 18 0,5
Middle East 771 20 18 2,3
Oceania 84 0 0 0
 
licence-processing capacity to small arms exports. 
Small arms exports are also important to Italy, 
though no precise data are reported on the num-
ber of ML1 export licences Italian authorities ap-
proved. The Czech Republic is another noteworthy 
small arms exporter. The number of ML1 licences 
approved by Czech authorities may not represent 
a large share of their total licences issued (e.g. less 
than 10 per cent in 2008), but these have included 
approvals for transfers to countries that few other 
EU Member States have considered advisable to 
supply.362 
 
 
 
 
361 Data from the EU Council’s 11th Consolidated Report.
362 In 2008, their clients included Sri Lanka. Five years earlier, 
the Czech were the only European authorities to approve 
small arms supplies to the Colombian armed forces.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criterion 7 was stated among the grounds of 
denial to 69 out of the 81 small arms exports that 
EU countries denied in 2008, making diversionary 
risk the most commonly stated ground for refusal. 
These denials statistics of 2008 compare well to the 
number of licences that European countries denied 
in previous years. Between 2005 and 2007, the num-
ber of ML1 export licences that were denied be-
cause of criterion 7 ranged between 68 and 88. 
Small arms exporting countries differ substan-
tially in terms of their respective approval/denial 
ratios. Spain and several Central European small 
arms exporters did not deny any small arms exports 
in 2008. In Belgium, the country that approved li-
cences for a higher value than any other European 
small arms exporter, authorities denied only two 
ML1 licences out of 633 applications; in one case the 
risk of diversion was stated as the ground for denial. 
German and Austrian fears of diversion stopped a 
much larger share of small arms export applications. 
Germany was responsible for almost two-thirds 
of all EU small arms export licence applications 
Table 9: ML1 licences approved/denied by region.361
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denied due to criterion 7 concerns in 2008 and in 
previous years. The larger volume of small arms ex-
port licences these authorities considered, and ap-
proved, does not explain the proportionally larger 
denials ratio; 42 denials on criterion 7 to 4530 ap-
provals boils down to a proportion of almost one 
per cent, far more than the denial ratio of other EU 
small arms exporters. One possible reason for this 
may be that German authorities have more informa-
tion to alert them of diversionary risks when small 
arms are concerned than other EU Member States. 
As a large state, Germany is in a better position than 
smaller states to commit diplomatic resources to 
in-situ post-export controls and register previous 
unauthorised re-exports, so as to deny unreliable 
importers further licences. These experiences of ex-
porting states are what the User’s Guide encourag-
es Member States to exchange. But the recommen-
dation does not guarantee all small arms exporters 
absorb available information; or if they do absorb it 
that they act on it as appropriate. 
Export screening practices are understood to 
be conducted differently in the different EU Mem-
ber States. Some countries more commonly work 
on informal pre-licence notifications, whereby ex-
porting companies can first test the ground, and 
thereby never reach the point of a formal decision 
being taken, in which case there may be fewer deni-
als. This makes it mandatory to consider more than 
the naked numbers of denials and to look instead at 
overall trends in licence approvals to gain a better 
understanding of licensing policy and practice. 
Locating the risk of diversion 
In 2008, small arms exports were denied to Alge-
ria, Andorra, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Israel, Kenya, Libya, Mauritius, Republic of 
Moldova, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Russian Federation, Serbia, South Af-
rica, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Ukraine, Yemen, and ‘embargoed’ places such as 
China (both Mainland China and Macao), Iraq and 
Lebanon. Data on small arms export licences ap-
proved or denied in 2008 can be broken down by 
sub-region as in Table 9.
The number of denials is not of itself sufficient to 
draw conclusions on licencing policy, but informa-
tion on denials can give pointers to where it may 
be worth investigating further. In that respect, the 
table clearly identifies Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, the Middle East and some non-EU European 
countries as destinations to which EU exporting 
authorities ascribed a higher risk of diversion, espe-
cially when the licences denied are set against the 
relatively few licences that were approved for these 
same regions. By the same measure, the Americas, 
Central Asia, the EU and Oceania stand out as re-
gions to which EU small arms exporters appear to 
ascribe a low risk of diversion.
This pattern of risk perception appears to have 
undergone changes, when compared with report-
ing on previous years. A first change concerns Sub-
Saharan Africa. Only two ML1 export licences were 
denied on criterion 7 grounds for that region in 
2004, and not a single such licence was denied in 
2005. By 2008, however, Sub-Saharan Africa ranked 
among the regions for which most small arms ex-
ports were denied, and each of these denials stated 
a risk of diversion. Note that the reasons EU licens-
ing authorities had to adapt their export practice 
are not examined here.
A second set of changes concerns the evolution 
of the approval/denial rate for export licences with 
end-users in the Americas from 2004 to 2008, as in-
dicated in Table 10. 
Small arms export licences to both South and 
North America more than doubled in the observed 
five-year interval.363 In 2008, licences approved 
for North America represented a value of €485 
million,36 4 of which €471 million worth of small arms 
was destined for the US. This increase has been as 
363  Calculating the increase in small arms exports is problem-
atic as some of the main SALW exporters do not report on 
exports. 
364 11th Consolidated Report. The reported ML1 export value 
is underestimated, as the report does not include data on 
Italian small arms sales.
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Region # ML1 licences 
approved
# ML1 licences 
denied
Crit 7 among 
grounds for denial
% crit. 7 denials / 
approved licences
2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008
Central 
America & 
Caribbean
74 109 15 3 13 2 17,3 1,8
North 
America
949 2033 0 0 0 0 0 0
South 
America
114 284 15 2 14 1 12,3 0,4
Total 1137 2426 30 5 27 3 2,4 0,1
 
cribed to the expiring of a 10-year ban on the sale 
of assault weapons. Since the ban expired in 2004, 
the US began to import more assault weapons than 
before. EU small arms exports to the US are far more 
substantial than exports made to all other coun-
tries in the Americas taken together, or to any other 
country in the world. Not one single export licence 
was denied for that destination in any of the years 
considered here. 
The table further indicates a shift in the ratio of 
approved versus denied export licences for SALW 
to Central America and the Caribbean as well as 
for South America. In 2004, these Americas south 
of the Rio Grande were the region for which most 
small arms export licences were denied for risk of 
diversion, i.e. 17.3 per cent to Central America and 
the Caribbean and 12.3 per cent to South America. 
But by 2008, that same part of the Americas was 
denied hardly any of the 393 requested small arms 
export licences. Moreover, the total number of ap-
proved licences for that region more than doubled, 
from 188 in 2004 to 393 in 2008. This trend appears 
to indicate European arms export authorities con-
sidered that region a far smaller cause for caution 
than in the past.
365 Data on export licences approved in 2004, as reported in 
the 7th Consolidated Report, in OJ of 23.12.2005, C 328/214.
Latin American small arms abuse
The impression that EU exporting states have 
liberalised small arms exports to the Americas is 
puzzling, given the lack of evidence that small arms 
exported to that region have become less likely to 
be diverted to end-users who put these weapons 
to problematic use. A wide range of reliable sources 
consistently depicts the Americas, and especially 
Latin America, as the region where small arms cause 
proportionally more harm than in any other part of 
the world. Nine out of the 10 countries that current-
ly suffer the highest rates of firearm casualties per 
capita are in Latin America. The proportion of these 
victims shot by small arms is over 70 per cent, even 
if figures differ slightly from one country to the next 
and from year-to-year.366
Apart from Colombia, Latin America no longer 
suffers ‘armed conflicts’ in the sense of that word 
whereby a major proportion of the casualties are 
suffered and caused by the involved states’ regular 
armed forces. Those forces’ abuses of power have 
been recorded in some state- and country-specific 
data, which indicate that in the Brazilian state of São 
366 According to the Colombian forensic institute Medicina 
Legal, firearms were used in 84.1 per cent of the homicides 
committed in Colombia in 2002, after which the percent-
age went down to 70.9 per cent of the homicides commit-
ted in 2008. In certain areas of Caracas, up to 94 per cent 
of the homicides were committed by firearms, according 
to Radiografía del país más violento del mundo. Alcaldía de 
Chacoa (Venezuela), 2007.
Table 10: ML1 export licences approved/denied to the Americas (2004, 2008).365
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Paulo and in Venezuela as a whole, up to 10 per cent 
of the homicides may be attributed to police forces, 
who tend to categorise such casualties as ‘criminals 
resisting arrest’.367 But these figures imply that at 
least 90 per cent of killings are perpetrated by those 
not authorised to legal use of force. 
Many of these unauthorised shooters are affili-
ated with a variety of organised crime syndicates, 
guerrilla groups, counter-guerrilla forces or other 
death squads. Even if few of these are dedicated 
to goals recognized as ‘terrorist’, and are absent 
from the terrorist list, European authorities are not 
believed to approve exports to non-state groups, 
whether ‘terrorist’ or other. Illegal non-state groups 
rather stage ‘grey deals’ using, for example, doc-
tored end-user certificates, and buy on the black 
market. That market is supplied indirectly. It sells 
arms that were at one time produced in legitimate 
factories, e.g. in Europe, and sold to destinations 
known and approved by the relevant export con-
trol authorities. Diversion of these exports removes 
the arms from the controlled system, and supplies 
those who cannot access the controlled market. This 
should make the risk of diversion a prime concern 
when screening small arms exports to the Americas. 
The difficulty in spotting diverted 
European-made small arms
EU-sourced exports of small arms to Latin Amer-
ica suggest licensing authorities are ill-informed 
about the role those arms play in the Latin Ameri-
can carnage. Open source statistics fail to provide 
reliable data on what is clandestine and therefore 
hidden. This makes it hard to determine quantities 
and types of EU-made small arms on the black mar-
ket, and even harder to deduce what proportion of 
these arms are available because of diversion. 
Small arms traded illicitly can be studied in indi-
rect ways nevertheless. It is not impossible – though 
it is difficult – to reconstruct diversion routes from 
367 Radiografía del país más violento del mundo. Alcaldía de 
Chacoa, 2007, p. 34; data on Saõ Paulo (Brazil) are summa-
rised from Estado da Segurança Pública Trimestrial statis-
tics under ‘ocorrências envolvendo policias militares’.
arms found in the hands of a group that had no ac-
cess to legal sales. In recent years, information has 
begun to be systematised about the types and ori-
gins of the arms used in Mexico by cartels that traf-
fic illegal drugs from Latin America to the lucrative 
market in the US. Government sources from Mexico 
stated that 60,000 of the 75,000 firearms seized 
from criminal users in the past three years could be 
traced to sales on the legal market for firearms in 
the US. 
There is evidence that European imports to that 
US market are among the arms that are diverted to 
the Mexican black market. Mexican Procuraduría 
inventories on arms seized from cartels include 
Italian-made Berettas and Browning pistols made 
in Belgium, as well as Llama Gabilondo pistols from 
Spain and Austrian Glocks.368 Additional sources 
on firearms purchased in the US and recovered in 
Mexico report large quantities of Romarms (Roma-
nian manufactured) AK-47s and almost a hundred 
FN FiveseveN 5.7mm pistols,369 the side-arm accom-
paniment to the FN PS90. The FiveseveN and the 
PS90 submachine gun, both of which are produced 
by the Belgian Fabrique Nationale (FN), are known 
in Latin America as ‘matapolicias’ (‘police killers’) 
for their capacity to perforate bullet-proof jackets 
when using a specific type of 7.5mmx28mm ammu-
nition. A request to export an older version of this 
submachine guns to end-users in Mexico caused 
considerable commotion in Belgium,370 yet the most 
problematic of users in Mexico now have access to 
these guns through diversion from the US market. 
These same types of arms have also been trafficked 
368 (Mexican) Gobierno Federal, Procuraduría General de la 
República & SEDENA, Tráfico de armas México-USA, 27 No-
vember 2008 and 26 Mach 2009.
369 Goodman C & Marizco M, US Firearms Trafficking to Mexico. 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – Mexi-
co Institute, September 2010, pp. 20-21.
370 Export permit granted on 24 February 2000, according to 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel, on quote 
in parliamentary report <www.dekamer.be/doc/PCRA/
html/50/ap052N.html> Commotion in Parliament and 
the Belgian media caused the export licence to be put 
on hold. The Mexican government cancelled the import 
documents before Belgian took a formal decision to deny 
or authorize the corresponding export licence.
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to Central America,371 and have been recovered from 
crime scenes still further south, where local police 
have routed tracing requests through Interpol. 
Police authorities in the country where the arms 
are produced and exported facilitate these trace-
requests to help identify the importer. Replies to 
the trace-requests are sent only to police or judicial 
authorities in the country where crimes were com-
mitted with the arms, and are not communicated to 
others or for different purposes, such as to help au-
thorities in the exporting state determine the risk of 
diversion when dealing with particular importers.372
EU export authorities can still assess the risk of 
diversion by taking leads from the already-quoted 
open sources. But if they took such leads, these did 
not affect their small arms sales to the US. In 2008, 
as already mentioned, applications for all EU ML1 
exports to that country were approved, as had been 
the case in previous years. EU-based exporters have 
appeared more likely to deny export of high-power 
SALW to smaller markets, which are now supplied 
indirectly through diversion from the US. The ex-
panding, lucrative and liberal US small arms market 
thus appears to constitute a loophole for the EU 
arms control system. 
More data are needed to determine to what 
extent EU small arms exports to the US, and else-
where, end up supplying problematic users in Latin 
America. Systematic analysis of such data can help 
reconstruct trafficking patterns over longer periods 
of time, which in turn can help judge the risk for di-
version on a sounder basis than haphazard media 
reports that EU export authorities currently have 
available, at best. A first such piece of analysis is in 
fact available from an independent investigation 
funded by the Belgian Federal Ministry of Foreign 
371 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ‘Florida wom-
an convicted of illegal gun exports to Honduras’, March 
2009; also covered in Weaver J, ‘Naples woman convicted 
in weapons plot’, The Miami Herald, 24 March 2009.
372 Information obtained from the Belgian Federal Police’s 
illicit arms tracing unit, interviewed in Brussels, 14 June 
2010.
Affairs.373 The investigation ‘re-mined’ registers of 
stockpiles of arms seized from illegal non-state ac-
tors in Colombia. The next section explores what 
lessons EU small arms exporters might want to draw 
from these research findings, which were first pub-
lished at the end of 2009.374 
The Colombian job – a study of diversion
At first sight, Colombia is of little relevance to 
a study of EU arms exports. The country’s imports 
from EU Member States decreased after the Colom-
bian armed forces were issued Israeli Galil assault 
rifles in 1993, to replace the German-made HK G3s 
they had been using until then. Less than a decade 
later, according to information available from the 
Consolidated Report, EU Council-reported exports 
(all ML categories) to Colombia in 2002 amounted to 
zero, a historical low that some ascribed to stringent 
use of the EU Code vis-à-vis the Colombian armed 
conflict and rampant human rights violations. In 
2004, Czech guns began to be exported to Colom-
bia, but until 2006 such and other EU-sourced sales 
to the country were worth less €3 million a year.
Colombia enforces a monopoly on imports 
and sales of arms through the state-owned Indus-
tria Militar (INDUMIL). The register that is kept by 
INDUMIL in Bogotá of all arms imported and arms 
sold in Colombia confirms the relative modesty of 
European arms exports to Colombian end-users. 
Until recently, the only EU-made arms that INDUMIL 
sold on a regular basis were Spanish revolvers. The 
large share of the other EU arms found in Colom-
bia had thus been supplied to others than those IN-
DUMIL authorised to possess and use arms, that is 
the different branches of the Colombian arms forc-
es, private security companies and private citizens 
who obtained permits if they pass a screening for 
judicial antecedents. Colombia therefore presents 
an environment of almost laboratory-like purity for 
373 Grant S 3.1/08-CP-25 awarded by the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ peace-building department to the Univer-
sity of Ghent by Royal Decree / A.R./ K.B./ 30 June 2008.
374 Vranckx A (ed.) Arms Tracing – Perspectives on control, traffic 
and use of illegal weapons in Colombia. Bogotá: Fundación 
Ideas para la Paz, November 2009.
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research on diversion of EU-made arms. The country 
was seen to present an even more interesting case 
after Colombian authorities and inspection teams 
from the Organization of American States (OAS) 
decommissioned thousands of arms from combat-
ants that began demobilizing from 2003 onwards. 
These combatants had belonged to anti-guerrilla 
militias that had operated under the umbrella or-
ganisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). 
The militia were held accountable for the killing and 
‘disappearing’ of thousands of citizens in rural Co-
lombia during the past two decades. Indirectly they 
are also responsible for the displacement of more 
than 3 million mostly rural Colombians. The AUC 
has been on the EU Terrorism List since 2001.
The entire AUC structure demobilised by mid-
2006, at which point more than 31,000 combatants 
had handed in a total of over 18,000 pieces of arma-
ment. Almost 5,000 of these pieces were European-
made, with more than 50 per cent of assault rifl es 
made in Europe. A sample of half of these arms was 
analysed in detail by a team from the Colombian 
think tank Ideas para la Paz and with the help of 
independent researchers from Belgium, Germany 
and Norway. This analysis revealed that only a very 
small portion of the arms the AUC had held could 
be traced back to the regular Colombian armed 
forces, commonly assumed to have backed up the 
AUC until long after these militia were declared il-
legal (from 1989 onwards). More than 95 per cent 
of their arms were imported through other chan-
nels than INDUMIL, making these illegal imports by 
Colombian standards. These imported AUC arms 
could be traced to manufacturers in Europe from 
16 diff erent European countries. The proportions 
of the AUC arms stockpile each of these European 
countries sourced are identifi ed in Graph 1.
These are not the only arms which EU exporting 
states failed to prevent being diverted to Colom-
bian terrorist groups. Large quantities of arms have 
also been seized from the ELN and FARC guerrilla 
forces, but that stockpile has not yet been analysed 
in as systematic a way as have the arms decommis-
sioned from the AUC, the result of which is recorded 
above. 
That studied sample can suffi  ce here to raise 
the question of how these arms were supplied to 
the groups that put them to highly lethal use in 
Colombia. The shortest route to an answer would 
go straight ‘upstream’ and simply ask the identifi ed 
manufacturers of these arms to check the series 
against their registers. That would make it possible 
to identify those involved in the fi rst step of what is 
no doubt a much longer diversion process. But as 
already noted, tracing requests are only facilitated 
via proper police work, not for statistical purposes. 
Police from the country where the arms are pro-
duced only consult with the arm’s manufacturers 
within the scope of specifi c criminal investigations 
conducted by the authorities in the countries were 
the arms were found.375
Graph 1: Source countries of European countries 
found in the AUC arms stockpile.376
375 Information obtained through interview at the Belgian 
Federal Police’s illicit arms tracing unit, Brussels, 14 June 
2010.
376 Data reproduced from Vranckx, A (ed.) Arms Tracing – 
Perspectives on control, traffi  c and use of illegal weapons in 
Colombia, op. cit, 2009, Table 4.1.‘Countries of origin of the 
weapons surrendered by the AUC, and Figure 4.3: Percent-
ages of European weapons in the sample by country’, pp. 
30-31. 
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Nevertheless, markings and other identifiers 
found on these arms make it possible for informed 
civilians to explore some hypotheses about how the 
arms came to be supplied to Colombian AUC com-
batants, in spite of the stringent EU arms transfer 
control regime. 
A first hypothesis, that export authorities in Eu-
rope did not to know arms stood a large chance to 
be abused in Colombia, can be discarded immedi-
ately. EU Member States’ authorities’ awareness that 
something was amiss in Colombia is demonstrated 
by the fact that very little was supplied out of the 
EU and numerous export licences were denied on 
the grounds of several criteria of the EU Code, in-
cluding the risk of diversion under criterion 7. But 
EU-sourced arms that were seized from the AUC 
were not exported to Colombia through legal pipe-
lines. Legal imports would have passed through 
INDUMIL, which has no such records, and EU au-
thorities would not have authorised transfers to il-
licit non-state groups such as the AUC. 
The second hypothesis is the arms were ap-
proved for export to end-users in third countries, 
after which the arms were diverted with or without 
the complicity of those end-users. Several such third 
countries were identified by inspecting seized arms 
and photos taken of seized arms since destroyed. 
This has led to the identification of various US im-
porters thereby adding weight to the hypothesis 
that the US civilian market has and continues to be 
an important ‘loophole’ through which small arms 
from the EU are diverted to Latin America. Mark-
ings on other arms, especially assault rifles, brought 
to light some of their former users’ identification 
marks. These include the armed forces of sev-
eral of Colombia’s neighbours, including Ecuador, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela. EU-based manufac-
turers shipped the arms to those countries, or al-
lowed the arms to be manufactured on location. 
Controlling local manufacture is difficult, especially 
with production arrangements that while originally 
agreed in the early 1970s continue to generate out-
put into the current millennium. 
A variant of the second hypothesis can thus be 
considered in terms of ‘EU’ arms in the AUC sample 
that were in fact produced in states neighbouring 
Colombia, where these were no longer within the 
bounds of the EU control system. But this expla-
nation lets EU Member States’ authorities off the 
hook too easily. Licensed production arrangements 
can take different forms, from arrangements that 
transfer the entire production of all components to 
a new location, to deals that allow local assembly 
of parts that continue to be shipped in from the 
country where the licensor is based. An example 
of the latter type of arrangement was concluded 
in the mid 1970s between the Compania Anónima 
Venezolano de Industrias Militares (CAVIM) manu-
facturer and the Belgian Fabrique National (FN) and 
regular exports began to be made to honour that 
contract. In 2002, Belgian ML1 exports categorised 
as ‘parts’ and worth nearly €20 million were sent to 
Venezuela. By that time, Belgian authorities had rea-
sons to be cautious: in February 2001 the then Bel-
gian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Michel, had al-
ready been asked whether Belgian foreign relations 
took into account reports that ‘in the last four years, 
semi-automatic small arms and ammunition had 
been supplied to the FARC guerrilla from pipelines 
in Venezuela, including arms that proceed from Bel-
gian licenced production at CAVIM-facilities’. Green 
Party Member of the Flemish Parliament, Lode Van 
Oost, had put the question in writing, adding that 
“naturally, Venezuelan authorities deny trading with 
FARC, but rampant corruption and involvement in 
illegal trade (arms, drugs), explains why arms pro-
duced in Venezuela are now in the hands of the 
FARC guerrilla”.377 
A third hypothesis is necessary to explain the sig-
nificant volume of Bulgarian-made arms in the stud-
ied sample. A large portion of these arms is a type 
of Kalashnikov calibre 5.56 produced by Arsena lad 
Kasanlak for which the Bulgarian authorities gave 
export permits in 1999. The importer was later 
proven to have employed a doctored end-user cer-
tificate signed by a retired Colombian army captain, 
who was subsequently prosecuted in Colombia. 
In that particular case, Bulgarian authorities were 
shown to be negligent in checking the end-user 
377 Author translation of the parliamentary question that 
was formulated by senator Lode Van Oost, of the Flemish 
Green Party www.dekamer.be/qrva/50_3N.html.
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certificate, which was not only signed by an officer 
too low in rank, but also concerned more than 7,500 
assault rifles of a type not in use by the regular Co-
lombian armed forces. As Bulgarian-made arms of 
still other types have been found in the AUC sample 
as well, these cannot all be traced to the aforemen-
tioned grey deal documented in court documents. 
More such deals may have been arranged, and Bul-
garian-made arms could also have been diverted to 
Colombia through other routes.
The Colombian case study does not provide a 
full answer to the question how AUC came to have 
so many European arms. It does nevertheless give 
a clear indication about the effectiveness of the EU 
arms transfer control system in keeping arms away 
from inappropriate end-users engaged in an armed 
conflict. That effectiveness is seen to be compro-
mised, as export authorities focussed on denying 
exports to end-users in Colombia, referring to dif-
ferent grounds stipulated in the EU Code/Common 
Position, while ignoring the risk small arms be di-
verted from exports to end-users in third countries 
nearby that EU authorities saw no reasons to deny.
Conclusions
The outcome of the ‘Colombian Job’ provides 
data specific to diversion of EU-made small arms 
into the Colombian conflict, but it also offers in-
sight into wider patterns and enables an evaluation 
of the EU arms transfer control mechanisms vis-à-
vis conflict regions. EU Member States’ authorities 
were almost all seen to cautiously comply with the 
constraints that mechanism imposed for exporting 
arms to Colombia, where a violent armed conflict 
was in play and human rights were believed to be 
under serious threat, for example through ‘internal 
repression’. For years, Colombia was seen to be un-
der a de-facto embargo that included the regular 
armed forces tasked with protecting the Colombian 
population against a plethora of heavenly-armed 
illegal non-state groups. Yet those groups’ combat-
ants were seen to be in possession of a large variety 
of EU-made arms, which EU authorities had allowed 
to be shipped to other places in the American hemi-
sphere, from where they were diverted into the 
Colombian conflict. This specific example suggests 
that either the EU rules are not being properly im-
plemented or that they are inadequate for the task 
of preventing diversion. 
There is little indication that the situation will 
change in the near future. The risk of diversion 
seems to weigh ever more lightly on deliberations 
about the rapidly-increasing ML1 exports to the 
Americas. EU Member States’ authorities appear ei-
ther ignorant of or unable to respond appropriately 
to the almost ‘epidemic’ upsurge in firearms-inflict-
ed criminal violence on the rise throughout much of 
Latin America in the past half-decade.
There are however steps, referred to above, that 
could be taken to begin to address this apparent 
problem with the EU system and thus reduce the 
risk of repeating a Colombian-type scenario in fu-
ture. These include:
!"better use of existing mechanisms and sources 
(e.g. Interpol; the International Tracing Instru-
ment) to gather information on sources and 
routes of supply;
!"systematic sharing of that information across 
the EU (ideally through the development of a 
central database on unauthorised re-exporters 
and cases of diversion that all Member States 
could access; 
!"improvements in national procedures for en-
suring that relevant information is utilised ef-
fectively in the licence application process; and 
!"insist in sales contract that the exporting coun-
try be notified asap in case (some of) the ex-
ported goods have gone missing.
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ANNEX: Criteria of the  
Common Position
1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obliga-
tions and commitments of Member States, in particular 
the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the 
European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and 
other subjects, as well as other international obligations. 
An export licence shall be denied if approval would be 
inconsistent with, inter alia: 
a the international obligations of Member States and 
their commitments to enforce United Nations, Euro-
pean Union and Organisation for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe arms embargoes; 
b the international obligations of Member States under 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; 
c the commitment of Member States not to export any 
form of anti-personnel landmine; 
d the commitments of Member States in the frame-
work of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and 
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation. 
2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the coun-
try of final destination as well as respect by that country 
of international humanitarian law. 
– Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude to-
wards relevant principles established by international 
human rights instruments, Member States shall: 
a deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the 
military technology or equipment to be exported 
might be used for internal repression; 
b exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing li-
cences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of 
the nature of the military technology or equipment, 
to countries where serious violations of human rights 
have been established by the competent bodies of 
the United Nations, by the European Union or by the 
Council of Europe; 
For these purposes, technology or equipment which 
might be used for internal repression will include, inter 
alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence 
of the use of this or similar technology or equipment 
for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or 
where there is reason to believe that the technology or 
equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or 
end-user and used for internal repression. In line with 
Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of the 
technology or equipment will be considered carefully, 
particularly if it is intended for internal security pur-
poses. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture 
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disap-
pearances, arbitrary detentions and other major viola-
tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
set out in relevant international human rights instru-
ments, including the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights. 
– Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude to-
wards relevant principles established by instruments of 
international humanitarian law, Member States shall: 
c deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the 
military technology or equipment to be exported 
might be used in the commission of serious violations 
of international humanitarian law. 
3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of fi-
nal destination, as a function of the existence of tensions 
or armed conflicts. 
Member States shall deny an export licence for military 
technology or equipment which would provoke or pro-
long armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or 
conflicts in the country of final destination. 
4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, secu-
rity and stability. 
Member States shall deny an export licence if there is 
a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the 
military technology or equipment to be exported ag-
gressively against another country or to assert by force 
a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member 
States shall take into account inter alia: 
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a the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between 
the recipient and another country; 
b a claim against the territory of a neighbouring coun-
try which the recipient has in the past tried or threat-
ened to pursue by means of force; 
c the likelihood of the military technology or equip-
ment being used other than for the legitimate na-
tional security and defence of the recipient; 
d the need not to affect adversely regional stability in 
any significant way. 
5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States 
and of territories whose external relations are the respon-
sibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and 
allied countries. 
Member States shall take into account: 
a the potential effect of the military technology or 
equipment to be exported on their defence and se-
curity interests as well as those of Member State and 
those of friendly and allied countries, while recognis-
ing that this factor cannot affect consideration of the 
criteria on respect for human rights and on regional 
peace, security and stability; 
b the risk of use of the military technology or equip-
ment concerned against their forces or those of Mem-
ber States and those of friendly and allied countries. 
6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with re-
gard to the international community, as regards in par-
ticular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances 
and respect for international law. 
Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the re-
cord of the buyer country with regard to: 
a its support for or encouragement of terrorism and in-
ternational organised crime; 
b its compliance with its international commitments, in 
particular on the non-use of force, and with interna-
tional humanitarian law; 
c its commitment to non-proliferation and other ar-
eas of arms control and disarmament, in particular 
the signature, ratification and implementation of 
relevant arms control and disarmament conventions 
referred to in point (b) of Criterion One. 
7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military 
technology or equipment will be diverted within the buy-
er country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. 
In assessing the impact of the military technology or 
equipment to be exported on the recipient country and 
the risk that such technology or equipment might be di-
verted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable 
end use, the following shall be considered: 
a the legitimate defence and domestic security in-
terests of the recipient country, including any par-
ticipation in United Nations or other peace-keeping 
activity; 
b the technical capability of the recipient country to 
use such technology or equipment; 
c the capability of the recipient country to apply effec-
tive export controls; 
d the risk of such technology or equipment being re-
exported to undesirable destinations, and the record 
of the recipient country in respecting any re-export 
provision or consent prior to re-export which the 
exporting Member State considers appropriate to 
impose; 
e the risk of such technology or equipment being di-
verted to terrorist organisations or to individual 
terrorists; 
f the risk of reverse engineering or unintended tech-
nology transfer. 
8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the 
military technology or equipment with the technical and 
economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into 
account the desirability that states should meet their le-
gitimate security and defence needs with the least diver-
sion of human and economic resources for armaments. 
Member States shall take into account, in the light of in-
formation from relevant sources such as United Nations 
Development Programme, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development reports, whether the proposed 
export would seriously hamper the sustainable develop-
ment of the recipient country. They shall consider in this 
context the recipient country’s relative levels of military 
and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU 
or bilateral aid.
